AFRICA DEVELOPMENT FORUM

Migrants, Markets, and Mayors

Rising above the Employment Challenge in Africa's Secondary Cities

Luc Christiaensen and Nancy Lozano-Gracia, Editors

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

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Foreword

In a rapidly urbanizing world, local governments often perceive migrants as a burden. Mayors point to additional pressure on already stretched basic services and increased competition in local labor markets as intractable challenges. Countering these perceptions, this research shows that migrants' contribution to urban population growth is declining and that migrants (both rural and urban) hold potential that can be leveraged for the economic development of cities, especially secondary cities. The evidence shows that migrants often strengthen the labor supply and economic dynamism of these cities by being younger and better educated or by bringing complementary skills to the existing labor force and adding to the cities' overall economic density. Taking proactive measures to facilitate the integration of migrants into the city can help raise the overall quality of life for all urban dwellers.

Conducted with support from Cities Alliance, *Migrants, Markets, and Mayors* takes a deep look at the urban challenges brought about by migration, with a focus on secondary cities, an area that has remained much underresearched. Currently available evidence primarily focuses on large cities. As this report highlights, however, in Africa more than 97 percent of urban centers have fewer than 300,000 inhabitants, and many migrants end up in surrounding towns. The research also moves beyond a focus on rural-to-urban migration and large cities, and expands the understanding of the role of migration flows across the city size gradient, including migration from one urban area to another. The case studies in four different urban settings—Jijiga in Ethiopia, Jinja in Uganda, and Jendouba and Kairouan in Tunisia—provide an overview of city, migrant, and urban labor market characteristics relevant across the African continent.

The report concludes by providing a series of practical entry points to help policy makers—both local and national—make cities more livable and productive while leveraging migrants' potential. Notably, it shows that to leverage migrants' contribution to the city and facilitate their integration, looking beyond labor market policies and an exclusive focus on migrants is important.

Mayors should take a holistic view of *Migrants* and *Markets* and focus on how cities are planned and managed more broadly, integrating actions with a view on migrants into their core urban development decisions.

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This report was prepared by a team led by Luc Christiaensen and Nancy Lozano-Gracia. Core contributors include Mohamed Amara, Tom Bundervoet, John Driscoll, Soraya Goga, Kirsten Hommann, Michael Keenan, Lana Salman, Barbara Summers, and Dinkneh Tefera.

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Editors and Contributors

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Main Messages

1. Africa's urbanization—facts and perceptions

a. Africa's urban population continues to grow rapidly (5.4 percent per year).

b. Policy attention has focused on Africa's largest cities, even though 60 percent of Africa's urban population lives across a rapidly growing number of towns and secondary cities.

c. Rural-urban migration is seen as the key contributor to Africa's urban growth and urban underperformance.

2. Urban migrants—new insights

a. Urban migrants typically account for at least a third of the urban labor force; of these, about half have arrived over the past three years, and about one-third to one-half have come from other urban areas.

b. Urban migrants are younger, have fewer dependents, and are more educated than urban residents; these gaps are larger for urban-urban migrants and decline as city size increases.

3. Migrants and urban markets

a. Overall, migrants—especially migrants to towns and secondary cities—integrate well into urban labor markets, irrespective of their duration of stay.

b. Africa's urban growth is increasingly driven by natural increase, not migration, mitigating migrants' contribution to the speed of urban expansion and thus congestion, especially outside eastern Africa and in towns.

c. Incipient empirical evidence supports the notion that migrants contribute positively to urban labor productivity and welfare, mainly by increasing urban density.

4. Policies to leverage urban migration—the mayor's wedge

a. Policies must be holistic, looking beyond labor market policies and migrants and focusing instead on how cities are planned and managed more broadly.

b. Urban markets must be supported with more information about migratory flows, less red tape for businesses, and forward planning to provide better urban infrastructure, services, and jobs.

c. National governments can help build the ability of mayors to respond to the needs of urban dwellers through stronger finances and capacity, as well as through better citizen engagement.

d. When divisions are strong, interventions targeting migrants are recommended, although with actions that improve living standards for all.

Abbreviations

CBO	community-based organization
COVID-19	coronavirus
CSA	Central Statistics Agency (Ethiopia)
GDP	gross domestic product
ID	identification
IOM	International Organization for Migration
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NUP	National Urban Policy
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SMEs	small and medium enterprises
SWAC	Sahel and West Africa Club Secretariat
UCLG	United Cities and Local Government
UN	United Nations
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

Overview

Leveraging Migration for Urban Development

In a rapidly urbanizing world, where more than two in three people are expected to live in cities by 2050, internal migration is often feared as a source of urban underdevelopment.[1] Over the coming decades, urbanization will be especially fast in Asia and Africa, where the urban share of the population is still substantially lower than in other regions. Historically, internal migration has been an important driver of urbanization. However, migrants are commonly perceived to have more difficulties integrating into the urban labor market than urban nonmigrants, given their lack of education, social networks, and family support in towns and cities. As a result, they are thought to mainly join the ranks of the unemployed and underemployed in the urban informal sector, and, if they do work, to take scarce jobs from citizens. Furthermore, they are seen to push up rents and housing costs and overburden urban centers' often crippled infrastructure and social services, thus holding back their economic development. Migrants from rural areas are especially seen as culprits in this scenario. Such views, widely shared and shaped by big city slum development, have instigated fears of urban underdevelopment, especially in Africa, where global poverty is increasingly concentrated (Beegle and Christiaensen 2019); it has also shifted the policy focus toward interventions to limit migration (Todaro 1997),[2] including through institutional neglect of informal settlements (Fox 2014).

Others argue that migrants are not worse off and that they instead positively contribute to the local economy in many ways. "The opposition between the 'poor, uneducated, informally employed migrant' and the 'better-off, educated, formally employed non-migrant' is not supported by the facts" (Beauchemin and Bocquier 2004, 2261). Some argue that the belief that urban migrants do not earn a living in the urban centers is unfounded; they cannot afford not to work and would otherwise return to their places of origin. Migrants are also

often the more dynamic and educated among rural populations because of migratory selectivity (Young 2013). Internal migrants in francophone West African urban centers in the 1980s and 1990s were not disadvantaged when compared with nonmigrants. Moreover, by increasing the size and population density of the city, migrants may also enable economies of agglomeration, an important force in urban economic growth. Additionally, skilled migrants can increase the urban skills pool, while unskilled migrants may complement skilled urban workers, in both cases generating positive human capital externalities. Even unskilled urban workers may still gain from migration—as has been carefully documented in China (Combes et al. 2020)—by accelerating their occupational transition, or if increased demand for unskilled labor following migration-induced agglomeration economies exceeds downward wage pressures and employment loss following their migration-induced replacement by unskilled migrant workers.

What about Africa today? How different economic forces play out (economies and diseconomies of agglomeration, labor complementarity or substitutability) is not clear *a priori*, and their individual effects are hard to identify empirically. The aggregate outcomes will also differ for various population groups (skilled or unskilled; migrant or nonmigrant). Other factors likely to affect outcomes include whether the urban destinations are smaller towns or bigger cities, whether their economies are growing quickly or stagnating, how responsive land markets and service provisions are to the arrival of newcomers, and whether arriving migrants have been mainly driven by distress at their place of origin or by the buoyancy of the destination (Busso, Chauvin, and Herrera 2021). The circumstances in Africa today are also quite different than those in China (or even the Africa of the 1980s and 1990s). Population growth is much faster and rural-urban labor mobility is much less restricted than in China, and per capita GDP growth on the continent has overall been less labor intensive (relying more on natural resources than on labor-intensive manufacturing exports). In fact, when observing Africa today, one mainly sees cities that are crowded, disconnected, and costly (Lall, Henderson, and Venables 2017), struggling to play their role as engines of economic growth and poverty reduction. This raises the question of whether migration and urbanization cannot be better leveraged.

The perspective on migration and urban development must be broadened in three dimensions. Debates about migration and urban development have arguably been somewhat reductionistic and misguided. First, much of the focus has been on larger cities (often only capital cities) and rural-urban migrants only. This leaves the challenges of most of Africa's urban centers and the majority of their population unaddressed. About 97 percent of Africa's urban centers or agglomerations have fewer than 300,000 inhabitants; urban agglomerations of less than 1 million people make up 60 percent of Africa's

urban population, spread across more than 7,500 urban centers (OECD/SWAC 2020). Increasing evidence further suggests that the development of towns and secondary cities may also be better at reducing poverty than the development of big cities (Christiaensen and Kanbur 2018). In addition, a sizable share of urban migrants come from other urban areas. Ignoring this group leaves out an important part of the migration and urban development dynamic. A more holistic and dynamic perspective, incorporating both migration flows along the full urban hierarchy and urban-urban migrants, is needed to better understand and leverage migration for urban development.

Second, the policy focus of efforts to address Africa's employment challenges has often been on urban youth employment programs, with variable success at best and a lack of differentiation between the needs of migrants and those of urban nonmigrants (Kluve et al. 2019). If migrants generally integrate well into urban labor markets, a broader and more differentiated policy package is needed to increase labor market outcomes for all urban citizens—migrants and nonmigrants alike. This package should go beyond labor market policies and include urban policy instruments to address institutional and regulatory constraints that misallocate land and labor within cities, fragment physical development, and limit productivity.

Third, the focus on the rate of urbanization (a key policy indicator from the national perspective) at the expense of urban population growth (the key concern for urban governments) has led governments to see migration as the major contributor to urban population growth. Whereas migration has historically been important for urban growth in developed countries, in Africa, urban natural increase has been much more important for urban growth than migration, with migration expected to become even less important in the future. This course creates opportunities to go beyond migration, using urban (and rural) population interventions to manage the rate of urban growth and foster urban development.

This report reviews how secondary towns and cities in Africa can better prepare for and manage the internal economic migration of workers to the mutual benefit of cities and migrants alike. This study, funded under the Cities Alliance Cities and Migration Programme, focuses on economic migration and urban labor market integration.[3] Under the program, four secondary case cities were selected in three African case countries, each representing significantly different settings: Jijiga in Ethiopia, Jinja in Uganda, and Jendouba and Kairouan in Tunisia (box O.1). Jijiga is the regional capital of Ethiopia's Somali Region, a thriving trading center on the trade corridor between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Djibouti. It has been growing rapidly mainly because of the migration of people in search of better opportunities, with access to urban services governed by a residency permit system as in the rest of Ethiopia. Jinja, recently elevated to city status and situated 80 kilometers from the capital, Kampala, also has high

BOX 0.1

Different Cities, Different Settings

Jijiga, Ethiopia

Jijiga, the regional capital of Ethiopia's Somali Region, is strategically located on the trade corridor between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Djibouti, and vibrant trade and commerce dominate economic activity in the city (map BO.1.1). Like many other cities in Ethiopia, Jijiga has been growing fast, in both built-up area (map BO.1.2) and population, driven by migrants in search of better opportunities. Its population was estimated at 221,000 in 2020, making it the tenth largest city in Ethiopia. With the country traditionally experiencing low mobility, the largest share of migrant flows are rural to urban, accounting for 33 percent of migrants in 2013. The region surrounding Jijiga is largely arid and sparsely populated, and most of its population are seminomadic livestock herders. However, migrants have been coming from across Ethiopia, despite the Somali Region being culturally and linguistically different from the core of Ethiopia, speaking the Somali language

Map BO.1.1 Jijiga's Strategic Location on Trade Routes with Somalia and Djibouti



Source: World Bank.

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Box O.1 Different Cities, Different Settings (continued)

Map BO.1.2 Jijiga's Growth, 1990–2015

a. Jijiga, 1990



b. Jijiga, 2000



c. Jijiga, 2015



Source: World Bank, using World Settlement Footprint 2015. figshare. Dataset https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.10048412.v1 (Marconcini et al. 2020).

and adhering to Islam rather than Orthodox Christianity. The unemployment rate in Jijiga, at approximately 20 percent in 2018, is similar to that of urban Ethiopia, but women fare worse, with female unemployment rates in Jijiga much higher than in the rest of urban Ethiopia (31 percent as compared with 26 percent).

Jinja, Uganda

Jinja is a secondary city with high economic potential whose growth is mainly driven by natural increase. It also has substantial inflows of commuters. Located along the

(continued next page)

Box O.1 Different Cities, Different Settings (continued)

corridor of major trading routes on Lake Victoria, at 80 kilometers from the capital, Kampala, Jinja has been identified as a city with high economic potential, ranking fourth among 32 cities analyzed (Hobson 2019). Although migration accounts for 31 percent of the growth in Kampala, it falls to 13 percent for the rest of the urban areas in the country. Secondary cities have been mostly growing as a result of natural growth (60 percent), and much less from migration (16 percent) or reclassification (14 percent). Among these secondary cities, the municipality of Jinja was elevated to city status in July 2020. Jinja has a history of hosting manufacturing activities and is a commuting city that harbors five times more people during the day than at night (Cities Alliance 2016). As such, it also provides an interesting backdrop for the study of spatial settlement and working patterns.

Jendouba and Kairouan, Tunisia

Located in the two poorest internal regions of Tunisia, the intermediate cities of Jendouba and Kairouan essentially act as stepping stones for rural migrants to the thriving coastal cities. Without an industrial base and with their hinterlands still heavily reliant on agriculture, both cities struggle with persistently high unemployment. Nonetheless, they have continued to grow and attract migrants from inland regions, while also seeing part of their population (often the more entrepreneurial and successful among them) move to the more prosperous coastal regions and cities. Cities such as Jendouba and Kairouan hence emerge as stepping stones for movement along the urban portfolio. More broadly, with almost two-thirds of its population already living in urban areas and an overall population growth rate of slightly more than 1 percent, population flows in Tunisian cities are bidirectional, with cities facing both in-migration and out-migration.

economic potential, with many daily commuters from the neighboring villages coming for work. Jendouba and Kairouan in Tunisia are intermediate cities in the two poorest internal regions of Tunisia; they are both challenged to ensure economic and social inclusion for their citizens, including rural migrants, and often act as stepping stones for onward migration to the thriving coastal cities.

Three perspectives are taken: those of the migrant, the market, and the mayor, broadly referring to how migrants fare in the urban labor market, how they affect aggregate urban productivity, and how mayors can leverage their potential to the benefit of all. Insights from national household survey data analysis are combined with insights from the case cities to address the first question (how migrants fare in the urban labor market). Given data challenges, a more indirect approach is taken to examine the second question (how migrants affect aggregate urban productivity). Because speedy urban population growth challenges mayors to maintain the urban infrastructure and services needed for economic buoyancy and the general welfare of citizens, the report first explores how migration in Africa affects the rate of urban population growth, as well as

the size and composition of its labor force, drawing on demographic data and the literature. These findings are further complemented with insights from key informant interviews in the case cities as well as by new empirical evidence from Uganda gathered for this report that directly estimates the contribution of migration to urban labor productivity and welfare.[4] Finally, the report reviews the policy options mayors can implement to better leverage migration for everyone in the city and the challenges they face in implementing them, again informed by the literature as well as by lessons from World Bank operations and interviews with case city officials. Given the focus of this report on migrant integration into urban labor markets, and in the absence of systematic data across countries, the multiplicity of migrant moves, in particular, seasonal, onward, and return migration, are not explicitly discussed. The implications of not explicitly accounting for multiple moves for the interpretation of the findings, however, is assessed.

How Well Do Migrants Fare?

In the report, a person is considered a migrant if they moved into an urban area fewer than 10 years ago (irrespective of their place of birth). They make up a sizable part of the urban labor force, accounting for at least a third of the urban labor force in five of the seven African countries examined.[5] Short-term (fewer than three years ago) and long-term (between three and ten years ago) migrants contribute about equally; rural-urban migrants are somewhat more prevalent than urban-urban migrants. Depending on the country, anywhere from one-half to one-third of migrants in urban areas come from other urban areas. When looking along the urban hierarchy, migrants are more frequent in big cities (more than 1 million inhabitants), comprising 39 percent of city populations on average, as compared with 31 percent of the population of secondary cities (100,000 to 1 million inhabitants), and about 25 percent of the population of towns (fewer than 100,000 inhabitants). They tend go come more frequently to secondary cities from other urban areas, while being slightly more rural and staying for a shorter period in towns.

Urban migrants are younger, have fewer dependents, and are more educated than urban nonmigrants; these gaps are larger for urban-urban migrants and decline as city size increases (figure O.1). Regression analysis across six Sub-Saharan African countries shows that migrants are, on average, five to six years younger than nonmigrants. This holds without differentiation across city size or migrant origin (figure O.1, panel a). Being younger further translates into having fewer dependents (Menashe-Oren and Stecklov 2017), with this gap being larger for urban-urban migrants than for rural-urban ones (who tend to have higher fertility rates) and declining as city size increases (figure O.1, panel b). Migrants are also more educated than nonmigrants. The education advantage migrants enjoy over

Figure O.1 Socioeconomic Characteristics of Urban Migrants and Nonmigrants



Source: World Bank.
Note: Definition of variables: Dependency ratio = [(nonworking-age household members) / (working-age household members)] × 100; working-age population = 15–64-year-olds; rural-urban = rural-urban migrant; urban-urban = urban-urban migrant. Sample population: Results obtained from ordinary least squares regression of $y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1\ SC + \beta_2 LC + \gamma_1 RU + \delta_1 RU \times SC + \delta_2\ RU \times LC + \gamma_2\ UU + \delta_3$ UU × $SC + \delta_4$ UU × $LC + \vartheta\ MigDur + v_j + e_{ij}$ for urban population pooled across three select countries (Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda), in which y = education, age, dependency ratio, sector of employment (1 = nonagriculture), SC = small city (20,000 to 1 million), LC = large city (more than 1 million), RU = rural-urban migrant, UU = urban-urban migrant, $MigDur$ = number of years in city since migration (0–10), v_j = country indicator, e_{ij} = random error term. Results for all migrants obtained from six countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Tanzania, Uganda), without distinction by origin of the migrant, that is, $y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1\ SC + \beta_2 LC + g_1 M +$ d1M′LC + uMIGDur + $v_j + e_{ij}$.

urban nonmigrants is, however, largely confined to urban-urban migrants. In fact, rural-urban migrants face a growing education deficit as they move to larger urban centers (from similar education levels as small-town nonmigrants to more than a one-year average gap in big cities) (figure O.1, panel c).

Somewhat surprisingly, agriculture remains a significant sector of employment in towns and secondary cities in Sub-Saharan Africa. About one in four urban nonmigrants is still employed in agriculture in small towns (fewer than 20,000 inhabitants) and about one in seven in large towns and secondary cities combined (20,000 to 1 million inhabitants).[6] The importance of agriculture is partly a reflection of *in situ* urbanization and related definitional issues (Potts 2018); it also highlights Africa's lack of industrialization. Small-town migrants are 11 percent less likely to be employed in agriculture than small-town nonmigrants, on average; this difference declines as urban center populations increase, eventually disappearing in large cities, where the share of agricultural employment is only a few percentage points overall (figure O.1, panel d).

The national experience from East African countries during the 2000s and 2010s suggests that migrants integrate well into urban labor markets overall, enjoying similar levels of welfare as nonmigrants, even after controlling for differences in human capital (age, education), occupation, and locational choice, irrespective of their duration of stay. Migrants to towns and secondary cities, who are the focus of this report, do at least as well as or even better than urban nonmigrants. Migrants to towns and secondary cities from other urban areas—labeled "urban-town migrants"—are more likely to be employed, work more hours, and enjoy a wage premium relative to nonmigrants. Unsurprisingly, they also end up with higher incomes and consumption per adult equivalent. These outcomes can be largely explained by these migrants' better educational attainment (as well as their choice of more buoyant urban destinations).

Rural-town migrants (those who come to towns and secondary cities from rural areas) also do well and tend to be at least as well off as town nonmigrants. They are substantially more likely to be employed and work more hours than urban nonmigrants, albeit at a wage discount. Altogether, this still results in substantially higher incomes at face value, or similar incomes when controlling for differences in socioeconomic characteristics, occupation, or location, suggesting that they largely enjoy similar economic opportunities in the towns or secondary cities they settle in.

Migrants from urban areas to cities perform similarly to (though not better than) their fellow city nonmigrants. They are more likely to be employed and work more hours than city nonmigrants, but their wages are slightly lower on average, offsetting some of the income gains from working longer, eventually resulting in similar incomes and consumption levels as those enjoyed by city nonmigrants.[7] Self-sorting of urban migrants by city size is likely at work: the more abled end up in the big cities, where they do well, but not better than city nonmigrants; the lesser abled urban migrants end up in towns and secondary cities (or rural areas), where they often outperform nonmigrants (especially in towns).

The experience of rural-city migrants in East Africa might come closest to the popular notion of "migrant dwellers joining the ranks of the unemployed,"

but this is not readily generalizable. Rural-city migrants also work longer hours for lower wages, though in this case resulting in substantially lower incomes than city nonmigrants. Even so, this finding from the East African sample countries studied here (Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda) does not carry over to other countries.[8] East Africa is also still the subregion with the highest contribution of migration to the urban population (consistent with its lower levels of urbanization). When controlling for human capital, occupation, and location, the lower labor market performance of rural-city migrants does not carry over to consumption. Rural-city migrants of similar age and gender and with similar dependency ratios and education levels enjoy similar welfare levels as city nonmigrants. As such, the findings resemble those of Beauchemin and Bocquier (2004) for migrants in West African urban centers in the 1980s and 1990s.

Finally, men are more engaged in the labor market and under better conditions than women, with male migrants more likely to be employed than male nonmigrants. Men are more likely to be employed than women on average; they work more hours and have significantly higher wages. Furthermore, across countries, male migrants are more likely than male nonmigrants to work, though there is no systematic difference in the employment rates of female urban migrants and female nonmigrants.

These core findings from the national household survey data are broadly robust to data considerations. If migrants mainly returned because they did not find employment, the integration results presented above, based on urban samples, may be overly optimistic. However, there is no indication that selective return migration is driving the results. Second, although the findings draw heavily on the East African experience, the good labor market integration of migrants in faster-growing urban East Africa arguably supports rather than detracts from the notion that migrants are well integrated into the urban labor market in general. Among Africa's subregions, urban growth is fastest in East Africa, with rural-urban migration still accounting for twice as much growth as urban natural increase. Finally, based on the national cross-sectional data available and after controlling for differences in sociodemographic characteristics, *duration of stay* does not affect migrant welfare levels as compared with nonmigrants. Here, further investigation using migrant panel data is warranted to establish the effect of migration duration more reliably, given that it is possible that the characteristics of migrant cohorts have changed over time.

The satisfactory labor market integration of migrants is also observed in the case cities, though the findings also reveal spatial differences within the city as well as other challenges. Despite the varying characteristics of migrants and settings across the case countries and cities (box O.1), labor market and welfare outcomes of migrants in the case cities are not consistently worse than those of nonmigrants. Regression analysis confirms that migrants in Jijiga have higher employment rates than nonmigrants. Migrants from other urban areas were

20 percentage points more likely to be employed than Jijiga nonmigrants, while rural migrants were 30 percentage points more likely to be employed.

Some of the patterns from Jijiga are replicated in Jinja, with urban migrants likely to do better than urban nonmigrants and rural migrants, and people in the city center significantly outperforming those in the outskirts. Importantly, however, contrary to the common perception that migrants mainly settle in the outskirts, many rural-urban migrants (about 50 percent) settled in the city center, where working hours, wages, and earnings are substantially higher and where they earned similar amounts to nonmigrants per adult equivalent. Migrants cope with generally higher rents in the city center by occupying the affordable segment of housing in this area of the city, which is located in some of the informal settlements of Jinja (such as Masese and Mafubira). Similar spatial settlement patterns have been documented in Arusha, Tanzania (Andreasen et al. 2017).

As in Jijiga and Jinja, urban-urban migrants in Jendouba and Kairouan are better educated, younger, and more likely to be employed than urban nonmigrants. But as in other cities, migration is not without its challenges. In interviews, migrants repeatedly reported harsh working conditions, low salaries, and patchy or nonexistent social security coverage. Facing more vulnerable economic conditions, they are more likely to accept any job, regardless of the conditions offered. In Jendouba, migrants are mainly seen as essential to sectors in which nonmigrants refuse to work, such as agriculture, leading to a process of "reverse commuting," whereby migrants who now live in the city and have access to better social services travel daily to work in the nearby rural fields (usually in small irrigated farms or olive groves). Finally, both men and women note the challenge of gender-based violence, which migrant women must endure at work (box O.2).

BOX O.2

The Double Burden Female Migrants Face in the Workplace

Enduring lower salaries and constant harassment, female migrant workers suffer from double discrimination in the workplace. In Jendouba, women work physically demanding jobs in agriculture and are paid significantly less than male workers for the same work. In fact, agriculture is a feminized sector where employers recruit women because they work longer hours for lower pay. According to female migrant experiences, factories prefer to hire single women unburdened by family. Moreover, sexual harassment of women in the agricultural sector is rampant, and female factory workers are subjected to verbal abuse and harassment from their employers, and sometimes from their male colleagues. Furthermore, limited social networks make it harder for female migrants to attend to their households and children while working long shifts.

Do Migrants Contribute to Urban Markets?

How labor markets and cities fare with migration also depends on how migrants affect the broader urban market dynamic. Thus far, a static view has been taken, focusing on how migrants fare in urban labor markets and their welfare compared with their urban counterparts. However, migrants also affect the broader urban dynamic. Each time a migrant enters (or leaves), she or he increases (decreases) the size of the urban center and affects the speed of its expansion. Depending on how migrants differ and where they settle, they can also change the structure of the urban labor force and the spatial buildup of the city. These changes may open up opportunities, such as agglomeration economies associated with larger urban centers and increased population density or following labor complementarity, but they can also bring challenges, especially if the benefits only come with a lag, or if urban nonmigrants are negatively affected (via housing shortages, congestion, or labor substitution). In many ways, these dynamic effects are likely of greater concern to mayors, with migrants easily becoming scapegoats for all ills.

Africa's urban growth is increasingly driven by natural increase, not migration, mitigating migrants' contribution to the speed of urban expansion and thus congestion, especially outside East Africa and in towns. At more than 4 percent, urban population growth remains substantial in Sub-Saharan Africa.[9] However, not only has the contribution of rural-urban migration to urban population growth in Africa been substantially lower than commonly perceived,[10] it is also declining rapidly, with natural increase now the major driver of urban growth (figure O.2). The contribution of rural-urban migrants to population growth also remains largest in big cities with low rates of urbanization, as in East Africa, but is otherwise grinding to a halt in many of Africa's capitals (Menashe-Oren and Bocquier 2021). Net rural-urban migration has been declining in most of Africa, especially among older population groups (Menashe-Oren and Stecklov 2017), while the decline in urban fertility is stagnating, especially in Africa's capitals, but increasingly also in other urban areas, pushing up the rate of urban natural increase. These insights are consistent with the empirical findings that rural-city migrants in East Africa actually struggle the most to integrate into the urban labor market, not migrants from towns or other countries. This tilt toward natural increase also points to urban population policies as an additional policy instrument for urban development.

Figure O.2 **Migration's Contribution to Urban Growth**



Source: Bocquier and Schoumaker 2018.

Declining contributions from migration to urban growth outside the cities, as illustrated in Tanzania (figure O.3), also place towns and secondary cities in a good position to leverage migration. Continuing migration pressure on capitals in East Africa suggests a greater role for other urban areas, secondary cities, and large and small towns in absorbing and leveraging migration. Across countries, migration to secondary towns and cities has also been documented to be better at reducing poverty than migration to cities (Christiaensen and Kanbur 2018), while many of the relevant agglomeration economies for Africa's countries can already be realized at a city size well below the metropolitan scale. By enhancing the urban skills pool and reducing the urban dependency ratio, town and urban-urban migrants can further foster urban productivity growth, a fact often overlooked by policy makers and urban nonmigrants alike.[11] Moreover, the case city evidence suggests that rural migrants often complement urban labor markets. As in Jendouba, Tunisia, the qualitative research in Jijiga, Ethiopia,

Figure O.3 Sources of Population Growth in Tanzanian Cities



Source: World Bank 2017.

showed that migrants typically engage at the lower end of the labor market, often taking informal jobs in the construction sector or as nannies. High levels of unemployment among urban nonmigrants, on the other hand, are more likely the result of limited economywide formal sector job creation and queuing, as urban nonmigrants aim for permanent formal sector jobs. Rural migrants fill

an important labor supply gap in an otherwise dynamic economy, an important reason why Jijiga continues to attract migrants from across the country, despite being culturally and linguistically distinct. This aspect remains, however, little appreciated by urban nonmigrants and city officials.

Incipient empirical evidence supports the notion that migrants positively contribute to urban labor productivity and welfare, mainly by increasing urban density. Estimates from six African countries suggest sizable positive effects of urban density on urban wages and household income (Henderson, Nigmatulina, and Kriticos 2021). Follow-up work using longitudinal data from Uganda and controlling for time-invariant individual and location effects further suggests that the positive agglomeration effects on urban labor productivity and welfare also hold when the urban density is brought about by migrants (Keenan and Christiaensen 2023). This empirical finding is the first of its kind and, given the demanding empirical specification, it is quite powerful. Furthermore, the impact goes well beyond migrants' effects on the age and skills structure of the urban areas they move to, and mainly operates through the creation of agglomeration economies.[12] Migrants' addition to the speed of urban growth does not appear to affect urban wages or welfare negatively. Overall, taking a more dynamic perspective, migration presents itself as a positive force of change, especially in towns and secondary cities.

The potential benefits of migration for the urban economy must, however, be considered against towns' broader financial and institutional capacity to make the necessary complementary investments. Although generally a positive force of change, and even if the contribution of migration to urban growth is limited and declining, the pressure to maintain housing, urban services (utilities, education, health), and infrastructure can be substantial at the margins, especially given that these services are already in poorer supply in towns than in cities (Henderson et al. 2019). The struggle for decent housing and access to utilities, for both migrants and nonmigrants alike, is highlighted in the case city life histories and confirmed in the household survey data in Jinja. Similarly, in Tunisia, the profile of migrants has changed from family to individual migration following rising housing prices and rents in urban areas after 2011. Qualitative surveys in Tunisia's case cities confirm that, although migrants see improvements in access to services as a result of migration, they are often forced to settle in areas where municipalities struggle to manage informal urban expansion, and hence remain disconnected from services and the rest of the city (box O.3). However, towns and secondary cities often lack the financial, technical, and planning capacity to provide the necessary business environment and urban services to build thriving urban centers for all their citizens (old and new alike), maintain an active and well-functioning labor force, and productively absorb new entrants. More broadly, this will also depend on the broader economic context within which these intermediate urban centers find themselves,

BOX 0.3

Voices of Migrants in Jendouba and Kairouan

A male migrant suggests there are many challenges to integration in Jendouba: "Most basic services are absent, there are no roads, electricity, drinking water, none of this infrastructure, there are no opportunities for any leisurely activities, and no jobs." In both Kairouan and Jendouba, migrants shared their frustration with government inattention: "The Omda [local government official] practices a form of clientelism and allowances are not distributed to those who deserve it." "We need leaders who are close to us, listen to us, and who understand our real problems."

Source: World Bank, based on eight focus group discussions conducted between December 9–12, 2020, in Jendouba, and December 16–19, 2020, in Kairouan.

such as their proximity to markets (domestic and international) and their economic base (natural resources, for example, mining and agriculture, manufacturing, services); however, this is a topic for further research.

What Can Mayors Do to Build a City for All?

This report brings an important message for mayors and local government leadership:[13] migrants (including rural migrants) are a force that can be leveraged for the economic growth of secondary cities given that they often strengthen the labor supply and economic dynamism of these cities by being younger, better educated, or complementary to the existing labor force. Migrants can contribute to building stronger urban labor markets, and it is also in the mayor's remit, together with other central and local government authorities, to facilitate and foster this contribution. Rather than fearing inflows of migrants, who are becoming a less important component of urban growth in much of Africa, city leaders can take proactive measures that facilitate their integration into the city and improve the overall quality of life for all urban dwellers. This message should resonate not only with mayors but with policy makers at all geographic scales.

The work in this report suggests that, to support the integration of migrants, one must look beyond labor market policies and migrants and focus on how cities are planned and managed more broadly. Some actions must be directed toward the way mayors interact with their cities. Municipal leadership should not view the integration of migrants into the municipality as "an additional piece of work, added to the end of overstretched planning processes, but rather an opportunity that should be integrated with what is already ongoing" (Blaser Mapitsa and Landau 2019, 9). Because labor market outcomes for

migrants in secondary cities do not seem to be worse than those of nonmigrants, supporting the integration of migrants into the socioeconomic fiber of cities will require a look beyond labor markets and into the functioning of land and housing markets. Successful migrant integration into secondary cities will require inclusive urban management that prepares for growth and benefits everyone, regardless of their origin. Finally, in some cases where divisions between migrants and nonmigrants are deep, a focus on migrants may be required.[14] Recognizing that migrants are a mobile population and understanding where they live and work within cities can help local governments and civil society, among others, to craft interventions that foster their integration.

Support MARKETS through More Information, Less Red Tape for Businesses, and Forward Planning to Provide Better Urban Infrastructure, Services, and Jobs

Lifting constraints and red tape in the business environment can help create much-needed new employment opportunities. Especially for cities such as Jendouba and Kairouan, where economic activity is limited and labor demand is weak, strengthening local economic development will be key to ensuring that jobs are available for migrants and nonmigrants alike. In secondary cities in lagging areas, an improved understanding of the local absolute advantages can help identify areas and sectors where government investments and efforts may lead to higher returns, in both the formal and informal sectors. Additionally, migrants primarily work in sectors where there are low barriers to entry. Consequently, the informal sector, where many migrants tend to work, dominates the economy of Africa's urban areas, and small and large enterprises will continue to coexist. Improvements in the business environment are often also an important step. The need for better-functioning urban land markets is especially a recurring concern, as in Ethiopia. If insecure property rights or limiting regulations make it difficult to buy or rent land, attracting new firms becomes much harder, and existing ones have difficulty expanding. This circumstance holds especially for larger manufacturing firms, which are an important generator of better-wage jobs. However, there are many other constraints to business development. Building partnerships with the private sector can help urban governments identify the most binding constraints for business development in their locality and better plan and coordinate urban investment.

Addressing housing and land affordability and adequate accessibility to jobs, services, and amenities can significantly improve migrant success in integrating into a city's economy and society. The spatial or physical dimension of inclusion consists of access to infrastructure, basic public services, road improvements, housing, and land (Serageldin 2016). The analysis in this report and interviews with migrants show that access to housing and land is one of the main challenges

faced by migrants as they move into cities. Migrants who moved to Jendouba after 2011 purchased small lots of cheap, undeveloped, privately owned land to build their houses, but this subdivision of land was not planned and lacks services. On the other hand, older waves of migrants to Jendouba settled on state-owned land, and although they are unlikely to be displaced, their tenure has not yet been regularized. With limited access to affordable housing, the only option migrants are often left with is to move to informal settlements with limited access to basic services and work opportunities. This situation also emphasizes the importance of urban growth management policies as concerns migrant integration into secondary cities. Less complex spatial plans that recognize current conditions and trends can be used to adjust service delivery to meet current and future demand. A focus on improving property rights, land tenure, and other instruments to facilitate the workings of land markets can go a long way toward improving the availability of serviced land for development, thus increasing the housing supply.

Better information for forward planning and innovative ways to collect it can enhance the availability of serviced land, supporting the fluidity of land and housing markets. Secondary cities such as Jendouba, Jijiga, Jinja, and Kairouan must improve municipal governance and finance, urban planning, and urban management practices to generate employment and support the socioeconomic integration of migrants and nonmigrants into city life and services. For example, improved coordination of land use and infrastructure decisions can help those in the outskirts—who are currently left unconnected to networks and with limited job opportunities—integrate better into the city, regardless of their migrant status. Prioritizing services and investments requires a better understanding of key migration dynamics and how they shape the municipality's growth and development. In interviews, government officials repeatedly highlighted the lack of information they face and the limited set of long-term planning tools at their disposal.

Innovative ways of collecting and updating demographic and spatial information can be used to ensure all residents, regardless of where they come from, are included in data-gathering efforts that affect service provision. Local governments can partner with community and other local organizations, advocacy groups, and universities to fill their information gaps and save resources (box O.4). For example, the deep, detailed, accurate, and appropriate data sets gathered by the Chicoco Maps team in Port Harcourt, Nigeria, demonstrate a successful methodological approach to and effective methods of participatory data gathering and sharing in informal settlements. Trade unions and business groups, particularly for informal sectors, are another key resource that can be mobilized; these groups often already collate information about their members or users. Although seeking out new data sources is important, incorporating questions of migration status into existing survey tools can help leverage well-established data-collection efforts and processes to provide a better

BOX 0.4

Collecting Data through Participatory Processes

In Mogadishu, an influx of internally displaced people resulted in a severe housing challenge for local authorities. In response, participatory planning techniques such as housing studies and charettes helped municipalities identify appropriate locations for building shelters and prototyping affordable designs as well as estimate the costs of implementing this policy. In Lebanon, neighborhood profiles (that is, collection at the neighborhood level rather than at the level of the entire city) helped city leaders prioritize and direct humanitarian support to the most vulnerable areas. Data-collection efforts also included baseline indicators to monitor the effects of these programs. Although both examples concern refugees or internally displaced people, lessons regarding data collection also apply to local governments devising spatial policies for migrant integration. Participatory approaches and pilot scales, such as at the neighborhood level, can save municipalities work and resources. In the Tunisian case, study presented in chapter 3, this could mean collecting crowd-sourced data specific to popular neighborhoods.

Source: World Bank compilation based on UN Habitat (2021).

understanding of migration. Information on the availability of land and land uses can be an important step toward building cadastral information to assist in planning and managing urban growth.

Build the Ability of MAYORS to Respond to the Needs of Urban Dwellers through Stronger Finances and Capacity as Well as Better Citizen Engagement

Strengthening fiscal and technical capacity in secondary cities can provide them with the needed instruments to generate employment and create cohesive communities. Stronger fiscal and implementation capacity will be needed to enable secondary cities to provide services and infrastructure to all their citizens. Better linking information, planning, and resources will be important. Similar to other African countries, in Ethiopia, urban local governments have traditionally been financed by fiscal transfers from the federal level, augmented by the cities' own municipal revenues. These resources are meant to finance cities' recurrent expenditures, leaving little to no room for capital expenditures. In response, a special intergovernmental grant was added to finance urban development. Both intergovernmental transfers are based on a formula using population size as a main parameter. As a mobile and unregistered group, migrants are underrepresented in official statistics and are thus not budgeted for, thereby complicating service delivery to migrants. Public-private partnerships could also be used to finance infrastructure and service provision, as in the education sector in Jinja. These arrangements could be extended to other sectors, such as the

development of roads, parks, housing, or solid waste management facilities. But local governments cannot do this alone; they must work closely with and be supported by regional and national levels of government. Overall, secondary cities must build effective local leadership and strengthen cooperation with other governmental and nongovernmental agencies (box O.5).

Strengthening overall citizen engagement can contribute to better migrant integration into city participation mechanisms, increase their voice in the city, and build cohesion with local communities. A local lens that listens to migrants is essential. Migrants are often de facto excluded from popular participation and planning processes. Ample evidence (Dixon, Bessaha, and Post 2018) shows that becoming actively involved in the host community can facilitate immigrant integration, ensuring their voices and concerns are heard, helping them influence local policy, and facilitating exchanges with nonmigrants. Expanding and encouraging civic community activities can be an important step toward easing and accelerating the integration of migrants into the city.

BOX O.5

The Key Role of the National Government in Strengthening Local Financing and Capacity

A first step toward addressing the needs of secondary cities is assessing their needs. Argentina provides an interesting example, where the national government has undertaken an effort to identify the capacity of local governments. Starting in 2018, with the support of the World Bank, Argentina's Undersecretariat of Municipal Relations of the Ministry of the Interior, Public Works, and Housing launched a pilot Municipal Institutional Capacity Assessment exercise for all municipalities in the province of Salta. Since then, the pilot has been extended to all local governments in Argentina with more than 20,000 inhabitants, and the ministry can now inform decisions on where to design programs to strengthen which capacity.

Tanzania provides another example. The national government has been working through the World Bank–financed Urban Local Government Strengthening Program since 2012 to leverage the intergovernmental fiscal transfer system to strengthen local capacity, build the information needed for long-term planning, and improve secondary cities' capacity to respond to challenges. The provision of grants to local governments is accompanied by performance indicators that provide financial incentives for local governments to update local urban plans and improve their local taxing system, among others. These mechanisms are intended to improve urban planning, increase own sourcing of income, improve fiscal efficiency, improve infrastructure, and strengthen capacity at the subnational level. Looking for opportunities for cofinancing can also strengthen local finances and enhance capacity.

Source: World Bank 2020.

Outreach programs should be creative and consider how the most marginalized groups, including migrants, can access information, perhaps through outreach and communication materials that are culturally sensitive to different tribes, ethnic groups, and languages. For example, the European Union plan for the inclusion and integration of international migrants brings migrants and local communities together around educational, health, or sports activities, while also ensuring migrants participate in consultative and decision-making processes. Platforms for dialogue between migrants and city authorities would also enable misunderstandings about migrants' position in the labor market to be addressed, as in Ethiopia, where city authorities mainly see migrants as the root cause of urban sprawl, unemployment, and insecurity, although they largely engage in the lower end of the labor market, taking casual jobs in construction, manual labor, and, for women, domestic services. Given resource and knowledge gaps, local governments can work with strategic partners to increase participation and community knowledge of programs through communication tools and built-in feedback mechanisms.

Target MIGRANTS When Divisions Are Strong, with Actions That Improve Living Standards for All

In some cases, divisions between migrants and nonmigrants may be strong, reflected in discrimination at work and in the communities where migrants live, or through other access barriers to services and jobs. In such cases, actions targeted at these places may provide an opportunity to improve living standards for all citizens.

In some cases, targeted interventions where migrants live and work can help identify bottlenecks to their successful integration into the city's social and economic activities. Some examples include upgrading interventions in specific neighborhoods or improving markets with a high presence of migrant laborers. However, policies and investments targeted at such places, although informed by migrants' needs, should be designed with a pan-urban approach to ensure that no new barriers are introduced that create segregated spaces populated by migrants alone. Targeted interventions through communication and awareness campaigns may be needed when information asymmetries are present; such interventions can ensure that both migrants and nonmigrants are aware of their rights and responsibilities to build a cohesive community.

Given the flexible nature of many jobs and migrant livelihoods, actions can target spaces where migrants work and through that improve employment conditions and opportunities, for migrants and nonmigrants alike. A study of migrant households in Arusha, Tanzania, finds that both migrants and urban-born nonmigrants often move among different locations in central parts of the city, either living with relatives or in rented accommodations. Many later move

out and establish their own households after some years (Andreasen et al. 2017). Similar to Arusha, in most cities it is possible to identify settlement patterns that reflect the spatial evolution of urban areas. These typologies help frame potential policies and intervention strategies that proactively support the integration of migrants into the economy and society of a municipality. An examination of the literature identified four different spatial typologies, often informal, where migrants may work in African cities: streets, markets and enterprise hubs, home-based businesses, and hidden and temporary spaces. These spaces are where many migrants enter the workforce, highlighting the challenges migrant workers face in these locations and industries.

Better intermediation and support services can counter discrimination and allow cities to leverage the capacity of migrants and maximize the return on the human capital of youth. To reduce discrimination against migrants and address sexual harassment issues, cities could strengthen access to and the quality of social protection systems (in coordination with the national level). Working with civil society organizations, especially those addressing youth or women's themes, could help develop awareness campaigns on sexual harassment prevention in the workplace and on workers' rights, including awareness of employers' responsibilities (box O.6). Municipalities

BOX O.6

Street Art Raises Awareness of Gender-Based Violence in the Municipality of Medenine

On March 13, 2021, in celebration of International Women's Day, the municipality of Medenine, Tunisia, organized a street art exhibition in collaboration with the Aswat Nissa (Women's Voices) civil society organization to raise awareness of gender-based violence. In a central street located near Habib Bourguiba Boulevard, close to a police station and national guard office, which are the first responders to victims of gender-based violence, activists painted the walls with motifs and slogans sensitizing viewers to the brutality, seriousness, and gravity of such incidents. The city of Medenine renamed the street Law 58, after a law intended to eliminate gender-based violence promulgated in February 2018. This kind of intervention, which brings together local governments and civil society organizations and uses various media such as street art, helps shift the perception of gender-based discrimination and violence away from that of a private matter that happens behind closed doors, to that of a public issue that must be openly addressed and discussed.

Source: World Bank, based on "Tunisia: Street Art to Raise Awareness of Violence against Women" (https://www.citiesalliance.org/newsroom/events/tunisia-street-art-raise-awareness-violence-against-women).

can also partner with industrial and other business establishments. Cities may play an important role in the implementation of adaptive social services to improve the social and economic inclusion of migrants. Because local leaders are closer than the national government to citizens, they can be key players in strengthening coordination to implement a case management information system with the involvement of different stakeholders: social workers, employment offices, labor inspection agencies, and nongovernmental organizations.

Bringing inclusion to the core of municipal policies and administration means it must be recognized as multifaceted, with interlinked economic, social, and spatial dimensions. The economic aspects of inclusion involve job availability, earning capacity, and opportunity for advancement. Influencing factors are the local economy and opportunities available for migrants, access to education and training, connectivity to employment, and access to noncollateralized credit and microfinance. In some cities, migrants expressed the desire for training that would allow them to upgrade their skills and eventually target better jobs in different cities, allowing them to move forward with their migration journey. Migrants are often unable to take time off from work to enroll in such skill-upgrading programs. Subsidizing these programs and providing migrants with a small remuneration to substitute for the daily wages they would forgo to attend training can help. Furthermore, because newcomers often have limited social networks, daycare support services can help women better integrate into the labor market. Like skills upgrading, facilities such as daycare centers should support all residents regardless of their migration status, although they may have a significant effect on migrant women, whose local networks may be weaker. For cities where natural population growth is still high, such as Jijiga or Jinja, national support for effective population policies, including female empowerment and access to contraceptives, can help manage urban population growth.

Developing an understanding of the barriers to the effective integration of migrants at the municipal level will open up potential avenues for national policies to support local governments. Mainstreaming migration policy into the development of and future revision of national urban policies in Africa presents an opportunity to incorporate an explicit view of migration and a valuable framework for assessing policies related to rural-urban mobility. National policy frameworks are important, but not sufficient on their own, to prompt local action on inclusion strategies (Serageldin 2016). Municipal and regional governments are essential for planning, aligning, and advocating for central and local resources to meet the demand in these sectors, especially in underserved and rapidly growing parts of municipalities.

Notes

1. Although international migration can be an additional force shaping cities, given the different nature of the flows and lack of systematic information about international migration across countries and case cities, this endeavor begins the study of the challenges at the intersection of urban development and migration with a focus on internal migration. Internal migrants also make up the vast majority of urban migrants.
2. The share of countries with policies to lower rural-urban migration has increased substantially worldwide (from 38 percent in 1996 to 80 percent in 2013) and is especially high in Africa (85 percent) and Asia (84 percent), where urbanization is also fastest (United Nations 2013 [https://esa.un.org/PopPolicy/wpp_datasets.aspx]).
3. Another component of the Cities Alliance Cities and Migration Programme explores the challenges and policy options of forced displacement.
4. Comparable cross-country urban panel data with consistent disaggregation of the urban population by origin (migrant versus nonmigrant) are needed to quantitatively estimate the effects of migration on aggregate urban productivity. Such data are not yet systematically available for Africa.
5. Data for Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.
6. Where possible, towns are further categorized into small (fewer than 20,000 inhabitants) and large (20,000–100,000 inhabitants) towns.
7. In absolute terms, urban-urban migrants to cities are still better off overall than migrants from urban areas who moved to towns or secondary cities, possibly because of the higher city wage premium.
8. Looking at other welfare indicators, such as measures of durables ownership and access to amenities (electricity, tap water), housing quality, and indoor air quality across 12 Sub-Saharan African countries during the 2010s, rural-urban migrant households in the densest population quartile (which covers most of the area in big cities and the centers of secondary cities) do at least as well as nonmigrants (Gollin, Kirchberger, and Lagakos 2021).
9. Growth of 4 percent per year corresponds to doubling in size every 18 years, which would challenge any government, even those with strong institutions and solid finances.
10. In contrast with the developed world, where migration accounted for 60 percent of urban growth, natural increase was already the dominant force in urban population growth in developing countries during the second half of the twentieth century, accounting for 60 percent, with migration and urban reclassification accounting for the remaining 40 percent (Farrell 2017).
11. Urban growth emanating from migration has thus been found to contribute less to urban congestion than urban natural increase, a fact tied to the lower dependency ratio of migrant households (Jedwab, Christiaensen, and Gindelsky 2017).
12. The impact of migrants' contribution to urban density on urban wages and welfare declines only marginally when controlling for the urban center's dependency ratio (and slightly increases when controlling for the urban location's skills ratios).
13. Given the wide range of governance structures in the African context, the use of the term "mayors" broadly represents local government authorities and leadership. Hence, in the remainder of the report, it is understood that the reference to mayors encompasses the city and municipality administrative leadership.

14. Although these recommendations are drawn from analysis for secondary cities, they are also broadly relevant to larger cities. However, in larger cities, a deeper focus on labor market integration policies may be necessary because information asymmetries may run deeper and more upskilling may be required.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Urban Migration—Boon or Bane?

The world is urbanizing and internal migration has historically been an important driver. In 1950, about 30 percent of the world's population lived in urban areas; this number reached 55 percent in 2018 and is projected to rise to 68 percent by 2050 (UNDESA 2019). Over the coming decades, urbanization is expected to be especially fast in Africa[1] and Asia,[2] posing challenges and opportunities for both sustainable development and poverty reduction.[3] Much will depend on whether countries and mayors can turn the increasing spatial concentration of their populations and the expansion of their urban centers into virtuous circles of economic growth and citizen welfare. Well-functioning, inclusive urban labor markets will be a key element of success. With internal migration historically an important force of urbanization,[4] it has attracted much attention.

Internal migration is often widely feared as a source of urban underdevelopment. Incoming migration flows, often motivated by the search for economic opportunities,[5] challenge mayors to maintain the urban capital stock and service delivery for productive employment and citizen welfare; they also affect local labor market dynamics. Some 50 years ago, these insights inspired Harris and Todaro to model a link between urbanization, migration, and urban unemployment. Their core prediction that urban wage job creation would, in fact, increase urban unemployment because more than one migrant would be attracted for every formal wage job created, has resonated ever since (Todaro 1976, 1997). It has led national governments and mayors in many cases to fear the impact of migration flows into their cities[6] and has influenced much development policy thinking about the location (rural or urban) and type of job creation (wage or self-employment) needed.

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Many Forces at Play

Migrants and urban labor markets are more heterogeneous and dynamic than captured in the original Harris-Todaro model, and many of the predictions of the Harris-Todaro model have either not been supported by subsequent empirical studies or have been found to be much more granular (Beauchemin and Bocquier 2004; Busso, Chauvin, and Herrera 2021). Urban areas typically contain multiple labor markets. The potential for remunerative formal wage work is, in fact, generally limited in Africa's low- and middle-income countries, including in their urban areas. Because most jobs in Africa's urban centers are informal and own-account—especially in Sub-Saharan Africa—migrants are expected to take up mainly informal jobs, at least at first. A fair amount of the available formal wage work is also in the public sector (50 percent in Gabon), and thus arguably even less accessible to newcomers, especially those coming from rural areas (De Vreyer and Roubaud 2013). More recent multisector urban labor market models, which account for this heterogeneity in urban jobs (including, for example, duality in self-employment, both low- and high-paying) and in workers' human capital, illustrate how policies can affect the outcomes of low- and high-skilled migrants and urban workers differently.[7]

Migration also generates a series of externalities that affect urban economic growth, the composition of labor markets, and thus the urban labor market dynamic itself. Three channels can be identified. First, by increasing the size and density of the city, migration enables economies of agglomeration, which have been shown to be an important force in urban economic growth, especially in the developed world, increasing employment opportunities for urban migrants and nonmigrants alike (Combes and Gobillon 2015). Second, migration also adds to urban population growth, which, if too fast, may cause congestion, eroding the benefits of agglomeration (Jedwab, Christiaensen, and Gindelsky 2017). Finally, to the extent that migrants differ from urban nonmigrants in their socioeconomic characteristics (age, skills, dependency), they may change the structure of the urban labor force. Skilled migrants can increase the urban skill pool, while unskilled migrants may complement skilled urban workers, in both cases generating positive human capital externalities. However, unskilled migrants may also increase competition and suppress wages for unskilled urban workers (citizens and recent migrants alike).

How these different economic factors and forces play out (heterogeneity of workers and jobs, economies and diseconomies of agglomeration, labor complementarity or substitutability) is not clear *a priori*, and their individual effects are hard to identify empirically. The aggregate outcomes will also differ for different population groups (skilled versus unskilled; migrant versus nonmigrant). Would upward wage pressure for unskilled urban laborers resulting from greater demand for labor following migration and urban agglomeration

suffice, for example, to offset downward wage pressures from increased labor supply? Would the effects be different for unskilled urban nonmigrants and recent unskilled migrants? Other aspects likely to affect outcomes include whether the urban destinations are smaller towns or bigger cities, whether their economies are growing quickly or stagnating, how responsive land markets and service provision are to the arrival of newcomers, and whether arriving migrants have been mainly driven by distress at their place of origin or by the buoyancy of the destination.

Experience from China shows that all urban citizens, including the unskilled, can gain from migration. Combes et al. (2020) empirically attempt to jointly consider and identify how these local externalities of migration (at both the city and city-industry level) play out in terms of nominal earnings for different groups (urban skilled, urban unskilled, rural-urban migrants). They show how all urban citizens, even recent rural migrants, in China in the early 2000s gained from additional migration, despite some substitution effects from incoming migrants at the industry-city level. High-skilled urban workers gained the most, followed by low-skilled urban workers, and finally recent rural migrants.[8] Based on sophisticated empirical analysis of rich national data, including on the urban labor market and industry composition, these findings illustrate the importance of a more dynamic perspective that explicitly accounts for local externalities and acknowledges the heterogeneity among workers and their labor market outcomes when examining the effect of migration on urban labor markets.

A More Comprehensive Approach

Can African cities also leverage migration to the mutual benefit of their citizens and migrants? The circumstances in Africa are quite different from those in China. Population growth is much faster, rural-urban labor mobility is much less restricted,[9] and per capita GDP growth on the continent has been less labor intensive overall (relying more on natural resources than labor-intensive manufacturing exports) (Beegle and Christiaensen 2019). Cities in Africa today are mainly crowded, disconnected, and costly (Lall, Henderson, and Venables 2017), struggling to play their role as engines of economic growth and poverty reduction, raising the question of whether migration and urbanization cannot be leveraged better.

In addressing Africa's employment challenge, policy makers have often concentrated on addressing the challenge of urban youth employment, with programs mainly addressing labor supply issues through entrepreneurship and skills development programs, credit provision, or a combination of the two. Success has been varied at best,[10] typically neglecting differential needs among

incoming migrants (either from rural areas or other urban centers) and urban nonmigrants. This report asks whether a broader and more differentiated policy package is needed—one that goes beyond labor market policies and includes urban policy instruments that address institutional and regulatory constraints that misallocate land and labor within cities, fragment physical development, and limit productivity (Lall, Henderson, and Venables 2017).

Much of the focus has also been on larger cities, often capitals,[11] leaving the challenges of most of Africa's urban centers and the majority of their populations unaddressed. About 97 percent of Africa's urban centers or agglomerations have fewer than 300,000 inhabitants; urban agglomerations of less than 1 million inhabitants make up 60 percent of Africa's urban population, spread across more than 7,500 urban centers (OECD/SWAC 2020).[12] In addition, the vast majority of the rural population in Sub-Saharan Africa lives concentrated around small cities and towns and intermediate urban centers;[13] 82 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa's poor are rural.[14] These intermediate centers are often a first stop for rural-urban migrants, especially the poor, given their closer proximity. By facilitating this first move, these intermediate urban centers act as stepping stones for migrants to increase their action space, that is, the range of destinations they can realistically aim for. As a result, rural moves to intermediate urban centers have been observed to be much more frequent than rural migration to large cities, even though wages and incomes are typically higher in the latter (De Weerdt, Christiaensen, and Kanbur 2021; Ingelaere et al. 2018).

This report thus asks how secondary towns and cities in Africa can better prepare for and manage the internal economic migration of workers to the mutual benefit of citizens and migrants alike. This objective is consistent with the New Urban Agenda adopted by the international community in 2016 (United Nations 2017), which calls for balanced territorial development policies and plans that strengthen the role of small and intermediate cities and towns in development policies and interventions. It also fits the broader call for greater cooperation and mutual support among cities and human settlements of different scales.

The study is part of the Cities Alliance Cities and Migration Programme. Under this program, four secondary case cities in three African case countries were selected (Jijiga in Ethiopia, Jinja in Uganda, and Jendouba and Kairouan in Tunisia) for an in-depth analysis of how migration affected their development and how it can be better leveraged. Together with the cross-country analysis of national household surveys and censuses, these case cities form the empirical basis for this report, further complemented by conceptual and empirical insights from the urban, migration, and labor economics literature and World Bank operations. The focus is on economic migration and urban labor market integration.[15]

The Migrant, the Market, and the Mayor

The report addresses the overarching question of how to better leverage internal migration for urban development, economic growth, and poverty reduction from three perspectives: those of the urban migrant, the urban labor market, and the mayor, broadly referring to how migrants fare in the urban labor market, how they affect aggregate urban productivity, and how mayors can leverage their potential to the benefit of all. It is organized as follows:

Chapter 2 discusses migrant and market perspectives by empirically examining whether there are any systematic differences in labor market outcomes between urban migrants and nonmigrants (the migrant perspective) and assessing how migrants are likely to affect urban development more broadly (the market perspective). In the absence of systematically compiled comparable cross-country data with consistent disaggregation of the urban population by origin (migrant versus nonmigrant), the latter question is only indirectly addressed by assessing how migration affects the speed of urban population growth; the size and density of the city, and thus its potential for agglomeration economies; as well as the structure of the city's labor force, which together drive much of the urban economic dynamic. These insights are further tested in one country, Uganda, for which longitudinal individual employment as well as urban density and composition could be compiled.[16]

Chapter 3 presents findings from holistic deep dives into the case cities, including perspectives of migrants and city authorities from representative surveys and visits to the cities. Chapter 4 concludes, focusing on the remit of the city government (the mayor perspective) and laying out a policy agenda to leverage migration for the mutual benefit of all concerned: urban migrants and nonmigrants as well as the city and its mayor.

Notes

1. Although "Africa" is sometimes used as shorthand for Sub-Saharan Africa in World Bank documents, here it also encompasses North Africa, including Algeria, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia (UN classification).
2. In Africa and Asia, urbanization rates are still lowest, at 43 percent and 50 percent, respectively.
3. In 2015, 56 percent of the world's extreme poor were living in Sub-Saharan Africa. This number was expected to rise to 90 percent by 2030 (Beegle and Christiaensen 2019). However, the COVID-19 (coronavirus) pandemic is estimated to have pushed many back into poverty (more than 100 million people according to recent World Bank estimates, a third of them being in Sub-Saharan Africa) (World Bank 2021).

4. At early stages of development, much urbanization follows from rural-urban migration. Other drivers of urbanization and urban expansion include rural reclassification (also known as "*in situ* urbanization") and especially natural urban population growth. The latter is increasingly important as countries develop in much of Sub-Saharan Africa (Bocquier and Schoumaker 2018; Jedwab, Christiaensen, and Gindelsky 2017; Menashe-Oren and Bocquier 2021).
5. Other reasons for migration include marriage, family reunion, and education. Nonetheless, employment is often a dominant factor, especially for rural-urban migration. It motivated between 37 percent and 63 percent of movements among youth (ages 25–34) in Ethiopia, Malawi, Nigeria, and Tanzania (Mueller and Lee 2019).
6. The share of countries with policies to lower rural-urban migration has increased substantially worldwide (from 38 percent in 1996 to 80 percent in 2013) and is especially high in Africa (85 percent) and Asia (84 percent), where urbanization is also fastest (United Nations 2013).
7. Basu et al. (2019) review the literature and develop a much richer model consisting of multiple labor markets, reflecting the greater heterogeneity of work observed in developing countries (including wage as well as low- and high-paying self-employment), the different pathways to it through free entry (low-paying self-employment) or wage employment (high-paying self-employment), and worker heterogeneity in ability and experience. Establishing equilibrium conditions and applying comparative statistics, they simulate the labor market outcomes of different policies on each of these groups, such as an increase in the income of free-entry self-employment and an increase in the wages of wage earners.
8. At the same time, the uneven spread of gains from migration (and urbanization) are also responsible for a large share of China's wage disparity (Combes et al. 2020).
9. With the exception of Ethiopia, African countries do not have a household registration (or *hukou*) system as in China, which constrains access to public social services to the location where one is registered.
10. Beegle and Bundervoet (2019) review the evidence for Sub-Saharan Africa and emphasize the importance of demand-side interventions.
11. The focus on larger cities is often motivated by a fear of urban unrest. A good part of the concern about youth employment in Africa stems from the view that underemployed youth are especially prone to antigovernment behavior, including public protests and violence. A review of the political participation of youth using historical data on local protests and household surveys from 16 African countries confirms that concerns about unemployment or underemployment are a particularly powerful motivator for protesting among youth, even though youth are only slightly more likely to protest than adults when dissatisfied with government policies (Resnick 2019).
12. The Africapolis project defines an agglomeration as a continuously built-up and developed area with less than 200 meters between buildings, which is considered urban if it has a minimum of 10,000 inhabitants (Moriconi-Ebrard, Harre, and Heinrigs 2016). Applying this uniform definition across countries outlines the decadal evolution of Africa's urbanization pattern between 1950 and 2010, with the latest update in 2015 (https://www.oecd.org/swac/topics/africapolis/). Here, Africa includes both Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa.

13. Although about 15 percent of the rural population in Sub-Saharan Africa lives less than three hours from a large city (more than 1 million inhabitants), 41 percent lives within one hour of a small city or town (fewer than 250,000 inhabitants), and 15 percent less than one hour from an intermediate city (250,000 to 1 million inhabitants). In the Middle East and North Africa (numbers are not reported for North Africa separately), 36 percent of the rural population lives within three hours of a large city, and half of the rural population lives within one hour of a small city or town (see Figure S2 in the Appendix of Cattaneo, Nelson, and McMenomy, 2021, available at https://www.pnas.org/doi/full/10.1073/pnas.2011990118).
14. Worldwide, 80 percent of the extreme poor are rural. In Sub-Saharan Africa, this proportion rises to 82 percent (Beegle and Christiaensen 2019).
15. Another component of the Cities Alliance Cities and Migration Programme explores the challenges of and policy options for forced displacement.
16. Addressing the question through more direct empirical analysis is an important area for future inquiry.

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Chapter 2

Migrants and Urban Development

Introduction

This chapter compares and analyzes the socioeconomic profiles and labor market and welfare outcomes of urban migrants and nonmigrants across countries to address whether they fare differently; whether the comparisons differ by urban destination (towns versus cities), migrant origin (rural versus urban), or other individual and location characteristics; and how migration may affect urban economic development more broadly. It looks for broad empirical regularities across countries and settings and the factors that condition them, with a particular focus on differences between cities and towns and different types of migrants (rural versus urban).

Care is taken in accounting for differences in underlying data and definitions across countries. Both census data and household welfare surveys from a series of countries are drawn upon. Together they enable this report to present a broad picture of emerging trends, though neither source contains all the necessary data to construct a fully standardized cross-country comparison across all migrant and urban dimensions. Census data provide a good representation of different urban settings, but is limited in its coverage of labor market and welfare outcomes. Household welfare surveys are rich in their coverage of labor market and welfare outcomes, but the samples are only representative of a country's urban population as a whole, strictly speaking (or of the capital and other urban areas). Definitions of "urban" and "migration" may further differ across countries and data sets, a well-known challenge in urban and migration analyses (Potts 2018). For transparency, these differences are carefully considered, documented, and commented upon.

This chapter is organized as follows: The first section develops workable definitions of migration and urban areas that enable the comparison of urban migrants to urban nonmigrants along the urban hierarchy. The broad, emerging

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features of Africa's urban migration, its urban hierarchy, and the appearance of migration within this hierarchy are also presented. The second section examines how urban migrants fare in the labor market and in terms of welfare as compared with nonmigrants, and how these profiles differ depending on city size, migrant origin, and migrant duration. The influences of human capital and occupational and location choice are further explored. The third section considers the robustness of the findings with regard to a series of data limitations, including the use of cross-sectional data only as well as country selectivity. The channels through which migrants are likely to affect the broader urban economic dynamic are commented upon in the final section, drawing on findings from the broader literature.

Overall, migrants appear to integrate well into urban labor markets and present themselves largely as a positive force of change. These positive outcomes especially hold true in towns and secondary cities, and more so for urban-urban migrants. Rural–big city migrants struggle more, especially when countries are less urbanized, as in East Africa, where rural-urban migration remains a significant contributor to urban population growth. However, part of the reason why these big cities may struggle more with migration (as in the original Harris-Todaro models) links to their lack of openness to the world. Institutional and regulatory constraints further misallocate land and labor, fragment physical development, and limit productivity (Lall, Henderson, and Venables 2017). These limitations make positive migration-urbanization dynamics less likely in Africa's big cities today, even though this is not specifically a consequence of migration. On the other hand, towns and secondary cities tend to be more reliant on domestic markets than big cities to begin with; they currently gain more from migration, given migrants' more favorable dependency ratios and education gaps with nonmigrants (larger for urban-urban than for rural-urban migrants), and their populations are currently growing relatively less through migration than those of big cities.

Migrants and Towns: Definitions and Metrics

Who Counts as a Migrant?

A common lay understanding of a migrant is a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons. This is the broad umbrella notion of migration advanced by the International Organization for Migration (IOM 2019). The smaller the area considered as area of residence, the quicker a person is classified as a migrant when that person moves and the larger the share of migrants in the overall population. Similarly, the longer a person is considered a migrant after moving into an area, the more

migrants there will be. These delineations are important to bear in mind when comparing migration rates across countries. In the tables in this chapter, an urban person is usually considered a migrant when moving in from another district (or zone).[1]

Migrants differ by duration and origin. Those having moved to a district or zone within the past 3 years are considered short-term migrants; those having moved 3–10 years ago are considered long-term migrants. All others who have been residing within the urban area for more than 10 years are considered urban nonmigrants.[2] Migrants who move to an urban area from a rural area (rural-urban migrants) are further distinguished from those who move from other urban areas (urban-urban migrants). Rural-urban migrants are often first-time migrants, and thus less familiar with the more monetary, anonymous nature of urban interactions (Ingelaere et al. 2018). They may also have different motivations for migrating, different skill sets, and different labor market experiences than migrants from other urban centers. As a result, rural-urban and urban-urban migrants may fare quite differently within the urban labor market.

Migrants account for a substantial part of the urban labor force, are about equally distributed between short- and long-term migrants, and a sizable share come from other urban areas. To compare the labor market integration and welfare of migrants with nonmigrants, both censuses and household surveys are used. Migrants account for at least a third of the urban labor[3] force in five of the seven countries examined (table 2.1). On average, slightly more than 50 percent of migrants have been living in the area for a longer time (3–10 years). Many (slightly less than 50 percent) have arrived only recently, suggesting a fair amount of return or onward migration. (Otherwise, the ratios would be more proportionate to the duration of stay, that is, 30 percent short term, 70 percent long term, unless migratory movements increased in recent years, which is not the case, as documented in the section "The Decreasing Contribution of Migrants to Urban Population Growth.")

The share of short-term migrants is lowest in Ethiopia (38 percent), but quite similar (about 50 percent) among most other countries. Ethiopia actively discourages internal migration through residence permits, which are required to access public services (akin to China's *hukou* system). Because of data limitations, only short-term migrants are considered in Uganda (defined as those who moved in the past five years), which partly explains the low migrant share (15 percent) in the urban labor force.

Much of the literature and policy dialogue typically equates urban migration to rural-urban migration (Lagakos 2020; Mueller and Lee 2019). However, table 2.1 shows that a substantial share of the urban migrant population is urban-urban migrants. On average, two in five urban migrants come from other urban areas, ranging from 23 percent in Tanzania (where rural-urban migration is more prominent) to 53 percent in Uganda.

Table 2.1 Migrant Share of the Urban Labor Force

Urban labor force	Ethiopia[a] (2013)	Tanzania[a] (2010)	Uganda[b] (2016)	Ghana (2010)	Kenya (2009)	Mali (2009)	Sudan[c] (2008)	Average
Share of the urban population (percent)								
Migrant	41	33	15	31	47	35	16	**30**
Nonmigrant	59	67	85	69	53	65	84	**70**
Share of the migrant population (percent)								
Recent (0–3 years)	38	52	—	47	53	50	39	**46**
Long-term (>3–10 years)	62	48	—	53	47	50	61	**54**
Rural-urban	58	77	47	—	—	—	—	**61**
Urban-urban	42	23	53	—	—	—	—	**39**

Sources: World Bank calculations based on the following sources: Ethiopia (Labor Force Survey [Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia 2013]); Tanzania (Living Standards Measurement Study [National Bureau of Statistics 2015]); Uganda (National Household Survey [Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2018]). For Ghana, Kenya, Mali, and Sudan, censuses were accessed through the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (Minnesota Population Center 2019); the original census data were sourced from Ghana Statistical Services, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, Mali's National Directorate of Statistics and Informatics, and Sudan's Central Bureau of Statistics.
Note: Unless otherwise specified, a person is considered a migrant if he or she moved into the area less than 10 years ago. The labor force consists of people 15–64 years old.
— = not available.
a. Migrants are considered people who moved to a zone (Ethiopia) or district (Tanzania) that is not their birth district less than 10 years ago.
b. Migrants are considered people who moved to a district less than 5 years ago.
c. Khartoum not included.

Finally, migrants also differ by the multiplicity of their moves, resulting in further subclassifications such as seasonal, onward or step, and return migration. The more standard categorization of migration by origin (rural versus urban) and duration (short versus long term) adopted here implicitly conceives of migration as a one-time permanent move, as in the theoretical literature on migration. However, migrants also differ by their migration history and the likelihood of further moves (onward or return), which may affect their labor market integration in the locality where they are found. Three groups come to mind: seasonal migrants; onward, in particular step, migrants; and return migrants (Lucas 2022). Studying seasonal, step, or return migration typically requires special sampling frames tracking individual migrants over time and space. Such longitudinal data are scarce, and when they exist, are typically limited to case studies such as the Kagera Health and Development Survey, which has tracked households and their members for two decades (De Weerdt 2010). The focus of this report is on uncovering broad empirical regularities regarding the urban labor market integration of migrants across multiple settings, requiring nationally representative surveys or censuses, and how this integration evolves over time (short- versus long-term migrants) and by migrants' origin (rural, towns, or cities). The relevance and implications of abstracting from migration histories for the broader question of labor market integration of urban migrants by origin and over time also differ (box 2.1). For these reasons, an in-depth study of seasonal, onward or step, and return migration is not pursued,[4] though the implications of their occurrence for the interpretation of the findings regarding the urban labor market integration of short- versus long-term and rural versus urban migrants are explicitly considered. In addition, the migration-urban nexus is further differentiated by city size (towns versus cities).

BOX 2.1

Multiple Moves: Seasonal, Onward, and Return Migration

Although migration is commonly considered a one-time decision, in practice it often is a sequence or cumulation of one-time decisions. With each decision, the range of possible destinations and livelihoods available at the destination—the migrant's 'migration action space'—changes. (Ingelaere et al. 2018). The process often results in multiple moves, which at times also follow a regular, recurring pattern, as in seasonal migration. The need to account for migration histories and multiple onward or return moves in the future when studying migration has gotten more attention. Three phenomena are particularly considered: seasonal migration, onward (and step) migration,

(continued next page)

Box 2.1 Multiple Moves: Seasonal, Onward, and Return Migration (continued)

and return migration. However, the challenge of tracking people over time across large populations and space continues to hamper the building of evidence. Drawing on a review of the latest case studies and the available information in the national surveys (much of it indirect), the following insights emerge (Lucas 2022).

Seasonal migration. Seasonal migrants are an important subset of short-term migrants. Seasonal migrants, in particular those moving between rural and urban areas, are typically migrants who move for shorter periods (typically less than a year) on a recurring basis to find temporary off-farm work in an urban area during the agricultural offseason. They may have specificities, such as being more land poor and wage employed at origin, that distinguish them from other short-term migrants who have just started their journey in the urban setting (when recorded in the survey or census) without a clear time horizon for returning and with the possible intention to stay. These different perspectives on employment and returning may, in theory, result in differential integration into, and effects on, the urban labor markets for seasonal and other short-term migrants. There is currently little theoretical or empirical guidance, however, on what these differences might look like. Moreover, because seasonal migrants keep their residence in their location of origin, they are typically not captured in this study. The national surveys and censuses used here to identify, define, and study a person's migration status start from residence-based sampling frames. As a result, the phenomenon of seasonal migration does not directly affect the interpretation of the findings on the urban labor market integration of short-term migrants reported in the study. If large in numbers, seasonal migration could, however, affect the dynamic effects of migration on urban labor market performance. The importance of seasonal migration (and commuting) likely differs substantially across urban centers and countries. However, the phenomenon is probably less prevalent than expected (Lucas 2022). Across eight African countries, less than 10 percent of the rural population is reported to be away for a period of 1–12 months for any reason (not just employment) and less than 3 percent of rural men are reported to be away for 3–5 months, the period most commensurate with seasonal migration. The numbers for rural women are even lower (1.6 percent away for 3–5 months). The exception is men in Niger, where 28 percent of rural men are reported to be away during the past 12 months, of which about one-third are away for 3–5 months. Overall, the implications for the interpretation of the findings on the urban labor market integration of short-term migrants likely remain limited.

Step migration. Migrants often also engage in onward migration, oscillating between places to improve their livelihoods. For example, about 30 percent, 55 percent, and 35 percent of rural-born adult migrants moved more than once in Ghana, Indonesia, and Mexico, respectively, though less than half of them moved more than twice (9 percent, 25 percent, and 13 percent in Ghana, Indonesia, and

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Box 2.1 Multiple Moves: Seasonal, Onward, and Return Migration (continued)

Mexico, respectively) (Lucas 2022). One form of onward migration that has received particular attention is step or ladder migration, starting from a rural home to a small town and then on to a big city (as observed in the case cities of Tunisia, discussed in chapter 3). As migrants become increasingly acquainted with the urban way of life and gather more work experience and capital, they expand their migration action space and move to the next center in the urban hierarchy. In the absence of complete migration histories, this phenomenon can only be studied indirectly here, by unbundling rural-urban and urban-urban moves by city size (rural-town and rural-city, town–secondary city, secondary city–city), and even then, only under the assumption that urban-urban moves are undertaken by former rural-urban migrants, not urban nonmigrants. However, the phenomenon of step migration is far from the norm and much less common than often perceived. Exploiting information in the Demographic and Health Surveys from 57 countries on the occurrence of town residency before city arrival among rural-city migrants, Lucas (2022) shows that in almost all countries (54 out of 57), more than 75 percent of rural-city migrants moved directly to the city without temporarily living in a town, and in more than half the countries this holds for more than 90 percent of rural-city migrants (Lucas 2022). These broad insights help contextualize the findings regarding the urban labor market integration of different types of migrants (short and long term; rural, town, and city) in the absence of information on their migration histories, as well as their dynamic effects on urban labor market performance.

Return migration. One peculiar form of onward migration is return migration. Lucas (2022) estimates that between 15 percent and 20 percent of rural-urban migrants return. Among migrants moving from urban to rural, between 30 percent (women) and 41 percent (men) originated in a rural setting. Clearly, the occurrence of return migration is nonnegligible. The phenomenon, and in particular the reasons for returning, are important when comparing the labor market performance of migrants with that of urban nonmigrants. If many migrants return and they mostly return because of economic failure, then a finding of equal or better urban labor market performance of migrants compared with nonmigrants may be upwardly biased (the worst performers have left). Alternatively, if return migration is driven by economic success (possibly combined with family commitments), the results would be biased downward. The section "How Robust Are the Findings?" assesses the findings on urban labor market integration of migrants and the phenomenon of return migration.

Source: Lucas 2022.

Urban Hierarchy

Cross-country comparison requires a standardized definition of urban areas. Defining urban areas is challenging, with official definitions of "urban" differing broadly across countries and data sources.[5] The borders between rural and urban become increasingly blurred following rapid population growth,[6] and the official or statistical urban boundaries often no longer overlap well with urban reality. This has resulted in numerous efforts to develop more economically intuitive, standardized definitions of urban areas that are comparable across countries. One such effort was made by Africapolis (OECD/SWAC 2020). It defines urban agglomerations as continuously built-up areas with a total population of at least 10,000 inhabitants.[7] National population statistics and georeferenced satellite images of built-up areas are used to map urban agglomerations across the African continent and classify them by size.[8]

At 5.4 percent per year, Africa's urban population continues to expand rapidly. Africapolis's spatial approach to defining urban areas allows for continuous, flexible evolution of the urban morphology, including the merger of previously separate urban and rural areas into larger urban entities, that is, "metropolitization," as well as the *in situ* urbanization of rural areas. It reveals the existence of many de facto urban agglomerations that are still considered rural in the official statistics. Accordingly, the latest Africapolis data through 2015 show that Africa's urban population expanded at a rapid pace, from 27 million in 1950 to 567 million in 2015, a 2,000 percent increase, or 4.8 percent annually (OECD/SWAC, 2020). In 12 countries, annual urban population growth exceeded 7 percent, representing a doubling of the urban population every 10 years since 1950.[9] Africa's urban population growth was somewhat lower from 1990 to 2010 (4.3 percent to 4.4 percent), down from 5.1 percent between 1950 and 1980. More recently (2010–15), annual urban population growth across the continent accelerated again to 5.4 percent, reaching 8.9 percent in East Africa and 6.2 percent in Central Africa. Despite higher initial levels of urbanization, urban population growth has also been robust in North Africa—roughly 4 percent from 1950 to 1990—dropping to about 3 percent from 1990 to 2010, and rising again to 3.7 percent more recently (2010–15).

Urban natural increase, not rural-urban migration, drives urban growth. Whereas rural-urban migration was historically the major contributor to urban population growth,[10] the intensity of natural population increase is the main contemporary force (Bocquier and Schoumaker 2018; Menashe-Oren and Bocquier 2021), together with the *in situ* urbanization of rural areas and their absorption into large urban agglomerations (metropolitization) (OECD/SWAC 2020).[11] The number of urban agglomerations in Africa rose from 618 in 1950 to 5,092 in 2000, rising by another 2,514 agglomerations to 7,606 in 2015, illustrating the importance of *in situ* urbanization. Simultaneously, the share of Africa's urban population living in big cities (more than 1 million inhabitants) increased

to 40 percent in 2015 (up from 13 percent in 1950), representing only 1 percent of the number of agglomerations (figure 2.1).[12] Growth in big cities' share of the urban population would have been larger still were it not for the continuous emergence of new urban settlements, which act as a counterbalance.

Three in five urban citizens live outside Sub-Saharan Africa's big cities, spread across a growing number of towns and secondary cities. The evolution of Africa's urban growth pattern underscores the importance of a balanced approach to urban development, with sufficient attention to towns and secondary cities. Much policy attention rightly goes to Africa's large urban agglomerations (more than 1 million inhabitants); their population almost tripled in Sub-Saharan Africa between 2000 and 2015 (from 55.9 million inhabitants in 2000 to 166.0 million in 2015) and more than doubled in North Africa (from 28.1 million inhabitants in 2000 to 62.0 million in 2015). However, growth has not been confined to the capitals or the countries' largest cities. Many secondary cities in the 100,000–1 million class also expanded during the 2000–15 period to pass the 1 million threshold. While Africapolis counted 25 big cities (more than 1 million inhabitants) in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2000, and 8 in North Africa, their number more than doubled to 57 in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2015 and to 17 in North Africa. Simultaneously, about half of Sub-Saharan Africa's population still lives in large towns (20,000–100,000) and secondary cities (100,000–1 million) (table 2.2), with the number of urban centers in these categories growing rapidly, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (from 1,302 large

Figure 2.1 The Evolution of Africa's Urban Agglomerations, 1950–2015



Source: Africapolis 2021 (https://africapolis.org/data, consulted April 2021).
Note: Includes both Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa.

Table 2.2 Distribution of the Urban Population, by City Size

	Share of urban population (%)				
	Small towns (10,000–20,000)	Large towns (20,000–100,000)	Secondary cities (100,000–1 million)	Big cities (above 1 million)	Total urban population
Survey data					
Ethiopia	16	31	19	34	24,292,230
Tanzania	7	27	37	29	18,567,240
Uganda	4	19	34	43	14,041,120
Census data					
Ghana	12	19	18	51	14,236,200
Kenya	2	10	26	62	28,559,230
Mali	15	19	17	49	5,697,331
Sudan	14	27	27	32	16,335,250
Average	**10**	**22**	**25**	**43**	**17,389,800**
Sub-Saharan Africa	9	23	28	41	408,803,400
North Africa	9	24	27	40	158,311,700

Source: Africapolis 2021 (https://africapolis.org/data, consulted April 2021).
Note: Countries are grouped based on the source of data used to study migration (household surveys for Ethiopia [2013], Tanzania [2010], and Uganda [2016]; censuses for Ghana [2010], Kenya [2009], Mali [2009], and Sudan [2008]).

towns in 2000 to 2,362 in 2015, and from 235 small cities in 2000 to 449 in 2015). This growth has left many mayors of towns and secondary cities struggling to provide their expanding populations with the necessary urban services and jobs.

Beyond these broad empirical regularities, sizable variation remains in the exact distribution of countries' urban population across their towns and cities. Among the countries in the report's sample (table 2.2), secondary cities (100,000–1 million) and large towns (20,000–100,000) make up more than half of the urban population in Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda, and about 36 percent to 37 percent in Ghana, Kenya, and Mali, where half or more of the population lives in big cities (more than 1 million). Small towns (fewer than 20,000) typically house between 10 percent and 16 percent of the population, but less so in Kenya (2 percent), Tanzania (7 percent), and Uganda (4 percent).

Migration along the Urban Hierarchy

To study the labor market performance of urban migrants and nonmigrants along the urban hierarchy, every individual interviewed in the survey or census would ideally be mapped directly into the corresponding city size classification.

However, household surveys and censuses usually only indicate whether people live in an urban or rural location and the district they live in.[13] To classify individuals by city size, the study restricts the analysis to the urban individuals in the surveys and censuses, in effect using each country's official definition of urban, and subsequently maps their districts of residence[14] to the corresponding urban agglomerations from the 2010 Africapolis database. Districts without an agglomeration in the Africapolis database were dropped from the analysis. Urban nonmigrants in districts that only contained one agglomeration (or numerous agglomerations with the same city size) were assigned the corresponding city size classification. Districts containing agglomerations with mixed city sizes were excluded in Ghana (9 districts), Mali (1 district), and Sudan (13 districts).[15] These are the practical principles followed to construct labor market and socioeconomic profiles of urban migrants and urban nonmigrants and compare them by city size distribution.

Given the focus on within-city comparisons, the mapping provides a sufficient empirical base with which to study differences in labor market outcomes and welfare among urban migrants and nonmigrants. Four city size categories are used: small towns (10,000–20,000 inhabitants), large towns (20,000–100,000), secondary cities (100,000–1 million), and big cities (>1 million). Given the differences in definitions of urban areas between Africapolis and the surveys and censuses, the city size distribution thus obtained does not perfectly match the corresponding city size distribution observed in Africapolis. In particular, in the sample of countries studied here, Africapolis tends to situate a larger share of the urban population in big cities.[16] There is a better (albeit still imperfect) match with the city size distribution reported in the World Development Indicators, which is based on official definitions of urban areas.[17] The focus of this study is also on the within-city comparison of migrant and nonmigrant profiles by city size, and not on the city size distribution itself. In the absence of a universally agreed–upon definition of urban areas and bearing these caveats in mind, the databases and city classification of the survey and census individuals constructed here thus provide a sufficient empirical base with which to begin to analyze the labor market and socioeconomic characteristics of urban migrants and their nonmigrant counterparts along the urban hierarchy, including in towns and secondary cities.

Migrants are more frequent in big cities, they tend to come more from other urban areas in secondary cities, and they are slightly more rural and stay for a shorter period in towns. Across the countries studied (most of them in East Africa and the Horn) (table 2.3), migrants tend to be especially frequent in the big cities, where they comprise 39 percent of the population, on average, compared with 33 percent, on average, across all urban areas, followed by secondary cities (31 percent of the urban population).[18] Large towns account for a smaller share of the population in towns (about 25 percent). Ethiopia is an exception,

Table 2.3 Migrant Share of the Urban Population, by City Size, Their Origin, and Duration

Working-age population	Small towns (10,000–20,000)	Large towns (20,000–100,000)	Secondary cities (100,000–1 million)	Big cities (above 1 million)	Total
Migrant share of urban population (%)					
Ethiopia[a]	46	45	43	25	40
Tanzania[a]	20	18	36	53	32
Uganda[b]	9	12	17	16	13
Ghana	26	23	25	40	31
Kenya	33	29	37	60	47
Mali	28	23	26	42	35
Average	**27**	**25**	**31**	**39**	**33**
Share of urban migrants that are rural-urban migrants (%)					
Ethiopia	69	57	47	54	58
Tanzania[a]	72	86	72	77	77
Uganda[b]	38	54	50	55	47
Average	**60**	**66**	**56**	**62**	**61**
Share of urban migrants that are short-term (0–3 years) (%)					
Ethiopia[a] (2013)	39	39	37	35	38
Tanzania[a] (2010)	44	45	48	58	52
Ghana (2010)	49	48	49	46	47
Kenya (2009)	54	56	54	51	53
Mali (2009)	51	51	46	49	50
Average	**47**	**48**	**47**	**48**	**48**

Source: World Bank calculations, based on Ethiopia (2013 Labor Force Survey); Tanzania (2010 Living Standards Measurement Study); Uganda (2016 Living Standards Measurement Study); Ghana (2010 Census); Kenya (2009 Census); Mali (2009 Census).
Note: Unless otherwise specified, a person is a migrant if he or she moved to an area less than 10 years ago. The labor force consists of people 15–64 years old.
a. Migrants are considered people who moved into a zone (Ethiopia) or district (Tanzania) that is not their birth district less than 10 years ago.
b. Migrants are considered people who moved to a district less than five years ago.

where migrants are a substantially smaller share of the population in the capital than in the secondary cities and towns, consistent with the country's deliberate policy of limiting migration flows to the capital as well as its recent focus on secondary cities.[19]

The composition of the migrant population itself tends to be slightly more rural and temporary in towns than in cities, with secondary cities tending to attract relatively more urban-urban migrants. One reason might be the existence of step or ladder migration, whereby rural migrants move to more proximate

(often also smaller) urban areas at first given lower migration costs.[20] There, they gather skills through training and on-the-job work experience, thereby increasing their migration action space to continue their journey to larger urban centers, where they expect to earn higher wages. Such step migration has been observed, for example, in Tunisia, one of this report's case countries (chapter 3), with the largest proportion of long-distance migration taking place between urban areas. See box 2.1 for a brief discussion of the phenomenon of step migration.

Urban Migrants Do Not Fare Worse Than Nonmigrants

One long-standing and still widely shared view considers migrants to be a major source of urban underdevelopment (Todaro 1997). They are seen to have more difficulties integrating into the urban labor market than urban nonmigrants given their lack of education, social networks, and family support in towns. As a result, they mainly join the ranks of the unemployed and underemployed in the urban informal sector; if they do work, they take scarce jobs from urban nonmigrants. Furthermore, they raise rental and housing costs and overburden urban centers' often crippled infrastructure and social services. Rural-urban migrants are especially seen as the culprit.

Others argue that it is unlikely that urban migrants do not earn their living in the urban centers; they cannot afford not to work and would return to their places of origin otherwise. They are often also the more dynamic and educated of rural populations because of migratory selectivity (Young 2013). "The opposition between the 'poor, uneducated, informally employed migrant' and the 'better-off, educated, formally employed non-migrant' is not supported by the facts" (Beauchemin and Bocquier 2004, 2261). Internal migrants in francophone West African urban centers in the 1980s and 1990s were not disadvantaged as compared with nonmigrants. Beauchemin and Bocquier (2004) find that migrants adapted quite well to the city, in both employment and housing. In this view, urban labor market integration problems do not concern migrants exclusively, but all urban dwellers.

What does the more recent evidence tell us, and do the patterns differ by city size and migrant origin?

Labor Market Integration and Welfare Outcomes

Evidence from the 2000s shows that urban migrants are, in general, at least as likely to be employed as urban nonmigrants, irrespective of duration of stay or place of origin. The finding from francophone West Africa that migrants in the 1980s and 1990s integrated well into urban labor markets (in both capitals and other urban centers) extended to East and West Africa in the 2000s (table 2.4).

Table 2.4 **Likelihood of Being Employed: Migrants versus Nonmigrants**

Probability migrant is more or less employed than an urban nonmigrant	All urban migrants		Short term (0–3 years)		Long term (3–10 years)		Rural-urban		Urban-urban	
Ethiopia	0.09	***	0.09	***	0.08	***	0.10	***	0.08	***
Tanzania	0.05	**	0.05	**	0.05	*	0.04		0.04	
Uganda	0.02		—		—		0.02		0.01	
Ghana	0.01	***	–0.03	***	0.06	***	—		—	
Kenya	0.04	***	–0.01	***	0.07	***	—		—	
Mali	0.02	***	0.04	***	0.02	***	—		—	
Average	**0.04**		**0.03**		**0.06**		**0.05**		**0.04**	

Source: World Bank calculations.
Note: Reported numbers are the coefficients of a linear probability model, reflecting how much a migrant (or migrant subgroup) is more likely to be employed, on average, than an urban nonmigrant. The coefficients are obtained by regressing being employed on a constant and being a migrant (or migrant subgroups). Uganda: migrants are considered people who have resided in an area for less than five years. Information on the origin of migrants was not available for Ghana, Kenya, and Mali. The slight difference in employment rates between those for all urban migrants in Tanzania and their rural-urban and urban-urban subgroups (both lower) arises from the slight difference in the underlying samples. Not all urban migrants in Tanzania could be classified by their origin. The labor force consists of people 15–64 years old. — = not available.
Significance level: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent.

Across the countries studied, both short- and long-term working-age urban migrants are at least as likely to work as urban nonmigrants, on average. More particularly, all long-term migrants are more likely than urban nonmigrants to be employed; only in two countries (Ghana and Kenya) are short-term migrants slightly less likely to be employed (by 3 percentage points and 1 percentage point, respectively). Contrary to popular belief, there is no systematic difference in employment rates by migrant origin. Both rural-urban and urban-urban migrants are at least as likely (and are mostly more likely) to be employed as urban nonmigrants. The extent to which they are more employed differs by country.

Migrants are also more likely to work than nonmigrants in towns and cities alike. Although employment rates tend to decline as city size increases (not reported here), the difference in employment rates between migrants and nonmigrants is similar across city size (3 to 4 percentage points with differences by city size not systematic across countries (table 2.5). In Ghana, the difference in employment rates between migrants and nonmigrants is largest in small cities, with migrants 9 percentage points less likely to be employed. A case study from Techiman (Ofori-Boateng 2017), a secondary city in Ghana, shows that rural-urban migrants fare especially worse than nonmigrants, which the author relates to their lack of social cohesion.

Table 2.5 Difference in Employment Patterns between Migrants and Nonmigrants, by City Size

Probability migrant is more employed than urban nonmigrant	Small towns (10,000–20,000)		Large towns (20,000–100,000)		Secondary cities (100,000–1 million)		Big cities (above 1 million)		All urban migrants	
Ethiopia (2013)	0.08	***	0.06	***	0.06	***	0.09	***	0.09	***
Tanzania (2010)	0.12	**	–0.01		0.22	***	0.09	***	0.06	***
Uganda (2016)	–0.01		0.02		–0.01		0.02		0.00	
Ghana (2010)	–0.01	***	–0.00		–0.09	***	0.02	***	0.00	
Kenya (2009)	0.04	***	0.08	***	0.06	***	0.02	***	0.03	***
Mali (2009)	0.03	***	0.04	***	–0.03	**	0.02	***	0.02	**
Average	**0.04**		**0.03**		**0.04**		**0.04**		**0.03**	

Source: World Bank calculations.
Note: Reported numbers are the coefficients of a linear probability model, reflecting how much a migrant (or migrant subgroup) is more likely to be employed, on average, than an urban nonmigrant by city size category. The labor force consists of people 15–64 years old.
Significance level: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent.

Greater inactivity among nonmigrants—not unemployment—and greater labor force participation among male migrants are part of the reason why migrants are more likely to be employed. Unemployment rates (the share of the active population out of work and looking for work) are similar across migrants and nonmigrants. Differences in employment rates (the share of the working-age population that is employed) are thus mainly driven by higher inactivity among nonmigrants. Furthermore, as compared with urban nonmigrants, male migrants are especially more likely to be employed (by 8 percentage points, on average, across countries) (table 2.6). Men migrate more in search of work, while women migrate more for social reasons (marriage; joining their families). However, these reasons for migration do not result in lower labor force participation, on average, for women than that of urban nonmigrants in general.[21]

Higher employment rates show that migrants are not disproportionately handicapped in finding work in urban labor markets. However, there are still many reasons why this may not translate to equivalent labor market performance or welfare. One common perception is that migrants are more likely to be employed because, in the absence of a social safety net, they cannot afford not to be. This may force them to adopt more temporary jobs or more hazardous or generally lower-paying occupations, or to do similar work for lesser pay. Higher employment rates may thus come with fewer hours worked, lower job quality, and lower wages, which translates into lower earnings, overall income, and welfare. The experience may further differ by migrant origin (rural-urban; urban-urban) and city characteristics (size and buoyancy).

Table 2.6 Male Migrants' Likelihood of Being Employed Compared with Urban Nonmigrants

Probability migrant is more employed than urban nonmigrant	All urban migrants	Male	Female
Ethiopia (2013)	0.09***	0.13**	0.06***
Tanzania (2010)	0.05**	0.12***	0.01
Uganda (2016)	0.02	0.09***	–0.01
Ghana (2010)	0.01***	0.04***	–0.01***
Kenya (2009)	0.04***	0.07***	0.00
Mali (2009)	0.02***	0.00	0.03***
Average	**0.04**	**0.08**	**0.01**

Source: World Bank calculations.
Note: For Uganda, migrants are considered to be those who have resided in the area for less than five years. Information on the origin of migrants is not available for Ghana, Kenya, and Mali. The labor force consists of people 15–64 years old.
Significance level: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent.

Looking at the broader labor market experience and welfare beyond employment rates, migrants integrate well overall, with some differentiation depending on origin (rural versus urban) and destination (other urban area versus big city). Table 2.7 presents the experience from Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda.[22] It focuses on describing broad empirical regularities across countries; the data across the three countries are pooled. Given the relatively small sample size across city size, towns and secondary cities have been grouped into one category, labeled "other urban" (that is, centers with fewer than 1 million inhabitants), of which between 40 percent (Uganda) and 83 percent (Ethiopia) live in centers with fewer than 100,000 inhabitants, thus distinguishing them from "big cities" (more than 1 million inhabitants). To enable the pooling of data across countries, individual wages, household income, and expenditures are normalized by dividing them by their respective country average. The results control for migrant duration (short versus long term), overall country differences, and gender in the analysis of individual outcomes (employment, hours worked, and wage); household size and the dependency ratio are controlled for in the analysis of household outcomes (income and expenditures per adult equivalent). The following patterns emerge:

- *Migrants in towns or secondary cities coming from other urban areas (towns or cities) integrate well into the labor market and tend to do even better than nonmigrants.* Urban-urban town migrants are more likely to be employed, work more hours, and enjoy a wage premium relative to nonmigrants. Unsurprisingly, they also end up with higher incomes and consumption[23] per adult equivalent, suggesting that town and secondary city migrants coming from other urban areas (cities and towns alike) are quite successful in integrating into the economic and social fabric of towns and secondary cities.

Table 2.7 Labor Market and Welfare Results: Migrants versus Nonmigrants

Working-age population	Employed (1 = yes) (LPM)	Hours worked per week (Tobit)	Real individual wage[a] (OLS)	Real household income per adult equivalent[a] (OLS)	Real household consumption per adult equivalent[a] (OLS)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Big city (1 = yes)	–0.100***	–2.740***	0.322***	1.235***	0.649***
Urban-urban migrant (1 = yes)	0.0567***	5.078***	0.214***	0.642*	0.333**
Rural-urban migrant (1 = yes)	0.0628***	4.679***	–0.190***	0.516*	0.0889
Urban-urban migrant × big city (1=yes)	0.00823	–0.0407	–0.374**	–0.622	–0.181
Rural-urban migrant × big city (1=yes)	0.0309	8.687***	–0.295***	–1.016***	–0.111
Short-term migrant (1 = yes)	0.0232*	4.551***	–0.0759	–0.0251	–0.0925
Gender (1 = male; 0 = female)	0.161***	20.09***	0.630***		
Household size				–0.133***	–0.0533***
Dependency ratio				–0.00202***	–0.00219***
Constant	0.559***	–2.717***	0.628***	3.448***	1.644***
R^2	0.0413		0.116	0.106	0.0975
Observations	*91,047*	*81,186*	*26,761*	*4,607*	*4,847*

Source: World Bank calculations.
Note: Country coverage: columns (1)–(3): Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda; columns (4) and (5): Tanzania, Uganda. Columns (1)–(3) estimated at the individual level; columns (4) and (5) at the household level. Hours worked refers to the total hours worked in the past week in Ethiopia and Uganda, but only hours worked in wage employment in Tanzania. Regressions control for country fixed effects; errors are corrected for survey design and regressions estimated with LPM (linear probability model) (column (1)), Tobit (column (2), and OLS (ordinary least squares) (columns (3)–(5)). Coefficients are reported. When multiplied by 100, coefficients for columns (3)–(5) can be interpreted as the percentage increase or decrease compared with the country average. The labor force consists of people 15–64 years old.
a. Individual wages, household income, and consumption are indexes, whereby the value of each observation is normalized by its respective country average to make them comparable across countries.
Significance level: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent.

- *Migrants from rural areas also do well in towns or secondary cities, tending to be at least as well off as town nonmigrants.* They are substantially more likely to be employed and work more hours than urban nonmigrants, albeit at a wage discount. Taken together, these outcomes still result in substantially higher incomes (and possibly higher consumption, though the latter is not statistically significant).
- *Migrants from urban areas to cities perform similarly to (though not better than) their fellow city nonmigrants.* Urban-urban city migrants are more likely to be employed and work more hours than city nonmigrants (albeit

less so than urban-urban migrants to towns),[24] but their wages are slightly lower, on average, offsetting some of the income gains from working longer, eventually resulting in incomes and consumption levels similar to those enjoyed by city nonmigrants. However, in absolute terms, urban-urban migrants to cities are still better off overall than migrants from urban areas who moved to towns or secondary cities, possibly because of the higher city wage premium.[25]

- *Rural migrants to cities tend to be the most poorly integrated*. The substantial wage gap rural migrants incur compared with city nonmigrants results in substantially lower incomes, despite higher employment rates and longer working weeks.[26] Nonetheless, just like urban-urban migrants to big cities, the income and consumption of rural-urban migrants to big cities are still higher in absolute terms than rural-urban migrants who moved to other urban areas (consistent with what has been documented in detail by Christiaensen, De Weerdt, and Kanbur [2019] for migrants from the Kagera region in northwestern Tanzania).
- *Short- and long-term migrants tend to do similarly well in terms of income or consumption patterns,* despite some slight differences in their labor market performance indicators. In particular, slightly lower employment rates and wages for short-term migrants tend to be compensated for by their longer working hours, resulting in similar welfare outcomes.
- *Overall, men are more engaged in the labor market than women and under better conditions.* Men are more likely to be employed than women, on average; they work more hours and have significantly higher wages. Furthermore, across countries, male migrants are more likely to work than male nonmigrants, though there is no systematic difference in the employment rates of female urban migrants and female nonmigrants.[27]

In short, the experience from Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda during the 2000s and 2010s does not support the notion that migrants are poorly integrated into urban labor markets, similar to the findings by Beauchemin and Bocquier (2004) for migrants in western African urban centers during the 1980s and 1990s**.** Migrants are more likely to be employed and work more hours, albeit most often at lower wages. Overall, they enjoy similar or higher standards of living than their fellow urban nonmigrants, with the possible exception of rural-urban city migrants, whose experience might come closest to the popular notion of migrant dwellers joining the ranks of the unemployed; however, evidence to support this claim remains tenuous.

Rural-urban city migrants in the sample cities do experience a substantial wage gap, which they do not manage to compensate for fully through longer

working hours, resulting in a welfare gap with the nonmigrant population. However, the findings from the three East African sample countries studied here do not carry over to other countries (Gollin, Kirchberger, and Lagakos 2021). Looking at other welfare indicators, such as measures of durables ownership and access to amenities (electricity, tap water), housing quality, and indoor air quality across 12 Sub-Saharan African countries during the 2010s, rural-urban migrant households in the densest population quartile (which covers most of the area of big cities and the centers of secondary cities) do at least as well as nonmigrants. Moreover, although lower wages may signify a concentration of rural-urban migrants in certain segments of the labor market, or even wage discrimination, longer working hours still indicate that migrants are working and contributing to the economy, and given complementarities, they may even increase the wages of urban workers.[28] From the perspective of migrants, cities are where they enjoy the highest wages and an income premium, compared with their (rural) place of origin, as documented by Henderson and Kriticos (2018) for Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda. Similarly, durables ownership, access to amenities, housing quality, and indoor air quality in the 12 countries studied by Gollin, Kirchberger, and Lagakos (2021) are much better for rural-urban migrants in the densest population quartile than in the least-dense population quartile (that is, in rural areas). Similarly, in North Africa, recent work on Tunisia suggests that rural-urban migrants have larger per capita expenditures, on average, than do rural nonmigrants. Moreover, young rural-urban migrants achieve higher per capita expenditure than urban youth (Amara, Ayadi, and Jemmali 2019).

On the other hand, migrants to towns and secondary cities, who comprise the focus of this report, tend to do at least as well as (those coming from rural areas) or better than (those coming from other towns or cities) nonmigrants. The better performance of urban-urban migrants than nonmigrants in towns and secondary cities (and similar or slightly lower performance in big cities) appears akin to the sorting of rural and urban populations advanced by Young (2013) in explaining the rural-urban wage gap. In this view, the more entrepreneurial or more educated of the rural population join the urban areas, while the lower-performing or less educated of the urban population move to rural areas, with each doing better than in their area of origin, and urban-rural migrants often joining the upper welfare ranks in their rural destinations. Similarly, the results here seem to suggest that the urban population also sorts itself, with the more able moving into the big cities, where they improve their lives without outperforming nonmigrants, and the lesser-able urban population (from the city or other urban areas) ending up in towns or secondary cities, where they also improve their lives, even outperforming nonmigrants.[29]

Human Capital, Occupational Choice, and Location

Similar welfare outcomes do not mean there are no integration challenges. The results thus far do not control for potential differences between migrants and nonmigrants with regard to human capital (education, age) or occupational choice (sector of employment, type of job), nor for sorting (return of migrants who fail). Although this omission does not counter the findings reported above, it may explain why migrants do relatively well—they may be better educated. If so, the results may also hide potential discrimination (unequal opportunities for equal qualifications or lower pay for similar work with similar qualifications). Such discrimination has been the subject of intense study in China (Gagnon, Xenogiani, and Xing 2014; Lee 2012; Pakrashi and Frijers 2017; Yao et al. 2018), where migrants are also explicitly excluded from urban social services.[30] Similarly, migrants who do not succeed may be more likely to leave, hiding churning and temporary pressures on urban housing, infrastructure, and social services that would challenge urban authorities to maintain services. In short, migrants may differ systematically from nonmigrants. As a result, satisfactory labor market integration and good welfare attainments should not be immediately equated with the absence of potential discrimination or broader integration challenges for city mayors.

Migrants are younger and have fewer dependents, though welfare gains for migrants remain (except for rural-urban city migrants), even after controlling for dependency ratios. Regression analysis across six Sub-Saharan African countries shows that migrants are five to six years younger than nonmigrants, on average. This finding holds without differentiation across city size or migrant origin (figure 2.2, panel a).[31] Being younger further translates into a lower dependency ratio among migrants than nonmigrants (Menashe-Oren and Stecklov 2017), with the gap being larger for urban-urban migrants than for rural-urban ones (who tend to have higher fertility rates) and declining by city size (figure 2.2, panel b). With fewer mouths to feed and children or elderly to take care of, migrants are more likely to work more hours and enjoy higher welfare levels (income, expenditures) per adult equivalent, even if their hourly or monthly wages are lower (Jedwab, Pereira, and Roberts 2021). However, this is only part of the story. Migrant welfare (except for rural-urban city migrants) still tends to be higher, even after controlling for household dependency status. This outcome holds especially for town and secondary city migrants (table 2.7, columns (4) and (5)),[32] even though their dependency gaps with nonmigrants are also largest.

Migrants are also more educated than nonmigrants, with the difference declining by city size and becoming negative for rural-urban city migrants. Overall, the educational attainment of the urban labor force increases by city size, with big city dwellers (migrants and nonmigrants alike) more educated than those in large towns and secondary cities, who are, in turn, more educated than those in small towns.[33] Furthermore, migrants are more educated than

Figure 2.2 **Socio-economic Characteristics of Urban Migrants and Nonmigrants**



Source: World Bank.
Note: Definition of variables: Dependency ratio =[(nonworking-age household members) / (working-age household members)] × 100; working-age population = 15–64-year-olds; rural-urban = rural-urban migrant; urban-urban = urban-urban migrant. Sample population: Results obtained from ordinary least squares regression of $y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1\ SC + \beta_2 LC + \gamma_1 RU + \delta_1 RU \times SC + \delta_2 RU \times LC + \gamma_2 UU + \delta_3\ UU \times SC + \delta_4\ UU \times LC + \vartheta MigDur + v_j + e_{ij}$ for urban population pooled across three select countries (Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda), in which y = education, age, dependency ratio, sector of employment (1 = nonagriculture), SC = small city (20,000 to 1 million), LC = large city (more than 1 million), RU = rural-urban migrant, UU = urban-urban migrant, $MigDur$ = number of years in city since migration (0–10), v_j = country indicator, e_{ij} = random error term. Results for all migrants obtained from six countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Tanzania, Uganda), without distinction by origin of the migrant, that is, $y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 SC + \beta_2 LC + \gamma_1 M + SC + \delta_1 M \times SC + \delta_2 M \times LC + \vartheta MigDur + v_j + e_{ij}$.

nonmigrants, on average (up to one year), across city size, with the gap declining as cities become larger (figure 2.2, panel c). As they move to larger urban centers, migrants also enter a better-educated labor pool, explaining why the education gap declines by city size.[34] The education advantage migrants enjoy over urban nonmigrants is, however, largely confined to urban-urban migrants.

Rural-urban migrants, in fact, face a growing education deficit as they move to larger urban centers (from education levels similar to those of small-town nonmigrants to more than a one-year average gap in big cities).

Better educational attainment mostly explains the better labor market outcomes for urban-urban town migrants. As documented above, urban-urban town migrants work longer hours and enjoy higher wages than town nonmigrants (table 2.7, columns (2) and (3)). These premiums disappear when controlling for age and educational attainment (table 2.8, columns (1), (2), (4), and (5)). Higher migrant educational attainment (figure 2.2, panel c) especially drives the results. Higher premiums would have been expected when controlling for age only.[35] However, working hours and wage premiums decline strongly for urban-urban town migrants. In other words, urban-urban town migrants mainly work longer hours and earn higher wages because they are better educated than town nonmigrants. Education also helps explain higher working hours among rural-urban town migrants, albeit to a significantly lesser extent.[36] The education gap with town nonmigrants is also much smaller. The wage gap, which was much smaller to begin with, also declines only slightly and is no longer statistically significant.

However, differences in educational achievements can only explain part of the wage gap incurred by rural-urban city migrants. Unlike urban-urban town migrants, rural-urban city migrants are substantially less educated than urban nonmigrants (by about 1.5 years on average), and, as expected, they work even more hours than urban nonmigrants with similar education and age, while also incurring a wage gap of 31 percent compared with the country average (table 2.8, columns (2) and (5)), consistent with the popular notion that migrants are concentrated in lower-paying occupations (more on this below).

Agriculture remains a nonnegligible sector of urban employment in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in towns and small cities, and for nonmigrants. About one in four nonmigrants are still employed in agriculture in small towns (fewer than 20,000 inhabitants) and about one in seven in large towns and small cities combined (20,000–1 million inhabitants). Continuing high employment in agriculture in Africa's urban centers (also high compared with other countries at a similar level of development) has been noted previously in the literature. This is partly a reflection of *in situ* urbanization and related definitional issues, as carefully documented by Potts (2018); it also highlights Africa's lack of industrialization (Henderson and Kriticos 2018) and the centrality of urban-rural links for secondary towns and cities (Cattaneo et al. 2022).[37] Given the role of *in situ* urbanization, urban agricultural employment unsurprisingly involves urban nonmigrants especially. Small town migrants are 11 percent less likely, on average, to be employed in agriculture than small town nonmigrants, with the difference declining as urban centers grow and virtually disappearing in big cities, where agricultural employment is much less frequent to begin with

Table 2.8 The Effect of Better Education on Labor Market Outcomes

	Hours worked per week (Tobit) (not conditional on employment)			Real individual wage (OLS)			
Working-age population	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)[a]**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**	**(7)**
Big city (1 =yes)	−1.442*	−9.392***	5.589***	0.397***	0.296***	0.285***	0.189***
Urban-urban migrant (1 = yes)	9.442***	−1.420	0.0384	0.289***	0.0385	0.0487	0.0192
Rural-urban migrant (1 = yes)	8.769***	6.072***	−0.383	−0.102*	−0.0883	−0.0838	−0.0818*
Urban-urban migrant x big city	−1.383	8.061***	−1.245	−0.392***	−0.183	−0.187	−0.0863
Rural-urban migrant x big city	6.249***	11.81***	4.532**	−0.387***	−0.215**	−0.221**	−0.161*
Short-term migrant (0–3 years) (1 = yes)	4.167***	9.727***	3.107***	−0.137***	0.0993*	0.101**	0.101**
Gender (male = 1)	18.88***	15.38***	4.911***	0.627***	0.543***	0.541***	0.542***
Age		5.106***	0.845***		0.0689***	0.0689***	0.0686***
Age squared		−0.058***	−0.0099***		−0.0007***	−0.0007***	−0.0007***
Some primary education		5.271***	−0.374		−0.0993	−0.115	−0.0685
Primary or any secondary education		9.760***	2.742**		0.0358	0.00807	0.0602
Secondary education completed		17.40***	6.376***		0.323***	0.288***	0.322***
Any postsecondary education		21.59***	3.787***		0.957***	0.889***	0.933***
Manufacturing			5.854***			0.322**	0.173

(continued next page)

Table 2.8 **The Effect of Better Education on Labor Market Outcomes** (continued)

	Hours worked per week (Tobit) (not conditional on employment)			Real individual wage (OLS)			
Working-age population	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)[a]**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**	**(7)**
Service			7.772***			0.262**	0.119
Constant	−16.60***	−101.3***	6.886***	0.584***	−1.089***	−1.311***	−1.145***
District fixed effect	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
R^2				0.120	0.194	0.195	0.258
Observations	*110,935*	*109,146*	*47,952*	*27,377*	*27,109*	*27,086*	*27,086*

Source: World Bank calculations.
Note: Country coverage: Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda. Hours worked refers to the total hours worked in the last week in Ethiopia and Uganda, but only hours worked in wage employment in Tanzania.
Regressions including individual wages are indexes, whereby the value of each observation is normalized by its respective country average to make them comparable across countries. Regressions control for country fixed effects; errors are corrected for survey design and regressions are estimated with Tobit (columns (1)–(3)) and OLS (ordinary least square) (columns (4)–(6)). Coefficients are reported. When multiplied by 100, coefficients reported in columns (4)–(6) can be interpreted as the percentage increase or decrease compared with the country average. The labor force consists of people 15–64 years old.
a. Hours worked regressions include the entire working-age population, that is, unconditional on employment (columns (1) and (2)); when the sector of employment is included, they are confined to those working (column (3)).
Significance level: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent.

(only a few percentage points of overall employment). Urban-urban migrants are even less likely than rural-urban migrants to be employed in agriculture compared with nonmigrants (figure 2.2, panel d).

The nonmigrant wage gap for rural-urban city migrants also persists after controlling for employment in agriculture (in addition to education and age). Few laborers in big cities work in agriculture, with migrants only slightly more likely to farm than city nonmigrants. Unsurprisingly, controlling for the broad sector of employment (agriculture, industry, services) does not explain much of the rural-urban city migrant wage gap. It also does not change the observed absence of a wage difference for other migration groups (once education and age are controlled for) (table 2.8, columns (5) and (6)).

Rural-city migrants are frequently employed as casual wage workers in lower-paying services, a possible explanation for their persistent wage gap with city nonmigrants. Further inspection indicates that migrants are more likely to be employed as wage workers in general than nonmigrants, with the difference declining as they stay longer.[38] For rural-urban migrants in cities, wage employment often involves casual wage work in services, including as domestic workers (Ethiopia, Uganda), which may explain their lower wages (see chapter 3 for more detail from case cities). Low entry and exit barriers facilitate access to these jobs, especially in cities that rural migrants move to more often to try their luck without prearranged access to a job. Urban-urban migrants to towns and small cities, on the other hand, are substantially more employed as, for example, public wage employees, partly explaining their better labor market performance as compared with nonmigrants, at least in Ethiopia. In contrast, it is rural-urban migrants who tend to be more employed than nonmigrants in the public sector in Tanzania. Overall, a more detailed understanding of migrant occupational profiles is needed to better understand the rural-urban city migrant wage penalty.

The findings regarding employment intensity and wages also hold after controlling for other city characteristics, in addition to education, age, and sector of employment (table 2.8, column (7)). Destination choice is unlikely to be arbitrary, and migrants may disproportionately opt for thriving urban centers, where they believe they stand a better chance of finding a job and earning higher wages. As a result, migrants may enjoy an employment and wage benefit because they select themselves disproportionally in more buoyant destinations, as compared with nonmigrants who do not have the same flexibility to move. This has been observed, for example, during the historical European mass migration to the United States (1850–1913), with immigrants more likely than nonmigrants to settle in states with a mix of high-paying occupations. This was an important strategy by which immigrants could achieve occupational parity with nonmigrants (Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson 2014). Location choice has also been found to play a role in explaining migrant-nonmigrant

wage differences in China, though to a much lesser extent (Combes et al. 2020). The inclusion of district indicator variables to control for city characteristics suggests that there are also only minor indications that city characteristics play a role in explaining migrant-nonmigrant wage gaps in the three countries studied here (table 2.8, column (7)), and only for rural-urban town migrants (the wage gap becomes statistically significant when controlling for city characteristics).[39]

Altogether, migrants end up enjoying welfare levels that are at least as good as those of nonmigrants, irrespective of their origin (rural or urban), destination (town or city), or duration of stay (short or long term). The consumption levels of migrants are not statistically different from those for nonmigrants, irrespective of the city they move to or their origin (table 2.9, column (4)). In fact, by choosing more buoyant urban destinations, migrants moving to towns and small cities may do even better than nonmigrants. When city characteristics are not controlled for (table 2.9, column (3)), migrants moving to towns and small cities enjoy statistically higher consumption levels than nonmigrants, with the gain largest for those coming from other urban areas.[40]

Table 2.9 Migrants' and Nonmigrants' Standards of Living

	Real income per adult equivalent		Real consumption per adult equivalent	
Working-age population	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**
Big city (1 = yes)	0.877***	0.448	0.523***	−0.293
Urban-urban migrant (1 = yes)	0.124	−0.0100	0.339*	0.201
Rural-urban migrant (1 = yes)	0.407	0.321	0.136*	−0.00968
Urban-urban migrant x big city	−0.147	−0.0910	−0.211	−0.0265
Rural-urban migrant x big city	−0.962**	−0.929**	−0.090	0.130
Short-term migrant (0–3 years) (1 = yes)	0.0948	0.118	−0.079	0.125
District fixed effect	No	Yes	No	Yes
R^2	0.167	0.261	0.182	0.220
Observations	*4,113*	*4,113*	*4,368*	*4,368*

Source: World Bank calculations.
Note: Country coverage: Tanzania, Uganda. Dependent variables normalized by their respective country average for comparability across countries. When multiplied by 100, coefficients reported in columns (4)–(6) can be interpreted as the percentage increase or decrease as compared with the country average. Additional controls include household size and dependency ratio, educational achievement of the most educated household member, and country controls. Most districts have only one urban center. Regression is run at the individual level for the working-age population, with all household members assigned the same household income or consumption. Households with a migrant are classified as migrant households of the corresponding migrant type. If migrants are from varying origins (rural versus urban) or destinations (town or small city versus big city) within the same household, they are assigned rural and town. Estimated by ordinary least squares controlling for survey design. The labor force consists of people 15–64 years old.
Significance level: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent.

Lower wages for rural-urban city migrants compared with city nonmigrants (controlling for human capital, dependency ratio, sector of employment, and location) (table 2.8, column (7)) do carry over to lower incomes (table 2.9, column (2)), despite longer working hours (table 2.8, column (3)). However, this does not translate into lower consumption (table 2.9, columns (3) and (4)). Rural-urban city migrants of similar age and gender and with similar dependency ratios and education levels enjoy welfare levels similar to those of city nonmigrants, at least in the two countries and survey years analyzed here (Tanzania 2010 and Uganda 2016).

Finally, the duration of stay does not affect migrant welfare level compared with nonmigrants (table 2.9, columns (1)–(4)), even after controlling for these differences in sociodemographic characteristics. At face value, more-recent migrants are less likely to be employed than longer-term migrants and also face a small wage penalty, which they compensate for by working more hours, resulting in slightly lower incomes and welfare levels (though the differences are not statistically significant; table 2.7). When controlling for their sociodemographic characteristics, the difference in welfare level as compared with long-term migrants turns positive but remains statistically insignificant. As migrants stay longer, their sociodemographic profiles also start converging on those of urban nonmigrants. They become more like urban nonmigrants—older, with higher dependency ratios and slightly lower levels of education.

Similar patterns of good migrant integration were observed in francophone Sub-Saharan Africa during the 1990s. Beauchemin and Bocquier (2004, 2261) conclude, "Recent research in Francophone West Africa gives a totally different picture from the one generally describing migrants as ill-adapted to city life and engaged in lower-level economic activities." In their view, "Migration could be seen as a qualifier rather than a hindrance in the urban job market. . . . From the point of view of housing and employment, migrants adapt quite well to the city. Urban integration problems do not concern exclusively migrants but all city-dwellers."

How Robust Are the Findings?

The analysis thus far has been based on urban samples. These samples exclude rural-urban migrants who returned to their place of origin. If migrants mainly returned because they did not find employment, the integration results presented above may be overly optimistic; they are based on the experience of those who remain. Second, the findings are derived from cross-sectional data, which limits the ability to draw inference on integration dynamics. If migrant

profiles change over time, inference regarding the effect of duration on migrant integration will be confounded with the effect of changing migrant characteristics. Finally, while some of the findings (employment, migrant sociodemographics) capture experiences from a broader set of countries, including two in West Africa, others (time worked and wage, income and consumption) mainly reflect the experience from East Africa (Tanzania, Uganda, and partly Ethiopia). However, rural-urban migration remains a more important factor in fueling urban population growth in East Africa than in the rest of Africa (Bocquier and Schoumaker 2018), which may affect the speed of urban expansion and the ability of towns and cities to absorb migrants into their labor markets, and thus the generalizability of the findings.

There is no indication that selective return migration is driving the results. Urban-rural return migration can be substantial, with shares typically declining as countries develop. In Sub-Saharan Africa, roughly one-third of male rural-urban migrants and one-fifth of female rural-urban migrants are found to return.[41] Migrants might return as part of a longer-term welfare maximization strategy; they migrate to find better-paying work and save, returning once saving targets are reached. They may also return because they were unsuccessful. If the former pattern dominates, urban samples underestimate migrant labor market integration; if the latter dominates, they overestimate it.

The available evidence on the reasons for return migration is scant, and the results are mixed. One case study from Tanzania links male returns primarily to poor job market outcomes, whereas female returns are mainly motivated by the dissolution of marriage, with women returning slightly more frequently than men (20 percent versus 16 percent) (Hirvonen and Lilleor 2015). In contrast, in India, where 10 percent of internal migrants are found to return, wealthier, older, and more educated males are especially more likely to return, many of whom become self-employed or rentiers or pensioners (Dhar and Bhagat 2020).[42] Finally, a study from Burkina Faso, where rural return migration has been particularly high in the past, shows that migrants maintain their advantage in accessing urban jobs, correcting for possible migrant selectivity (Zourkaléini and Piché 2013).

In addition to affecting the representativeness of the urban migrant population, selection may also affect the representativeness of urban nonmigrants. One in two male and two in three female urban-rural migrants are urban nonmigrants (not returnees) (Cattaneo and Robinson 2020). If these are the lesser performing in urban areas who find a better match for their skills in rural areas, as suggested by Young (2013) and Cattaneo and Robinson (2020), the migrant integration gap would be overestimated.

It is unclear whether selective out-migration (by migrants or nonmigrants) leads to an overly optimistic view of migrant labor market integration and welfare as compared with urban nonmigrants when only studying urban

samples; this is especially unclear when also accounting for selectivity in the out-migration of urban nonmigrants. If anything, the available evidence might suggest the opposite. The slightly better educational outcomes of more recent migrants compared with longer-term ones could also be seen as supportive of the notion that the results are robust to considerations of return migration (that is, the more educated ones who are more likely to be successful have returned). Simultaneously, it cannot be fully excluded that urban-rural return migration because of unemployment is a part of the integration narrative, especially during periods of economic decline. If this is the case, migrant flexibility also plays a particularly important role in helping urban labor markets adjust, as in Zambia during the 1990s (Crankshaw and Borel-Saladin 2019).

No difference in welfare outcomes is observed between short- and long-term migrants, though long-running panels of migrants are needed to properly understand the effects of migration duration on migrant integration. Although short-term migrants have more difficulty finding work than long-term migrants, they tend to work more hours, albeit at a lower wage. These differences do not translate into them having lower welfare than long-term migrants, even when controlling for differences in age and education. Nonetheless, differences in sociodemographic characteristics among migrant cohorts cannot be excluded, which may, in turn, affect labor market integration and welfare over time. The slightly better educational attainment observed among more recent migrants in the cross-sectional data (figure 2.2) might, for example, reflect Africa's rapid expansion of primary school enrollment in rural areas since the 1990s instead of the selective out-migration of the more successful and better educated. If so, the possible interpretation of the educational difference between recent and older cohorts as supportive of good labor market integration would no longer hold. Other unobserved changes might also be at work. A differential decline in schooling quality between rural and urban areas (as enrollment rates increased) may have reduced the skills levels of recent migrant cohorts as compared with past ones, possibly affecting their labor market integration.

Finally, in the absence of migration histories, it is also hard to further unbundle the drivers behind the results for urban-urban migrants, which could be urban nonmigrants moving to another town, or step migrants who first move to the more accessible towns before moving on to larger urban centers. The phenomenon of step migration is, in general, likely limited, however (box 2.1) (Lucas 2022), even though it may be more prevalent in certain settings, as seen in the two Tunisian case cities studied in this report (chapter 3).

In short, to properly identify how migrants fare over time compared with nonmigrants and analyze the importance of certain types of onward migration such as step migration, panel data tracking the same migrants are needed.[43] However, the inability to further distinguish heterogeneity among urban-urban migrants beyond the socioeconomic controls already included does not

invalidate the general finding that they tend to be better integrated than urban nonmigrants into the urban labor markets.

The good labor market integration of migrants in faster-growing urban East Africa arguably supports rather than detracts from the notion that migrants integrate well into urban labor markets in general. The migrant integration findings presented thus far draw heavily on experiences from East African countries (Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda). Countries in East Africa are not only the least urbanized in Sub-Saharan Africa, but they also experience the fastest urban population growth, with rural-urban migration (and reclassification) still contributing twice as much as natural population increase (D'Aoust 2021). Rapid urban expansion challenges urban centers to keep up with housing, infrastructure, and service provision, which is arguably exacerbated when driven by an influx of people from outside, adding to the labor market barriers migrants already face when navigating their new labor environments. Similar labor market and welfare outcomes in such settings would support the notion that urban migrants do not necessarily do worse than their urban counterparts, and would suggest similarly successful (or even better) integration in other settings where urban growth is less pronounced and less driven by migration, as in the rest of Africa (Bocquier and Schoumaker 2018).

The findings reported here are also consistent with the successful labor market integration of migrants reported by Beauchemin and Bocquier (2004) in francophone Africa during the 1990s and early 2000s (on the heels of the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s). However, Sub-Saharan Africa also experienced solid economic growth during the 2000s, with Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda performing well above average (even in per capita terms). The findings further hint at differentiated outcomes by city size and migrant origin, with rural-urban city migrants finding it somewhat more challenging to integrate than urban-urban town migrants, who often tend to outperform nonmigrants. How national economic performance, urban characteristics (size, demographic structure, population growth), and those of the migrants' environment affect migrant labor market absorption deserves further investigation.

Urban Markets at Work: A Dynamic Perspective

How labor markets and cities fare following migration also depends on how migrants affect the broader urban market dynamic. Thus far, a static view has been taken, focused on how migrants fare in the urban labor markets and their welfare compared with their urban counterparts. However, migrants also affect the broader urban dynamic. Each time a migrant enters (or leaves), he or she increases (decreases) the size of the urban center and affects the speed of its

expansion. By leaving, they can also change the structure of the urban labor force (for example, if they differ in their demographic characteristics or skills from urban nonmigrants or if only migrants with certain characteristics leave). Depending on where they settle, they may also affect urban productivity by affecting the spatial buildup of the city.

Migration can thus open opportunities, for example, through the generation of agglomeration economies that often occur when urban centers become larger or more dense, or following labor complementarity. But it can also bring challenges, especially if the agglomeration benefits only come with a lag, or when nonmigrants are negatively affected (through housing shortages, congestion, or labor substitution). Rapid urban expansion fueled by migration might, for example, lock urban centers into a low-level equilibrium, holding back migrants and citizens alike in the face of lagging complementary infrastructure, housing, or services. Alternatively, domestic immigration could also reduce urban poverty following skills complementarity with nonmigrants, inducing an infrastructure response as in Brazil during the 1990s (Ferré 2011).

How these dynamics pan out will be conditioned further by countries' level of development and economic performance. They likely also differ by city size (towns versus big cities). Often the dynamic effects are the more pressing concern of mayors, with migrants easily becoming the scapegoat for all ills. In the absence of direct empirical evidence on the direction and strength of the effects of migration on urban productivity and welfare,[44] in what follows the focus is on the channels through which migrants may affect the size of urban areas and the speed of their expansion, and by implication the likelihood of agglomeration (dis)economies as well as the effect of migration on the structure of the urban labor force, that is, the strength and composition of its human capital and the potential for human capital externalities or complementarities. The implications of urban spatial buildup (where migrants arrive and settle) and related issues of urban spatial mismatch (the distance between living and work space), which fall more directly under the mayor's remit, are reviewed in chapter 4. New direct econometric evidence on the implications of migration on urban productivity from one African country (Uganda) is further presented, beginning to fill the empirical void on the effect of migration on urban productivity and welfare in Africa and complementing the inductive insights obtained in the first two sections below.

The Decreasing Contribution of Migrants to Urban Population Growth

The policy focus on urbanization continues to view migration as the principal driver of urban growth. Urban growth is the rate at which the urban population expands. It is determined by the sum of the rate of urban natural population increase, net rural-urban migration, and rural-urban reclassification.

Urban natural increase thus increases urban growth one-to-one; every percentage point increase in urban natural population increases urban growth by 1 percentage point. On the other hand, the rate of urbanization—the rate at which the urban share of the population increases—also depends on the rate of rural natural population increase, which mitigates the effect of urban natural increase on the rate of urbanization. At the extreme, if the rates of rural and urban natural increase are the same (natural population growth in rural areas is equal to that in urban areas), then the rate of urbanization is fully determined by rural-urban migration (and reclassification),[45] which makes rural-urban migration the primary driver of urbanization (in addition to reclassification).[46] In practice, however, urbanization and urban growth are often used interchangeably, and given the national policy focus on urbanization, policy attention has been directed increasingly toward rural-urban migration in examining the challenges of urban governance, at the relative neglect of the demographic drivers of urban change.[47]

However, similar levels of urbanization can coexist with high and low rates of urban natural increase. The difference in the rate of urban (and rural) natural increase between Africa and Asia is, for example, an important factor in understanding why Africa and Asia have been urbanizing at a similar rate during the second half of the twentieth century, but with quite different rates of poverty reduction and economic growth. They both began at similarly low levels of development and urbanization and similarly high levels of poverty, and rural-urban migration rates were similar across both continents. However, both urban and rural natural population increase were substantially higher in Africa, resulting in much higher urban growth in Africa, as well as a pattern of urbanization without economic growth (Jedwab, Christiaensen, and Gindelsky 2017).

For mayors, the relevant metric is urban growth, that is, the speed at which the urban population expands, not the rate of urbanization; policies should thus focus on the drivers of urban growth.[48] Urban growth significantly drives the rate at which they must invest to maintain the city's capital stock and public services. Failure to invest adequately fuels congestion and erodes returns to agglomeration. On the other hand, urbanization—the change in the share of the population living in urban areas—is of special concern to national governments and guides the spatial allocation of their investments. Given the different underlying processes, despite a number of common components, as highlighted above, the failure to distinguish between urbanization and urban growth can be misleading when studying urban development and designing policies (D'Aoust 2021; Farrell 2017; Fox 2012; Jedwab, Christiaensen, and Gindelsky 2017).

At more than 4 percent, urban population growth remains substantial in Sub-Saharan Africa, but it is increasingly driven by urban natural increase, not migration. Annual growth of 4 percent corresponds to doubling in size every 18 years,[49] which would challenge any government, even those with strong

institutions and solid finances. The available evidence from the developing world further suggests that, at 60 percent, urban natural increase was already the dominant force of urban population growth in developing countries during the second half of the twentieth century (and significantly more than the corresponding estimate of about 40 percent for developed countries) (Farrell 2017). Work by Bocquier and Schoumaker (2018) suggests that the share of urban natural increase stands to increase even further. Net rural-urban migration has been declining in most of Africa, especially among older population groups (Menashe-Oren and Stecklov 2017), whereas the decline in urban fertility is stagnating, especially in Africa's capitals, but also increasingly in other urban areas, pushing up the contribution of urban natural increase.

The contribution of migration to urban growth remains largest in big cities with low rates of urbanization, as in East Africa (figure 2.3), but is otherwise grinding to a halt in many African capitals. This deceleration is consistent with the empirical findings on migrant labor market integration and urban welfare discussed earlier in this chapter. Although urban migrants in the countries studied (Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda) did not fare worse, in general, than nonmigrants in terms of urban labor market integration and welfare, rural-urban city migrants were challenged most to integrate, to a greater extent than observed in francophone cities during the 1980s and 1990s. These francophone countries were also already more urbanized to begin with. Using data from 449 cities in Brazil, Busso, Chauvin, and Herrera (2021) similarly conclude that the Harris-Todaro equilibrium conditions of rural-urban migration contributing to urban unemployment are larger in larger cities with archetypically rural catchment areas nearby (and stronger among workers with primary education, but no secondary education). In such circumstances, migration is more likely to compound natural increase and accelerate urban growth, challenging mayors even more to keep up with housing and infrastructure to avoid congestion and maintain agglomeration economies. Nonetheless, while predicted net migration into African capitals was high in the 1970s (50 percent of the population of capitals) and still positive in 2015 (18 percent),[50] the contribution of rural areas is declining quickly, from 50 percent (of the capital's population) to a level comparable to that of other urban areas (9 percent of the capital's population) (Bocquier and Schoumaker 2018). Urban natural increase is increasingly the key driver of urban growth.

Declining contributions from migration to urban growth in towns and secondary cities puts them in a good position to leverage migration, provided sufficient complementary investments are made. The continuing migration pressure on capitals in East Africa suggests a greater role for other urban areas, secondary cities, and large and small towns in absorbing and leveraging migration. Across countries, migration to towns and secondary cities has been documented to be better at reducing poverty than migration to big cities

Figure 2.3 **Sources of Population Growth in Tanzanian Cities**



Source: World Bank 2021.

(Christiaensen and Kanbur 2017), while in contrast to the developed world, no positive size effect of big cities is found for developing countries.[51] Many agglomeration economies can already be realized well below the metropolitan scale (Rodriguez-Pose and Griffiths 2021). More broadly, in other Sub-Saharan African subregions, other urban areas (especially secondary cities) are now

losing their population to the capitals, while the net inflow from rural areas has been declining (Bocquier and Schoumaker 2018), resulting in declining net migration. The phenomenon of secondary cities as "transit hubs" is also epitomized by the two case cities in Tunisia, which both find themselves in lagging regions.[52] Lower migration pressure in towns and secondary cities, combined with overall good absorption of migrants into labor markets as documented above, suggests intermediate urban centers can play an important role in helping rural populations exit agriculture as their countries develop, provided these centers are also sufficiently supported and managed well.

The Effect of Migrants on the Age and Skill Structure of the Urban Workforce

Migrants are younger than nonmigrants, on average, resulting in lower dependency ratios and positively affecting urban productivity over time.[53] As with education, the gap is larger in towns and secondary cities and for urban-urban households (figure 2.2, panel b). There is little difference in the dependency ratio between rural-urban city migrants and city nonmigrants. Higher dependency ratios directly reduce the share of the urban working-age population as well as the share of the working-age population that is active in the labor market, given the greater need for caregiving, resulting in lower incomes per capita, which, in turn, may lower human capital accumulation (given lower savings and human capital investment), as well as lowering human capital externalities, thus lowering urban economic growth.

Higher urban dependency ratios in developing countries as compared with developed countries have been shown to be another important factor in understanding the lower performance of urban Africa and the broader phenomenon of "African urbanization without growth" (Jedwab, Pereira, and Roberts 2021). Similarly, urban population growth emanating from migration has been found to contribute much less to urban congestion than urban natural increase, with the lower dependency ratios of migrant households identified as the likely channel (Jedwab, Christiaensen, and Gindelsky 2017). Indirectly, however, being younger and more fertile, migrants also add to the crude birth rate in the near future, and thus urban natural increase, slowing down the urban demographic transition in the medium term. The latter is consistent with the recent pattern of stagnation in the decline of the total fertility rate among Africa's urban population, which is especially pronounced in Africa's cities, where the share of migrants is higher, though somewhat less in its other urban centers, where the share of migrants is also less pronounced (Bocquier and Schoumaker 2018; Farrell 2017).

By enhancing the urban skills pool, rural-town and urban-urban migrants can also foster urban productivity growth. The importance of human capital for urban economic performance and growth, in addition to economies

of agglomeration, has been widely documented (De la Roca and Puga 2017; Moretti 2004). Education fosters the development and spread of more productive technologies, such that people residing in more educated towns or cities become more productive more rapidly over time. By increasing the average skills level of the urban labor force in towns and secondary cities (although not in big cities), migrants positively contribute to this process, even more so for urban-urban migrants, who tend to enjoy a larger education advantage over nonmigrants than rural-urban migrants (figure 2.2, panel c).

Moreover, despite lower educational achievements, rural-city migrants can still contribute to urban productivity growth, given skills complementarity, broader agglomeration economies, or both. The lower education of rural-city migrants compared with nonmigrants (figure 2.2, panel c) does not have to translate into lower economic performance of their destination city. Much depends on whether they will complement the existing workforce, enabling the workforce to leverage itself, for example, by moving up the occupational ladder and generating positive externalities, or whether migrants will substitute for it, with competition typically mostly felt among incumbent low-skilled workers. Nonetheless, even with substitution, low-skilled nonmigrant workers (including recent migrants) may still benefit from migration if downward wage pressures, which are often confined to the city-industry level, are offset by broader agglomeration economies at the city level.

The ratio of rural migrants to low-skilled urban nonmigrants was found to be the main driver of nominal wage gain among urban citizens in China during the early 2000s (and was more important than the effects of location, that is, other city characteristics such as city size). Gains were largest for high-skilled urban workers, followed by low-skilled urban workers, but were still positive for recent rural migrants in cities as well. Although new migrants competed with recent rural migrants for the same jobs (exerting downward wage pressures), the overall positive effects of migration on agglomeration economies at the city level more than compensated for this competition, such that those recent rural migrants at the bottom of the occupational ladder still saw their wages increase in the presence of migration, albeit marginally (Combes et al. 2020).[54]

Emerging Evidence of a Positive Effect of Migration on Urban Productivity

The effects of urban density on urban labor productivity (wages) and household welfare in Sub-Saharan Africa have been little studied and are *a priori* unclear. Some argue that returns to density in developing countries could be larger because small informal firms and uneducated entrepreneurs and workers dominate (Duranton 2015). They rely more on their external environment, increasing the opportunities for resource sharing,[55] more and better-quality

matching, and more and faster learning. Others argue, however, that African cities in particular have not only low economic density[56] and higher urban costs (congestion, pollution, crime) (Grover, Lall, and Timmis 2021), but also limited access to regional and global markets. Institutional and regulatory constraints misallocate African cities' land and labor, fragment their physical development, and repel global investors (Lall, Henderson, and Venables 2017). These factors constrain the cities' production of locally traded goods and services, resulting in limited economic spillovers and low economic potential.[57] From this perspective, migration may compound the effects of ineffective urban policies that cause low economic performance rather than being the cause itself. There is, however, little direct evidence on how these different forces play out.

Most studies report somewhat larger effects of urban density in developing countries than in developed countries (Duranton 2015). Consistent with this view, a study using carefully constructed, standardized measures of urban density for six Sub-Saharan African countries shows large wage gains from being in denser urban settings, and even larger returns to density for household income (Henderson, Nigmatulina, and Kriticos 2021). Further, the effects are typically larger than such estimates for other parts of the developing world. The study establishes a positive effect of urban density on urban labor performance within the African context, but does not explore the link with migration.

New evidence further supports the notion that migrants also positively contribute to urban labor productivity and welfare, mainly by increasing urban density. In particular, the question that arises is whether the positive agglomeration effects on urban labor productivity and welfare also hold when driven by migrants. Using longitudinal individual panel data for six rounds spanning 2005/06–2015/16[58] and uniquely controlling for sorting, measurement error, and dynamic learning through individual and location fixed effects, the findings from a study from Uganda confirm the existence of sizable, positive agglomeration effects (table 2.10) (Keenan and Christiaensen 2023). In addition, they show that these effects also hold when urban density is brought about by migrants. This empirical finding is a first of its kind, and given the demanding empirical specification, is quite powerful.[59] Follow-up analysis further shows that the positive effect migrants exercise on urban labor productivity and welfare through urban density goes well beyond their effect on the age and skills structure of the urban areas they move to.[60] Migrants may also add to the speed of urban growth, which does not appear to affect urban wages or welfare negatively.

Overall, taking a more dynamic perspective, migration presents itself as a positive force of change, especially in towns and secondary cities. It reduces the dependency ratio of the urban labor force and augments the skills pool, and with natural increase and reclassification—not migration—being the driving forces of urban expansion in the past, these positive effects of migration hold even more so today and in the foreseeable future. However, these factors must

Table 2.10 The Contribution of Migrants to Urban Labor Productivity and Welfare through Agglomeration in Uganda

	Log (wages)		Log (wages)		Log (household income per adult equivalent)		Log (household consumption per adult equivalent)	
Characteristics of the urban center	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**	**(7)**	**(8)**
Log (urban population density)	1.228***		0.486**		2.385***		1.075***	
Log (urban migrant population density)		0.800*		0.814**		0.517		0.467***
Log (urban nonmigrant population density)		0.741		−0.470		2.493***		1.111***
Urban population density growth (3-year)	−0.00378		−0.00844**		0.0102**		0.00287*	
Urban migrant population density growth (3-year)		−0.00061		−0.00114		0.00171**		0.000669***
Urban nonmigrant population density growth (3-year)		0.00537		−0.00349		0.00704		0.00686***
Observations	*2,039*	*2,011*	*2,039*	*2,011*	*5,090*	*4,980*	*5,090*	*4,980*
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Local fixed effects	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Source: Keenan and Christiaensen 2023.
Note: Additional controls include, at the city level, variables to capture the agglomeration effects (log urban area [km^2], market potential), urban growth (3-year urban area growth, 3-year market potential growth), the urban age structure (child dependency ratio, elderly dependency ratio), urban skill structure (ratio of primary completed to no education; ratio of O-level or technical education completed to no education; ratio of A-level or university education to no education), urban centers' occupational diversity (Herfindahl index), agro-ecological features and shocks (average and standard deviation of annual rainfall), and number of conflict events in the district. Additional controls for individual features include age, education level indicators, household dependency ratio, and sector of employment (agriculture, manufacturing, services).
Significance level: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent.

be considered against the broader financial and institutional capacity to provide the necessary business environment and urban services to build thriving urban centers for all citizens (old and new alike), maintain an active and performant labor force, and productively absorb new entrants.[61] The next chapter of the report reviews the extent to which this is happening through deep dives into four secondary case cities in three countries (Ethiopia, Tunisia, and Uganda). More broadly, whether migrants are a positive force of change will also depend on the broader economic context within which these intermediate urban centers find themselves, such as their proximity to markets (domestic and international) and their economic base (natural resources, for example, mining and agriculture, manufacturing, services), which is a topic for further research.

Notes

1. Depending on the country, data source, and year considered, this report considers mostly between 100 and 200 districts or zones in a country, except in Mali and Sudan. Ethiopia (Labor Force Survey 2013) has 100 zones; Ghana (2010 Census) has 148 districts; Kenya (2009 Census) has 127 districts; Mali (2009 Census) has 27 districts; Sudan (2008 Census) has 86 districts; Tanzania (Living Standards Measurement Study 2010) has 169 districts; Uganda (Uganda National Household Survey 2016/17) has 113 districts.
2. In the literature, place of birth is sometimes also considered in classifying people as migrants (either independently or as an additional criterion). The tables and figures presented in this chapter take this into account for Ethiopia and Tanzania, where a migrant is defined as a person born elsewhere who moved to a district within the past 10 years (place of birth is used as an additional criterion). Consequently, those born in an urban area who lived elsewhere and moved back within the past 10 years are considered urban nonmigrants. However, in the tables in this chapter, those born elsewhere who stayed for more than 10 years in a given urban area are also classified as urban nonmigrants.
3. The focus here is on the urban labor force, that is, those employed or unemployed. Those outside the age bracket of 15–64 are not considered.
4. The World Bank longitudinal Living Standards Measurement Study–Integrated Surveys on Agriculture could, in principle, be used. The nationally representative surveys track individuals across time and space in eight African countries, constituting a notable and exceptional step in this direction. However, the surveys typically only track individuals for two to four years, preventing analysis of long-term labor market integration (https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/lsms/initiatives/lsms-ISA).
5. Conceptually, political-administrative, morphological (based on land use), and functional boundaries (flow of people and goods) can be used to distinguish urban areas from rural areas (OECD/SWAC 2020). Correspondingly, the literature speaks of cities, agglomerations, and metropolitan regions. In practice, country definitions of urban are based on numerical criteria (for example, a minimum

number of inhabitants), on space (administrative boundaries), and on function (provincial capital, local government seat, and so on), as well as any combination thereof, in effect combining notions of city, agglomeration, and metropolitan region. What people do for a living is sometimes added (for example, a maximum threshold for the share of people employed in agriculture) to reflect the notion that "urban" stands for a degree of structural transformation, and thus a shift away from economic activities that directly use primary resources (land, forests, fish) (Potts 2018). These differences result in broad heterogeneity among national definitions of "urban" results, with differing effects on the reported speed of urban growth and rate of urbanization. Potts (2018) carefully documents, for example, how the reclassification of essentially rural villages when using largely population-based criteria of urban areas (with low or outdated population thresholds to define urban areas) often leads to larger estimates of urban growth and urbanization in Africa than the observed occupational evolution in these areas would warrant.

6. See Cattaneo et al. (2022) for a discussion of the importance of considering the rural-urban continuum differentiated along the urban hierarchy.
7. Although inevitably somewhat arbitrary, new activities and services are found to be emerging mainly above the 10,000-inhabitant threshold, representing a qualitative change. In Africa, the 10,000-inhabitant threshold corresponds to 1,000–1,500 households (compared with 3,500–4,000 in Europe) (OECD/SWAC 2020). The built environment contains no unbuilt spaces greater than 200 meters between structures.
8. The UN Statistical Commission has endorsed the "Degree of Urbanization" as a recommended method for international comparisons. This definition is based on both population concentration and density.
9. These include Angola, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritania, Niger, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.
10. It is no accident that the Nobel-prize-winning Harris-Todaro model, which examines the effects of rural-urban migration on urban unemployment, was developed in the late 1960s when population growth in several African capitals was exploding. Nairobi more than doubled during the 1950s and expanded by 80 percent during the 1960s. Similarly, Dar es Salaam expanded by 103 percent and 121 percent during the 1950s and 1960s, respectively; Kampala expanded by 322 percent and 152 percent, and Accra by 114 percent and 85 percent, respectively.
11. The widespread phenomenon of *in situ* urbanization in Africa over the past decades drives urbanization in many of Africa's current urbanization hotspots, not rural-urban migration or natural urban population growth, according to OECD/SWAC (2020). The findings by Bocquier and Schoumaker (2018) and Menashe-Oren and Bocquier (2021) are based on census data, focusing on the role of urban natural increase. Regardless, they concur that rural-urban migration has become much less of a force of urbanization and urban growth in Africa than before, except in East Africa (see the section "Emerging Evidence of a Positive Effect of Migration on Urban Productivity").
12. Similarly, the World Development Indicators (based on the UN World Urbanization Prospects) place the share of urban agglomerations of more than 1 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa's urban population at 39 percent.

13. The residential information of an individual is typically not recorded at the individual level, but at a higher geographical level (enumeration area, subdistrict, district). Georeferenced information on the enumeration areas would normally suffice to classify individuals as urban and by city size, but such information is not publicly available for reasons of confidentiality. The lowest geographical level of residence available for each individual is usually the district, which holds in most of the study's sample of household surveys and censuses.
14. In Uganda, where individual residence was provided at the subdistrict level, subdistricts (instead of districts) were mapped to the urban agglomerations from Africapolis.
15. In Kenya, too many districts had agglomerations with mixed city sizes to warrant their omission. Therefore, if 70 percent of the total agglomeration area from Africapolis in the specific district consisted of one city size classification, then that district was assigned the dominant city size classification. In the end, nine districts were still dropped because the composition of agglomeration city sizes did not satisfy this criterion.
16. For the countries examined here, the city size distribution deviates most from the Africapolis city size distribution for Uganda (between 12 and 35 percentage point difference across city size categories), whereas it is almost identical in Ethiopia. In the other countries, the difference across the various size categories mostly ranges between 5 and 15 percentage points.
17. For Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, the share of the 2015 urban population living in urban agglomerations of 1 million or more reported in the World Development Indicators (consulted on April 15, 2021) is very similar to the share reported by Africapolis (39 percent and 40 percent, respectively). By country, the difference is between 4 percent and 9 percent (with the exception of Mali, where it is 25 percent). The shares of the urban population living in other city size categories are not reported in the World Development Indicators.
18. The contribution of migration to urbanization and urban growth is higher at lower levels of urbanization, especially in capitals, as in East Africa, but declines as levels increase (Bocquier and Schoumaker 2018).
19. The lower share of migrants in the urban population in Uganda is largely definitional. Only people who arrived in the past five years could be identified in the Living Standards Measurement Study. Based on the 2014 census and considering everyone who moved into the district over the past 10 years as a migrant, the migrant share of the urban population in Uganda is 19 percent.
20. The share of short-term migrants would be expected to be higher in towns than in cities if step migration among rural-urban migrants were nonnegligible. The findings in table 2.3 would broadly support such notions, with the share of short-term migrants being slightly larger in all countries listed, except in Tanzania, where short-term migration to the city is especially prevalent (58 percent compared with an average of 48 percent across all countries). Nonetheless, the difference in the share of short-term migrants between towns and cities across the four other countries is relatively small (48.4 percent, on average, in towns compared with 45.8 percent in secondary and big cities combined). The finding of some, but relatively limited, step migration is consistent with the findings reported by Lucas (2022) (box 2.1).

21. In Ethiopia, 65 percent of men migrated for employment-related reasons as compared with 45 percent of women. Similarly, in Uganda, 51 percent of men had migrated to look for work; this motivated only 31 percent of female migrants. In Tanzania, the shares were 15 percent and 5 percent, respectively. Joining the family was the most important reported reason for migration in Tanzania (for men and women alike).
22. Information on hours worked, wages, and income and expenditures is only available in the surveys, not the censuses.
23. Although expenditures do not account for public goods consumption, expenditures and consumption are used interchangeably here.
24. The sum of the coefficients on the urban-urban migrant variable and the urban-urban migrant–city interaction term is still positive.
25. This can be seen from the large, positive, statistically significant coefficient on the big city indicator variable in columns (3) to (5) of table 2.7.
26. The total wage gap for rural-urban city migrants as compared to big city nonmigrants is nearly 50 percent. To see this, the coefficients on rural-urban migrant and on the rural-urban migrant and city interaction term must be added: $(-0.19 - 0.295) \times 100 = -48.5$ percent (table 2.7, column (3)). To see the extent to which income declines for rural-urban city migrants compared with that of city nonmigrants, one must add the coefficients on rural-urban migrant and on the city–rural-urban migrant interaction term: $(0.516 - 1.016) = -0.5$, or by about 50 percent.
27. This statement is based on results from running the regressions in table 2.7 separately by gender. Results are not reported here.
28. Zhao (2020) shows how rural-urban migrants in China increase the wages of urban workers, with the effect being larger for more skilled urban workers. This happens through the accelerated occupational upgrading of urban workers (especially low- and medium-skilled workers) and an increase in demand for labor through the expansion of the number and output of industrial firms, which can now rely on a steady supply of low-skilled workers.
29. Such sorting across the urban hierarchy is observed, for example, among young college graduates in Colombia. The most talented individuals sort into big cities, primarily because they move for college and remain there afterward. Individuals moving to smaller cities for work after college are relatively less able than those who remain in the college city, but often become the highest earners in their destinations. College graduates who move to bigger cities after college typically do not outperform those in their destination city, even though they are relatively more able in the college city they come from (Bacolod, De la Roca, and Ferreyra 2021).
30. Following a similar household registration system, rural-urban migrants in Ethiopia face similar challenges in accessing urban social services.
31. Note that the age gap for rural-urban and urban-urban migrants compared with nonmigrants is calculated for three countries, while the age gap for all migrants is for six countries, explaining why the latter does not necessarily lie in between the former as in the other panels in figure 2.2.
32. The welfare comparisons between urban migrants and nonmigrants reported in table 2.7 (columns (4) and (5)) control for household dependency status and household size.

33. For example, in the big cities and small cities and large towns in the six countries studied, there are 13.9 percent and 6.0 percent more urban dwellers who completed secondary school or enjoyed some postsecondary education, respectively, than in the small towns. Correspondingly, there are 11.2 percent fewer citizens without any formal education in big cities than in small towns and 4.2 percent fewer citizens without any formal education in towns and secondary cities than in small towns. Results are not reported in figure 2.2.
34. Potentially better educational attainment among those moving to larger centers does not suffice to offset higher average education levels in these centers.
35. Older people work and earn more; migrants are younger (including urban-urban town migrants), which reduces the estimated coefficients in the absence of controls for age (table 2.8, columns (1) and (4)).
36. Only a relatively small decline in the coefficient on working hours is observed when adding age and educational controls. The wage gap also becomes slightly smaller and is no longer statistically significant.
37. One way urban-rural links manifest is through urban-rural commuting as documented in the secondary city case studies of Jinja (Uganda) and Kairouan (Tunisia) (chapter 3). The importance of accounting for the rural-urban continuum when designing development policies is reviewed in Cattaneo et al. (2022), who further advocate for the delineation of urban-rural catchment areas by travel time to the nearest urban centers, and differentiation by the position of the urban center within the urban hierarchy.
38. Wage employment, during which skills and savings are accumulated, often precedes the start up of a business and entry into the upper tier of self-employment (Basu et al. 2019).
39. If anything, the wage gap between rural-urban city migrants and nonmigrants becomes smaller instead of larger when controlling for district variables, though the effect of city characteristics within big cities is somewhat difficult to ascertain in this specification because there are only a few districts in the big cities, and the big city effect has already been controlled for.
40. The coefficients on being a migrant to a town or small city decline when controlling for city characteristics through district fixed effects (compare coefficients in table 2.9, columns (3) and (4)). In the absence of district controls and assuming migrants are more likely to go where they stand to enjoy higher consumption levels, higher welfare outcomes related to the location would be loaded on the migrant coefficients, which is what is observed for town migrants. The extent to which location choice matters in explaining welfare differences between migrants and nonmigrants in cities is harder to detect, given that there are few districts within big cities; they largely coincide.
41. Estimates are based on return patterns observed in demographic and health surveys from the 1990s and 2000s (Cattaneo and Robinson 2020). For Ethiopia (2000) and Tanzania (1999), two of the countries studied here, the return shares of male rural-urban migrants are 31 percent and 15 percent, respectively, and 15 percent and 29 percent, respectively, for female rural-urban migrants.
42. Women are less likely to return, but with high returns among those who end their marriages (as in Tanzania). Consistently, there is no substantial difference in return

rates by consumption status, and many of the returning women are also uneducated.

43. The importance of controlling for evolving migrant characteristics in studying their labor market integration has been clearly demonstrated, for example, in studying the labor market integration of international migrants in the United States (Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson 2014; Lubotsky 2007; Minns 2000).
44. The work by Combes et al. (2020) for China is a notable exception.
45. It is the difference between the rate of urban and rural increase that matters. If the two are equal, the rate of urbanization is fully driven by migration (and reclassification). In developing countries today, the rate of rural natural increase usually exceeds the rate of urban natural increase (urban areas tend to be ahead of rural areas in the demographic transition), thereby eliminating some of the effect of migration on the rate of urbanization (Jedwab, Christiaensen, and Gindelsky 2017).
46. Migration is often calculated as a remainder category after deducting urban natural increase from overall urban growth. The contribution of migration and reclassification are thereby lumped together, mainly because systematic data on reclassification as a driver of urban growth are often hard to locate.
47. Whereas the number of developing countries implementing policies to lower population growth has largely gone unchanged since 1996, the number of countries implementing policies to slow rural-urban migration tripled (from about 40 to about 120) (Farrell 2017).
48. The concept of urban growth is discussed here within the context of urban governments, which are primarily concerned with the expansion of *their* cities, not the expansion of the urban population of the country as a whole.
49. The actual rate of expansion is somewhat lower, given that some of Africa's urban growth follows from reclassification (see the section titled "Urban Hierarchy); Potts 2018). The reclassification of villages into new towns should be deducted. The absorption of neighboring villages into existing urban centers, on the other hand, is rightly included. This absorption constitutes a real urban management challenge, as highlighted during conversations with the authorities in the case city of Jinja, Uganda (chapter 3).
50. These results are based on eight countries (Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, Zambia). Similar findings were obtained when adding six more countries from East and West Africa for which only the in- and outflows of the capital and the rest of the country could be calculated, and not other urban and rural areas separately (Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda). Net migration into the capital then declined from 82 percent of the capital's population in 1975 to 12 percent in 2015.
51. A high share of industries that benefit from agglomeration economies, well-developed urban infrastructure, and effective governance allow countries to take advantage of agglomeration economies of scale. These conditions are not met in most African big cities. As a result, the absence of a positive relationship between city size and economic growth is unsurprising (Frick and Rodriguez-Pose 2016, 2018a, 2018b; Lall, Henderson, and Venables 2017).
52. This also makes them more prone to Harris-Todaro-type equilibrium conditions (Busso, Chauvin, and Herrera 2021).

53. Young adults (ages 15–29) comprise the bulk of rural-urban migration flows (career starters, family builders, and relatively easily mobilized populations). Young adult rural-urban migration remained at relatively high rates over the 1980–2015 period, with substantial effects on the urban dependency ratio—larger than either fertility or mortality. Migration for older adults (ages 30–59), while not as strong, has the opposite impact on dependency ratios. Their share has declined over the past 20 years and is more common in the opposite direction (urban to rural), or at least closer to zero (Menashe-Oren and Stecklov 2017).
54. Results control for observed individual characteristics.
55. This includes sharing of indivisible public goods, production facilities, and marketplaces as well as access to a greater variety of inputs and risk pooling, all of which enable specialization and economies of scale.
56. Low economic density may arise from slow, or high cost of, intracity mobility, resulting in segmented cities.
57. It is argued that urban nontradables do not benefit as much from density as urban tradables (Burger, Ianchovichina, and Akbar 2022), and they are harmed more by negative urban externalities such as poor intracity mobility and congestion, with especially the former (low uncongested speed) being more detrimental (Akbar et al. 2022).
58. Information on time-variant urban characteristics, including levels and growth in urban density (for nonmigrants and migrants separately) as well as levels and growth in urban area and market access, is obtained using census (2002 and 2014) and geospatial data.
59. Higher urban wages and welfare may be the result of more productive individuals moving to denser cities (as opposed to density itself) or of certain urban amenities (local heritage, productive amenities, other geographic characteristics) attracting migrants while also driving urban wages. Individual and location fixed effects help control for this; in their absence, estimates of the effect of urban density on wages would be biased upward. Similarly, individual fixed effects help control for imperfectly measured skills (education is only a proxy), at least to the extent that they are time invariant, as well as dynamic learning (to the extent that it is driven by time-invariant personality traits). The inclusion of individual and location fixed effects does not exclude potential bias related to time-variant individual and location characteristics, though a series of additional time-variant characteristics are also included to help mitigate potential bias arising from unobserved time-variant characteristics.
60. The impact of migrants‘ contribution to urban density on urban wages and welfare declines only marginally when controlling for the urban center’s dependency ratio (and slightly increases when controlling for the urban location’s skills ratios).
61. Note that by controlling for location fixed effects, the estimates also control for urban governance performance (at least the average levels) and other urban amenities that may affect urban performance. From that perspective, it is not surprising to find lower density effects on wages when omitting local fixed effects, especially if urban governance issues are even more pronounced in cities than in towns (table 2.10, columns (1) and (3), and columns (2) and (4)). Such a decline in the effect of density on wages would also be consistent with the notion of sorting based on urban amenities that improve urban performance.

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Chapter 3

Case City Insights from Three Countries

Introduction

This chapter presents four case city deep dives from three case countries, each representing strikingly different settings: Jijiga in Ethiopia, Jinja in Uganda, and Jendouba and Kairouan in Tunisia. Jijiga is the regional capital of the Somali Regional State of Ethiopia, a thriving trading center on the trade corridor between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Djibouti in an otherwise largely arid, sparsely populated, and culturally and linguistically distinct region. It has experienced rapid growth in population and built-up area, mainly from an influx of people in search of better opportunities. Ethiopia itself has low urbanization rates and a unique residency permit system that requires citizens to hold a permit to access urban services. Jinja, situated 80 kilometers from the capital of Uganda, Kampala, also has high economic potential (ranking fourth among 32 cities analyzed for economic potential in Uganda). It has a history of hosting manufacturing and agro-processing businesses; it is a tourist destination; and it is suitably located along major trading route corridors on Lake Victoria. It was upgraded to city status in 2020 and is a commuting city that hosts five times more people during the day than at night (Cities Alliance 2016). Jendouba and Kairouan in Tunisia are intermediate cities in the two poorest internal regions of Tunisia; each faces challenges in ensuring economic and social inclusion for its citizens (including rural migrants), while part of each city's population is also leaving in search of better opportunities in larger cities.

The chapter situates each case city within the broader urbanization and migration dynamic in its respective country, followed by migrant and city perspectives on how migrants integrate into the city and how their quality of

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life could be improved. To this end, the chapter draws on a mix of qualitative methods (life history interviews, focus group discussions, key informant interviews) and representative quantitative household surveys (Tunisia, Uganda).[1] The key findings are summarized here. Background papers provide more in-depth information.[2]

The Case of Jijiga, Ethiopia

Urbanization and Internal Migration in Ethiopia

Ethiopia, Africa's second most populous country with a population of approximately 110 million, is urbanizing quickly from a low base. Estimated at only 17.3 percent in 2012, Ethiopia's urban population share was one of the lowest in the world, well below the Sub-Saharan African average of 37 percent. However, this is set to change dramatically. According to official figures from the Ethiopian Central Statistical Agency, the urban population is projected to nearly triple from 15.2 million in 2012 to 42.3 million in 2037, growing 3.8 percent a year. The World Bank's 2016 Urbanization Review estimates a higher urban population growth rate of 5.4 percent a year, with the urban population tripling by 2034. Natural increases were the main driver of urban population growth until 2018, whereas rural-to-urban migration has recently been a more important driver (World Bank 2015a).

Most urban population growth in the coming decades in Ethiopia is expected to happen in towns and secondary cities. The population in secondary cities, defined here as cities with 100,000 to 500,000 inhabitants, is expected to increase from 3.5 million in 2015 to more than 20 million by 2035 (figure 3.1). Similarly, the population of small towns (less than 50,000) is projected to increase to 21 million by 2035, up from 9 million in 2015. If managed well, this rapid urban population growth presents an opportunity to shift the structure and location of economic activity from rural agriculture to the larger, more diversified urban industrial and service sectors. However, if managed poorly, rapid urban population growth will pose challenges as cities struggle to provide jobs, infrastructure, services, and housing. Infrastructure and service delivery are already stretched thin in many cities because of rapid urban expansion and overextended municipal budgets, while formal labor markets are failing to keep up with the demand for jobs.

Cities and towns in Ethiopia have experienced rapid poverty reduction in recent years. The urban poverty headcount dropped from 26 percent in 2011 to 15 percent in 2016; this dynamic was strongest in small and medium towns (figure 3.2). This reduction in poverty was mainly driven by strong employment growth and increased self-employment (accompanied by higher returns), the main form of employment of the poor. Labor market developments have

Figure 3.1 **Urban Population Trends and Projections in Ethiopia, 2007–35**



Source: Schmidt et al. 2018.

Figure 3.2 **Contribution to Urban Poverty Reduction by City Size in Ethiopia, 2011–16**



Source: World Bank calculations based on 2016 Household Consumption Expenditure Survey (Ethiopia CSA 2016).

reversed since 2016, with widespread unrest resulting in a sharp increase in urban unemployment.

Ethiopia has traditionally been a low-mobility country; according to the 2013 Labor Force Survey (the most recent survey with information on migration), internal migration has remained limited. In the five years before the 2013

Labor Force Survey, more than 6 percent of Ethiopians changed their zone of residence (table 3.1).[3] Though the scale of internal migration did not increase between 1999 and 2013, its pattern changed, with rural-urban migration becoming the dominant migration flow between 2008 and 2013 (figure 3.3), and it has remained so since. Although smaller cities and towns attracted the most rural migrants as a share of their population (table 3.1), in absolute terms, Addis Ababa has been the main destination, with nearly 40 percent of all rural migrants moving to the capital.

Table 3.1 Recent and Lifetime Internal Migrants as a Share of the Population in Ethiopia, by Year

	1999		2005		2013	
	Recent migrants (%)	Lifetime migrants (%)	Recent migrants (%)	Lifetime migrants (%)	Recent migrants (%)	Lifetime migrants (%)
Whole country	5.70	32.34	7.52	28.17	6.49	22.59
Rural areas	3.61	25.88	4.93	20.58	3.49	13.42
Urban areas	16.87	66.51	19.99	64.64	17.25	55.41
City						
Adama	—	—	16.89	71.72	21.66	69.57
Addis Ababa	9.00	60.08	7.92	53.33	9.61	46.41
Adigrat	25.13	82.94	21.26	68.89	12.67	42.86
Arba Minch	25.55	82.11	26.23	77.95	19.03	64.73
Asosa	38.69	92.46	26.47	80.82	24.88	74.57
Assela	—	—	25.07	70.99	22.12	69.98
Awassa	31.43	78.80	25.66	75.81	22.75	71.63
Bahir Dar	—	—	23.09	69.83	26.17	69.69
Bishoftu	—	—	13.52	59.39	20.01	58.25
Debre Birhan	—	—	26.16	74.18	17.79	53.61
Dessie	—	—	18.15	67.62	14.32	49.61
Dire Dawa	14.01	70.29	13.81	68.29	10.63	49.71
Gambela	19.05	79.22	22.18	75.33	14.13	54.57
Gonder	39.73	73.97	22.40	66.54	11.99	52.58
Harar	16.14	63.83	13.63	56.67	12.54	48.41
Jijiga	17.26	68.69	13.32	55.95	10.82	37.72
Jimma	—	—	14.62	57.38	18.55	60.41
Mekele	22.46	66.11	17.26	67.06	15.87	49.19
Nekemte	—	—	15.42	61.31	26.04	73.82
Shashemene	26.72	72.50	15.87	68.93	22.12	62.76
Sodo	27.78	88.89	30.73	66.96	16.93	54.77

Source: World Bank calculations, based on Labor Force Survey data (Ethiopia CSA 1999, 2005, 2013).
Note: Recent migrants are individuals who moved less than five years before survey data collection. Based on the population ages 15 and over. — = not available.

Figure 3.3 **Share of Migration in Ethiopia, by Type and Year**



Source: Ethiopia CSA (1999, 2005, 2013).
Note: Migrants are defined here as individuals who moved less than five years before survey data collection. Based on the population ages 15 and over.

Internal migration in Ethiopia is driven by education and demographics. Statistical analysis shows that younger and better-educated rural dwellers are more likely to migrate compared with older or less-educated villagers; this is true for both rural-urban and intrarural migration. The effect of education is strong, with rural dwellers who obtained at least some secondary education being 26 percentage points more likely to migrate, all else being equal (most rural-urban migrants have only primary school education). Rural-urban migration has a dual nature, with young and relatively less educated women moving to Addis Ababa for domestic work and slightly older and better-educated rural dwellers moving to secondary urban centers to work in commerce, agriculture, and services. The characteristics of the zone of origin also influences the propensity to migrate; people in rural zones with high population densities were more likely to migrate, which is consistent with the potential role of land shortages. Poverty and remoteness inhibited migration, with people in zones with a higher poverty rate and at a greater distance from an all-weather road being less likely to move. As in other countries, rural-urban migration comes with material benefits; rural-urban migrants in Ethiopia experience substantial gains in real consumption levels (de Brauw, Mueller, and Woldehanna 2017).

Although rural migrants tend to be better educated than rural "stayers" (those who stay in their home villages), they are significantly less educated than urban nonmigrants and engage in different types of jobs. According to

the 2013 Labor Force Survey, more than 57 percent of rural migrants in urban areas had not completed primary school (last column of table 3.2) as compared with only 36 percent of urban nonmigrants. At the other end of the spectrum, 13 percent of migrants had completed secondary education or higher as compared with 25 percent of urban nonmigrants. These differences in education translate into different patterns of employment. Rural migrants are less likely to have permanent wage jobs in the public or private sector or to be self-employed in the formal sector and are instead more likely to work as temporary or casual labor and in informal self-employment. Rural migrants are also less likely to be unemployed or inactive than urban nonmigrants, a pattern that can partly be explained by migrants' readiness to take up any manual labor opportunities while better-educated nonmigrants queue for permanent wage jobs (World Bank 2015b). Differences in education and employment structure between migrants and nonmigrants are smaller in smaller towns; in small towns, rural migrants actually drive up the skill level of the local labor pool.[4] On the other hand, urban-urban migrants tend to be better educated than urban nonmigrants (data not reported here), with the education premium declining as city size increases.

Low migration rates can partly be explained by persistent low education levels in rural Ethiopia, but also by factors related to land and identification (ID) policy. Land in Ethiopia is government owned; leaving one's rural *kebele* (village) of origin for longer than a predefined period means forsaking one's rights to land. In certain regions of Ethiopia (land is a regional mandate), gaining nonfarm employment can mean losing access to land, which discourages migration and diversification. In addition, Ethiopia does not have a national ID, instead using a system of local IDs linked to one's kebele of birth. Access to public services or support schemes in kebeles outside one's own kebele is limited, though cities have considerable discretion in setting their own rules.[5] Obtaining an urban kebele ID card is often a long and cumbersome process for rural migrants.

Despite the barriers to migration and the lack of recent data, the view that rural-urban migration has skyrocketed in recent years is widely accepted. Poor weather, unrest, and conflicts in various parts of the country have led to substantial population movements and have likely increased the relative attractiveness of urban areas. Increased land fragmentation in certain parts of the highlands means that land cannot be subdivided further, leaving a large cohort of young people functionally landless. Qualitative research suggests that rural migrants face a myriad of difficulties in their destination towns and cities, including trouble finding accommodations and jobs, a lack of familiarity with urban life, harassment by local authorities, limited access to public services and support schemes (because they lack the kebele ID), and, in some cases, linguistic and cultural differences.

Table 3.2 Characteristics of Rural Migrants Compared to Urban Nonmigrants in Ethiopia, by Location

	Addis Ababa		Major towns		Medium towns		Small towns		All urban centers	
	Migrant	Nonmigrant	Migrant	Nonmigrant	Migrant	Nonmigrant	Migrant	Nonmigrant	Migrant	Nonmigrant
Sex										
Male	35.1***	49.3	40.8***	49.2	44.6***	49.3	47.6	50.3	43.6***	49.4
Female	64.9	50.7	59.2	50.8	55.4	50.7	52.4	49.7	56.4	50.6
Education										
No education	20.8***	3.1	19.2***	9.2	22.4***	14.7	26.0***	20.5	23.1***	11.4
Primary incomplete	44.6***	14.5	37.3***	22.6	32.2**	28.9	30.6	32.8	34.2***	24.3
Primary complete	10.2	9.5	9.7***	11.5	9.5**	11.6	8.8**	10.9	9.3***	10.7
Secondary incomplete	17.5***	30.4	20.1***	29.3	20.6***	27.2	17.7***	22.8	19.1***	27.6
Secondary complete	2.2***	18.6	3.7***	10.8	3.8***	5.4	1.9***	3.4	2.9***	10.0
Postsecondary	4.7***	23.6	9.5***	16.2	10.8	10.5	12.5***	8.3	10.2***	15.0
Adult education	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.5	0.7***	1.8	2.5***	1.4	1.2	1.0
Employment status										
Public employee	6.4***	24.9	13.0***	22.6	19.1	20.0	21.1	20.2	17.1***	21.9
Private employee (permanent)	21.7	23.3	7.7	8.4	5.7***	2.6	2.2	1.4	6.9***	9.5
Private employee (temporary)	39.8***	16.0	32.2***	13.8	19.6***	8.3	8.3	6.5	20.4***	11.1
Private employee (contract)	5.0	5.6	4.4	4.0	2.6**	1.5	2.6	1.6	3.2	3.2
Private employee (casual)	6.7***	2.4	4.9**	3.6	3.8**	2.1	1.7	1.0	3.6***	2.2

(continued next page)

Table 3.2 **Characteristics of Rural Migrants Compared to Nonmigrants in Ethiopia, by Location** (continued)

	Addis Ababa		Major towns		Medium towns		Small towns		All urban centers	
	Migrant	Nonmigrant	Migrant	Nonmigrant	Migrant	Nonmigrant	Migrant	Nonmigrant	Migrant	Nonmigrant
Self-employment (formal)	2.7***	9.1	2.2***	4.1	1.5***	3.4	1.3***	3.0	1.7***	5.1
Self-employment (informal)	14.3	14.4	27.7**	30.8	34.1*	37.2	38.1	37.2	31.9***	29.4
Other	3.5	4.3	7.9***	12.8	13.6***	25.0	24.8**	29.3	15.3***	17.6
NEET	23.1**	25.6	20.4***	23.9	19.4	20.4	13.0***	18.3	17.9***	22.2
Unemployment	20.4***	26.1	17.1***	22.9	14.2***	18.4	7.6***	12.8	13.3***	20.3
Hours worked (main job)	52.7***	47.5	48.1***	44.9	40.2***	36.9	29.9***	34.9	39.2***	40.8
Real wage (birr)[a]	1,411.0***	2,291.5	1,052.0***	1,540.4	2,213.0	2,001.2	2,151.1	2,122.2	1,841.9	2,034.9
Age (mean)	23.0***	29.0	24.0***	28.0	26.0***	28.0	27.0	28.0	26.0***	28.0
Observations	1,850	11,829	4,077	12,196	3,235	7,752	2,022	3,622	11,239	35,481
Observations (employment)	1,133	5,776	2,477	5,921	1,986	3,785	1,356	1,836	6,985	17,353

Source: World Bank calculations, based on 2013 Labor Force Survey data (Ethiopia CSA 2013).
Note: The table compares migrants from rural areas with nonmigrants. All individuals ages 15–64 are included. Migrants are only those who moved from rural areas. NEET = not in education, employment, or training.
a. Monthly real wage at 2013 prices.
Mean separation test: ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

Jijiga

The Ethiopia case study on rural-urban migration focuses on Jijiga, the regional capital of the Somali Regional State of Ethiopia. The Somali Region is one of 10 regional states in Ethiopia and borders Kenya and Somalia. The region is largely arid and sparsely populated, and most of its population are seminomadic livestock herders. The Somali Region is culturally and linguistically distinct from the core of Ethiopia, speaking Somali and adhering to Islam rather than Orthodox Christianity. Jijiga is strategically located on the trade corridor between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Djibouti, and vibrant trade and commerce dominate economic activity in the city (map 3.1). Like many other cities in Ethiopia, Jijiga has been growing fast, both in population and built-up area, mainly because of the migration of people in search of better opportunities (map 3.2). In the absence of a recent census (the last census was carried out in 2007), the population of Jijiga was estimated at 221,000 in 2020, making it the tenth largest city in Ethiopia.

Map 3.1 Jijiga's Strategic Location on Trade Routes with Somalia and Djibouti

Source: World Bank.

Map 3.2 Jijiga's Growth since 2000

a. Jijiga, 1990



b. Jijiga, 2000



c. Jijiga, 2015



Source: World Bank, using World Settlement Footprint 2015. https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.10048412.v1.

The unemployment rate in Jijiga, at approximately 20 percent in 2018, is similar to that of urban Ethiopia. However, there is a pronounced gender effect, with male unemployment being lower in Jijiga (as compared with urban Ethiopia) but female unemployment much higher (figure 3.4). In line with urban Ethiopia in general, wage employment accounts for the single largest share of employment in Jijiga. In 2018, 56 percent of employed people in Jijiga were engaged in wage employment, as compared with 53 percent for urban Ethiopia as a whole.

Figure 3.4 **Poverty and Unemployment, Jijiga and Urban Ethiopia, 2018**



Source: Urban Employment and Unemployment Survey (Ethiopia CSA 2018).

Figure 3.5 **Composition of Employment, Jijiga and Urban Ethiopia, 2018**



Source: Urban Employment and Unemployment Survey (Ethiopia CSA 2018).

The higher wage share in Jijiga is especially due to relatively higher employment in the public sector (figure 3.5). In 2018, wages were significantly higher in Jijiga than in urban Ethiopia, but this must be interpreted carefully given the limited number of observations from Jijiga. According to official data, poverty rates in Jijiga are the lowest in the country.

In line with the national numbers in table 3.2, migrants in Jijiga were more likely to be employed than nonmigrants, but they tended to work in different sectors. In the 2013 Labor Force Survey, 59 percent of migrants in Jijiga (ages 15–64) were employed, as compared with 38 percent of nonmigrants (table 3.3). Wages for migrants were lower, though this is explained by their younger age and lower education levels and not by the mere fact of their being migrants. Migrants were more likely than nonmigrants to work in manufacturing and family-oriented services (mainly female migrants working as domestic workers in households). Nonmigrants were more likely to work in more skill-intensive sectors, such as financial and business-oriented services and public administration.

Regression analysis confirms that migrants in Jijiga have a higher employment rate and work more hours than nonmigrants. Migrants from other urban areas were 20 percentage points more likely to be employed than Jijiga

Table 3.3 Migrants' and Nonmigrants' Employment Profile in Jijiga

	Migrant	Nonmigrant
Employed (% yes)	59.2	37.9***
Unemployed (% yes)	7.0	9.0*
Inactive (% yes)	33.7	53.0**
Observations	*693*	*954*
Paid employee (% yes)	53.4	50.6
Self-employed (% yes)	45.8	47.6
Observations	*407*	*370*
Wage in Ethiopian birr/month (only for wage employed)	1,990	2,738**
Observations	*221*	*186*
Agriculture (% yes)	3.6	3.5
Manufacturing (% yes)	8.6	5.3**
Construction (% yes)	14.4	10.1
Commerce (% yes)	24.6	28.2
Transport and communications (% yes)	10.7	12.6
Financial and business-oriented services (% yes)	4.2	7.9**
Public administration, education, health (% yes)	15.9	21.4**
Community and family-oriented services (% yes)	15.7	7.3**
Observations	*407*	*370*

Source: World Bank calculations, based on 2013 Labor Force Survey data (Ethiopia CSA 2013).
Note: Migrants are individuals who moved to Jijiga at most 10 years before survey data collection. Based on the population ages 15 and over.
Means difference test: ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

Table 3.4 Employment, Hours, and Wages of Migrants Compared with Nonmigrants in Jijiga

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Variables	**Employed**	**Hours worked**	**Wages**
Urban migrant	0.200***	26.87***	–534.0
	(0.0548)	(6.313)	(420.9)
Rural migrant	0.303***	39.18***	–884.6
	(0.0413)	(5.472)	(566.6)
Male	0.232***	31.39***	1,461***
	(0.0254)	(4.236)	(366.0)
Incomplete primary education	0.0386	2.093	–571.0
	(0.0331)	(4.838)	(600.0)
Complete primary education	0.0741	7.230	520.6
	(0.0598)	(8.561)	(1,645)
Complete secondary education	0.0344	–0.729	–696.0
	(0.0481)	(5.620)	(624.6)
Complete postsecondary education	0.301***	22.54***	1,548*
	(0.0419)	(5.430)	(857.4)
Observations	*1,632*	*1,632*	*403*

Source: World Bank.
Note: Column (1) shows the results, in marginal effects, of a logistical regression. Column (2) shows the results, in marginal effects, of a Tobit estimation of hours worked per week. Column (3) shows the results of a regression of monthly wage. Each regression includes age and marital status. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

nonmigrants, while rural migrants were 30 percentage points more likely to be employed (table 3.4, column (1)). Rural and urban migrants also worked significantly more hours than nonmigrants (table 3.4, column (2)). Controlling for other characteristics such as gender and education, migrants do not earn lower wages than nonmigrants (as shown by the nonsignificant coefficients on the migration variables in table 3.4, column (3)).

Migration to Jijiga: The Migrant Perspective

Despite its distinct culture, religion, and language, Jijiga attracts migrants from all over Ethiopia. Most of the participants in the qualitative research migrated from rural areas of Amhara and the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region (see box 3.1 for information on the research design used in Jijiga). Migrants are attracted to Jijiga because of the perceived widespread availability of low-skilled jobs and higher wages as compared with other cities. Most migrants obtained information on employment prospects in Jijiga before migrating, most often from friends, family, and peers from the same home village who had previously migrated to Jijiga. Motivations to migrate in the first place were, without exception, linked to a lack of income-generating opportunities and poor living conditions in the rural areas the migrants hailed from.

BOX 3.1

Qualitative Research Design in Jijiga

To better understand the opportunities and challenges of rural migrants in Jijiga and contrast these with nonmigrants, in 2020 a small-scale qualitative research study was implemented. The study consisted of 12 focus group discussions with different groups of migrants stratified by migration status (recent migrants, longer-term migrants, and nonmigrants) and gender (table B3.1.1); 24 life history Interviews with individuals selected from different categories stratified by migration status and gender; and 13 key informant interviews with local authorities, officials, and experts from various sector offices. Overall, 72 young people participated in the focus group discussions and life history interviews, spread between migrants (48) and nonmigrants (24), split evenly across gender. Male and female focus group discussions were conducted separately.

Most of the participants in the study were young and low-skilled, reflecting the general profile of rural migrants. More than 70 percent of participants were between 18 and 21 years old; 70 percent had primary education or lower. Most participants were single. Most of the participants were wage-employed, reflecting both the employment structure in Jijiga and the fact that migrants are less likely to be self-employed.

Table B3.1.1 Characteristics of Participants in the Qualitative Study

Characteristic	Category	*N*	%
Age	18–21	47	73
	22–30	17	27
	Total	64	100
Education	Primary (grades 1–8)	45	70
	Secondary (grades 9–12)	15	23
	College or university	4	7
	Total	64	100
Marital status	Married	18	28
	Single	43	67
	Separated or divorced	3	5
	Total	64	100
Employment status	Wage-employed	38	59
	Self-employed	24	38
	Unemployed	2	3
	Total	64	100

Source: World Bank.

Although entering the city can be challenging for migrants, finding employment is less so. At the city entrance, incoming buses must stop at police checkpoints for security checks. Migrants, who lack identification documents issued by the city (the so-called kebele ID), are often extorted by police who could block their entrance into the city. For example, a male migrant stated, "When I arrived at Jijiga for the very first time, I feared a lot. The policemen mistreated me upon arrival and asked me for money to pass the checkpoint at the town entrance. I paid them a 100 birr bribe to enter the town. I had to also call a friend of mine from Jijiga town to beg them to allow me to enter the town. On that same day, they had sent back three other newly coming migrants at the checkpoint." However, once this barrier is passed, finding employment appears to be surprisingly easy. Most migrants managed to find work within two weeks of arrival in Jijiga. The majority of migrants found casual employment in daily labor and construction and, for young women, domestic work. Migrants use informal networks and brokers to make contact with potential employers.

In contrast to migrants, nonmigrants found it more difficult to find jobs. This challenge is linked to the different kinds of jobs nonmigrants aspire to. Whereas migrants tend to take any available job for immediate subsistence reasons, nonmigrants search for permanent and public service jobs. However, such jobs are relatively scarce, resulting in long spells of unemployment. Most nonmigrants are reluctant to engage in activities characterized by manual labor and relatively low, irregular wages. Though migrants and nonmigrants clearly operate in different segments of the labor market, nonmigrants blamed high in-migration for the challenges they faced in finding employment, citing stiffer competition from migrants. Female nonmigrants in particular faced difficulties in finding employment, which they ascribed to widespread cultural barriers and stereotypes according to which women should stay at home and handle household chores.[6] Female migrants, in contrast, found employment easily given the high demand for domestic workers in Jijiga.

Though most migrants are relatively low skilled (primary education or less), the better-educated migrants typically engaged in similar jobs as the low-skilled ones. There is an understanding, shared by migrants and nonmigrants alike, that jobs that require higher levels of schooling or college are the privilege of nonmigrants. A female nonmigrant said, "There is distinction between migrant and nonmigrant. For example, if a given migrant has similar credentials and qualification with mine, I would certainly be picked for the job."

Though migrants secured jobs easily, the jobs themselves were challenging. Migrants mainly highlighted excessively long working hours and delays or irregularities in payment, which they cannot do much about given their informal status and their dependence on the job. A majority of female migrants who engaged in domestic work also suffered domestic abuse.

Interactions with and perceptions of local authorities strongly differ between migrants and nonmigrants. Migrants expressed frustration about a lack of service

provision and support from the Jijiga city and kebele administrations. The majority of migrants hold a common perception that they are not welcome to any kind of service offered by the city and kebele administrations. The feeling of exclusion from public services and support was expressed by one of the experienced female migrants. "I don't really feel as if I am living in Ethiopia. It does not seem I am living in Ethiopia." Migrants reported having access to the public hospital but no access to any employment or livelihood services offered by the city administration because of lack of a city kebele ID. Migrants explained that this meant they could not advance to more lucrative activities that require official permits and licenses, for which a kebele ID is required (for instance, obtaining a driver's license requires a kebele ID, as does obtaining a business license that would enable formal self-employment). Nonmigrants had better access to employment opportunities requiring formal credentials but also expressed low expectations regarding the city authorities' capacity to address the youth employment challenge, mainly because of excessive bureaucracy and perceived corruption.

Despite difficult relations with local authorities and the police, migrants intended to stay in Jijiga for the foreseeable future. Though their jobs are often hard and insecure, the majority of migrants reported that living conditions in Jijiga are better than in their place of origin; most migrants were content with their decision to migrate to Jijiga. Migrants aspired to have their own businesses, with male migrants aspiring to obtain a driver's license and have their own "Bajaj" (three-wheel motorized vehicle for taxi services) and female migrants wanting to start their own small businesses such as boutiques and restaurants. These activities, however, would require them to have a kebele ID.

Migration to Jijiga: The City's Perspective

City authorities and sector offices interviewed for the study in 2020 confirmed that the number of labor migrants coming to Jijiga has increased over the years—a trend they describe as alarming. City authorities believe that relatively better job opportunities with attractive payment and high labor demand for construction work and daily labor attract labor migrants to Jijiga. In addition to these "pull" factors, the authorities indicate that various conflicts and ethnic clashes in neighboring regions and several parts of the country pushed many migrants to Jijiga in the late 2010s.

In line with earlier research on internal migration in Ethiopia, city authorities expressed a largely negative view of migration. The main reasons cited were the increase in the unemployment rate and competition for scarce jobs between migrants and nonmigrants, the expansion of informal settlements and illegal trade, escalating rental prices, and security threats such as robbery and theft. City and sector officials stressed that interventions at the national and regional level should aim to support migrants in their places of origin and that the main policy direction should be to restrict migration to the city because of competing priorities. A representative of the mayor's office stated, "There are different

possibilities and opportunities for migrants. They can at least survive on their own, by working in the town freely. To tell you the truth, greater attention should be given to the local residents. Thus, there are competing priorities we should address first. It is after that we can deal with the situation of migrants."

The city authorities acknowledged the issue of the kebele ID and explained that migrants typically cannot meet the criteria required to apply for this ID. Living in the city for at least six months and having a fixed and identified residence are the key requirements. Because migrants typically live together in informal housing and frequently move from one place to another in search of lower rent, they cannot meet the criteria. In addition, kebele officials stress that they do not give migrants kebele IDs because they lack comprehensive data on migrants in the town and there are security threats, given that the town borders unstable neighboring areas (for instance, Somalia).

The lack of comprehensive records and data on migrants was frequently mentioned as an obstacle to providing services to them. The city authorities and sector offices suggested there should be a continuous registry of migrants for predictable and comprehensive interventions, such as providing kebele IDs and other legal documents and licenses required for access to public services, including employment services and loans from the Micro and Small Enterprises Development Agency. Simultaneously, the authorities also emphasized that the local capacity to keep data on migrants up to date was insufficient.

Moving Forward: Leveraging Migration for the Benefit of Both the City and the Migrant

The qualitative research in Jijiga highlighted the opposing views held by migrants and city authorities. The migrants' point of view is that they are trying to improve their lives by leaving home and migrating to a place with better job opportunities and that the city authorities try to make this harder by restricting equal access to services enjoyed by their fellow citizens who were born in the city as well as through frequent harassment by law enforcement bodies. The view of city authorities and nonmigrants is that migrants are the root cause of urban sprawl, unemployment, and insecurity in the city and that efforts should focus on keeping migrants in their home communities through job opportunity programs in their rural places of origin. City authorities hold that scarce public resources should be invested in improving the living standards of the local city population.

These opposing views seem to arise, at least in part, from a misunderstanding of migrants' position in the local labor market. The qualitative research has shown that rural migrants tend to engage in the lower end of the labor market, taking casual jobs in construction, manual labor, and, for women, domestic services. These are jobs that most local youth in Jijiga, with their relatively higher levels of education, are not interested in; they aim instead for higher-quality permanent jobs and employment in the public sector. High levels of unemployment among migrants and nonmigrants in Jijiga are more likely to be

a consequence of limited economywide formal sector job creation rather than competition from low-skilled rural migrants.

The case could be made that migrants have in fact contributed to the rapid development and growth of Ethiopian cities, including Jijiga since the early 2010s. High unemployment rates among urban nonmigrants, who aim for permanent formal sector jobs, coincide with low unemployment rates among migrants. The finding that migrants find work quickly indicates high demand for casual labor and family services that cannot be satisfied by the local labor force, given the reluctance of nonmigrants to engage in these activities. The labor market in Jijiga is segmented, as it is in cities in Ethiopia in general, and is characterized by high demand for casual and low-skilled (and poorly paid) labor provided by migrants and relatively low demand for graduates competing for a limited number of mainly public sector jobs. In this labor market, competition between migrants and nonmigrants is limited, and the physical development of the city depends on migrant labor. Rural migrants seem to complement the skills mix of the local labor pool by supplying labor for highly sought-after tasks that local labor does not supply, much as has been observed in China (Combes et al. 2020).

Migrants thus make positive contributions to Jijiga's development, but with extra strains that are highly visible, especially in the housing market. The development of unplanned informal settlements on the outskirts of town is likely partly fueled by migration. Migration can also contribute to overcrowding of public health facilities and public transport, stress on water infrastructure, or extra strain on the provision of public services in general. Cities in low-income countries struggle to provide services to rapidly increasing populations under severe resource and capacity constraints. Under such circumstances, having to share limited resources with a growing population of "outsiders" can easily cause frustration among hosting populations and authorities, although migration to cities and towns can be a boon here as well, given that it is more cost-effective to provide services to dense urban populations than to scattered rural populations. The key issue is, however, the discrepancy between planning and financing service delivery at the urban local government level and the rapidity of local urban population growth.

In Ethiopia, urban local governments have traditionally been financed by fiscal transfers from the federal level, augmented by a city's own municipal revenues. Together, these resources are meant to finance cities' recurrent expenditures, leaving little to no room to finance capital expenditures. To respond to this shortfall, a special intergovernmental grant was added to finance urban development. Both intergovernmental transfers are based on a formula that uses population size as a main parameter. As a mobile and unregistered group, migrants are underrepresented in official statistics and are thus not considered in service delivery budgeting and planning. This complicates service delivery to migrants who, because they lack a kebele ID, are not considered urban residents and are thus not budgeted for.

Making migration more beneficial to both migrants and host cities and towns will require intervention and reform on several levels. At the federal level, planning and budgeting for service delivery at the urban local government level would need to explicitly take human mobility into account, adding an extra layer of complexity to an already complex process. This effort will require better data on the scale and composition of migrant inflows, as highlighted by the local authorities interviewed for the Jijiga study. In light of capacity constraints, partnering with civil society or local research organizations could be helpful. Given widespread negative attitudes and perceptions about migrants, awareness would need to be raised regarding the motivations and experiences of labor migrants, the challenges they face, and the contributions they make to arrive at a broader, more nuanced view of migration and migrants. Without this awareness, introducing and promoting policies and interventions to facilitate the integration of migrants into urban labor markets and ensuring their right to access public services like any regular citizen may prove very difficult.

Migration to Jijiga and other cities in Ethiopia will likely continue to increase in the coming years and decades. As young generations of Ethiopians become better educated, they will increasingly leave the farms to seek better opportunities in towns and cities. This spatial transformation of society is inextricably linked to social and economic development and contributes to growth and poverty reduction; it also increases pressure on already limited city budgets and infrastructure. The challenge for Jijiga, as for other cities in Ethiopia, is to leverage this fast growth and in-migration for the benefit of both the city and the migrants. Although certain important actions are beyond the immediate control of city authorities (such as budgeting for service delivery at the city level), the city authority can nevertheless undertake a number of initiatives to make migration more beneficial to the migrant and the city. Among others, the research conducted in Jijiga suggests two potential initiatives:

- *Issue business permits and licenses.* Currently, migrants cannot establish formal enterprises or become formally self-employed because they lack a kebele ID. Self-employed migrants are thus by definition informal. Issuing formal business licenses to migrants could expand the city's tax base while protecting migrants from harassment by local law enforcement bodies.
- *Information, documentation, and registry.* As emphasized by key informants, the lack of reliable documented data and information on migrants makes it difficult to register migrants as nonmigrants and provide them with IDs, which in turn leads to their exclusion from public services and support. Thus, one of the basic measures to address this difficulty would be to establish a database of migrant flows, potentially in collaboration with local research organizations or civil society organizations. The feasibility of this effort can be assessed through a pilot.

The Case of Jinja, Uganda

Urbanization and Internal Migration in Uganda

Despite current low levels of urbanization, Uganda's urban population has been growing since 1960 at a rate of 6 percent or more annually, except for a period after 1970 characterized by political instability and civil war (World Bank 2021c). In comparison, rural population growth was hovering at about 3 percent annually (World Bank 2021c), despite a much higher rural fertility rate of 5.9 births per woman in 2020 as compared with 4 births per woman in urban areas (World Bank 2020). The low level of urbanization in 2019 (24 percent), while somewhat puzzling, can be explained by the very high minimum population threshold (25,000 inhabitants as defined in the Local Governments Act 1997 [CAP 243]) used by the national government when defining "urban" areas in Uganda (Sladoje, Randolph, and Khan 2019). Using a spatial approach for measuring urbanization as in the Africapolis database managed by the OECD (2020) (map 3.3), Uganda's urbanization level would

Map 3.3 Uganda and Its Towns and Cities



Source: World Bank, based on OECD (2020).
Note: By 2060, Uganda will reach an urbanization level of 50 percent (using national definitions of urban areas), and cities other than Kampala are forecast to grow even faster than the capital. Indeed, between 2002 and 2014—the years of the last two population censuses—the urban population doubled from 4 million to 8 million (World Bank 2020, 2021c), while the country's overall population density grew by 41 percent (Mensah and O'Sullivan 2017). Uganda's urban population is expected to exceed its rural population by 2060, reaching between 46 million and 53 million (World Bank 2020). This would add 35 million to 42 million people to the current urban population of 11 million, roughly 1 million per year (figure 3.6). Also, between the 2002 and 2014 censuses, the population in other secondary cities and towns grew by 7 percent, as compared with 5 percent in Kampala.

Figure 3.6 Urban and Rural Population in Uganda, Projected to 2060



Source: World Bank 2021c

have been 39 percent in 2015; the official statistics for 2015 recorded only 22 percent (United Nations 2019).

Outside of the metropolitan area of Kampala, secondary cities and towns are still relatively small, rarely surpassing the 200,000 mark (figure 3.7). Kampala dominates the country's urban system, with an estimated 4.3 million inhabitants in the metropolitan region (Sladoje, Randolph, and Khan 2019), which includes the larger cities of Nansana, Kira, Makindye Ssabagabo, and Kyengera. Uganda has four regions—Central, Eastern, Northern, and Western; within these are 135 districts, which are further subdivided into counties and municipalities. Kampala, not shown in figure 3.7 because of scale, is located in the most populous Central region.

Apart from the redrawing of administrative boundaries, both natural growth and migration contribute to urban population growth. Estimates (figure 3.8) drawn from the two censuses in this analysis[7] indicate that population growth in Kampala between 2002 and 2014 was driven by migration (31 percent) and reclassification (27 percent), with intradistrict migration (22 percent) and natural growth (20 percent) playing smaller roles. Population increases in secondary cities (Other urban) have been mostly due to natural growth (60 percent) and much less due to migration (16 percent) or reclassification (14 percent).

Positive net migration to Kampala and other cities and towns rose between the two censuses and is matched by commensurate outflows from rural areas. Figure 3.9 shows that rural areas experienced a large outflow of migrants between 2002 and 2014. These migrants moved to Kampala and other urban areas, although migration to Kampala is slightly higher, with 328,400 net arrivals to the city[8] between 2002 and 2014, as compared with a combined net flow

Figure 3.7 Population of Ugandan Cities and Towns, Excluding Kampala, by Region



Source: Brinkhoff 2021 (citypopulation.de).
Note: Censuses were conducted in 2002 and 2014; figures for 2020 are estimated. For some of the towns, 2002 data are missing.

of 271,840 migrants to other urban areas. Net domestic migration to Kampala and other urban areas was more than five times higher in 2014 than in 2002 (figure 3.10). Only a short period of decline (after 2004, likely due to conflict in the north of the country) disrupted the otherwise continuous rise in net migration to urban areas.

Figure 3.8 Decomposing Population Growth in Uganda between 2002 and 2014



Source: Computed from censuses shared by Integrated Public Use Microdata Series.

Figure 3.9 Net Migration Flows in Uganda between 2002 and 2014



Source: Computed from censuses shared by Integrated Public Use Microdata Series.

Migration has been a powerful instrument for reducing poverty in Uganda and elsewhere. Between 2005 and 2009, poverty incidence declined twice as fast for people who moved out of their villages to other rural areas as compared with those who stayed behind, despite similar starting positions. This translated into a 7 percent increase in annualized consumption, on average, controlling for

Figure 3.10 Net Migration to Urban Areas in Uganda, 2002–14



Source: Computed from censuses shared by Integrated Public Use Microdata Series.

selection bias to the greatest degree possible. The annual increase in consumption is as high as 37.5 percent for those who migrate from rural to urban areas. However, the impact of rural-urban migration on poverty reduction was lower, given that those who migrated to urban areas were less poor to begin with (World Bank 2016b).

Zooming in on Jinja

This study focuses on Jinja to provide an understanding of the fundamental differences between both the personal characteristics and the living conditions of migrants and their host population. The analysis looks at differences in job market outcomes for migrants when controlling for origin, education, skills, and personal connections. Jinja municipality was selected for this empirical investigation because it ranks high (fourth) among 32 cities analyzed for economic potential (Hobson 2019). In July 2020, Jinja was elevated to city status. It has a history of hosting manufacturing businesses, is suitably located along the corridors of major trading routes on Lake Victoria, and is a commuting city that hosts five times the population during the day than at night (Cities Alliance 2016). In short, it is a city worthy of investigation and support to address possible constraints on migrant integration using efficient local policies.

A household survey was implemented in Jinja municipality and surrounding suburbs in 2020–21 (table 3.5), accompanied by life history and key informant interviews with migrants and public officials, respectively, to support

Table 3.5 Number of Migrants in Jinja, by Type

Stratum	Rural-urban migrants	Urban-urban migrants	All migrants	Nonmigrants
City center	122	33	155	377
Outside city center	93	47	140	368
Outskirts	123	51	174	415
Total	338	131	469	1,160

Source: World Bank, based on Jinja household survey 2021.

Table 3.6 Demographic Differences between Migrants and Nonmigrants in Jinja

Demographic characteristics	Rural-urban migrants	Urban-urban migrants	All migrants	Nonmigrants
Sex (1 = Male)	0.49	0.41*	0.47*	0.49
Age	27.25***	28.78***	27.68***	31.68
Marital status	0.56***	0.60***	0.58***	0.43
Household size	4.74***	4.09***	4.56***	6.28
Dependency ratio, all	0.73***	0.69**	0.72***	0.92
Dependency ratio, children	0.60***	0.64***	0.61***	0.77
Observations (individuals)	*338*	*131*	*469*	*1,160*
Observations (households)	*207*	*96*	*365*	

Source: World Bank, based on Jinja household survey 2021.
Note: Observations are at the individual level for sex, age, and marital status. The sample used only includes working-age adults (15–64 years). Observations are at the household level for household size and dependency ratios. T-tests are computed using nonmigrants as the base.
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

the quantitative findings with a more qualitative narrative. The sample of 675 households was stratified based on the business center, the municipality net of the business center, and the suburban ring to understand the extent of commuting to downtown jobs. Life history interviews were conducted with older migrants, with equal representation by gender and origin (rural or urban). Finally, key informant interviews with public officials and private sector groups were conducted to illuminate the constraints on and tools of government.[9]

How Migrants in Jinja Differ from Nonmigrants

Migrants are younger, more are female, and more are likely to have smaller households and be married than nonmigrants. These dynamics are consistent with the national data for Uganda. Migrants from both rural and other urban areas are three to four years younger than nonmigrants, on average (table 3.6). Households are also smaller, with migrant households having nearly two fewer permanent members. Migrant households from other urban areas are particularly small, with only 4.09 people living in households, on average.

Consequently, dependency ratios (the ratio of nonworking-age members to working-age members) are also lower for migrant households.

Differences in education underscore the heterogeneity of rural-urban and urban-urban migrants. Consistent with national trends, urban-urban migrants tend to be better educated than urban nonmigrants, whereas rural-urban migrants are less educated, as shown in figure 3.11 for completed primary school and completed O- and A-levels. All migrants and nonmigrants have similar literacy rates, slightly above 91 percent; there is no significant difference among the groups with respect to having "no education." Migrants from other urban areas are also more likely to have attended university than both Jinja nonmigrants and migrants from rural areas. These figures are similar to national trends and highlight that rural-urban and urban-urban migrants bring different levels of human capital to cities and likely compete in different labor markets.

Migrants also tend to live in households with higher total household consumption levels (excluding rent) than nonmigrants, but this difference is driven by migrants from other urban areas. Rural-urban migrant household consumption levels are not statistically different from those of urban nonmigrants at the individual level, but migrants from other urban areas live in households that consume roughly 60 percent more than Jinja nonmigrants. Urban-urban migrant households spend more on food, eating outside the home, utilities, and other nonfood items, which may be explained by their being wealthier to begin with, as has also been suggested by the findings in World Bank (2016b). Expenditures for education, transportation, communication, health, and consumables are similar across all population groups. Because migrant households are smaller, the per-adult equivalent spending of both urban-urban and rural-urban migrant households is also greater than that of nonmigrants. These dynamics show that migrants can stimulate local economies through relatively higher spending levels. These results are consistent with estimates (not presented here) derived using the Uganda national household survey.

Where Do Migrants Live?

Rural-urban migrants are more likely than nonmigrants and urban-urban migrants to reside in the city center. Nonmigrants are evenly spread across the city, with about one-third living in each stratum (table 3.7).[10] Compared with nonmigrants, rural-urban migrants are more likely to live in the city center and less likely to live in the outskirts. They pay 27 percent less rent and occupy the affordable segment of housing in the city center, located in some of the informal settlements of Jinja (such as Masese and Mafubira). This is consistent with the settlement patterns observed in Arusha, Tanzania (Andreasen et al. 2017), and elsewhere in Africa (see the section "Where Migrants Live" in chapter 4). Rural-urban migrants often live in the city center when they first move to Jinja, where casual jobs and cheap rental housing

Figure 3.11 Education Level of Migrants and Nonmigrants in Jinja



Source: World Bank, based on Jinja household survey 2021.
Note: NEET = not in education, employment, or training; R-U = rural to urban; U-U = urban to urban.

Table 3.7 Migrants' Housing Characteristics in Jinja

Housing characteristics	Rural-urban migrants	Urban-urban migrants	Nonmigrants
Stratum: City center	0.48***	0.30***	0.34
Stratum: Outside city center	0.31	0.41	0.34
Stratum: Outskirts	0.21***	0.29***	0.32
Rent, excluding imputed values (Uganda shillings)	23,635**	36,677**	32,415
Rent, including imputed values (Uganda shillings)	25,924***	37,467***	34,161
Number of bedrooms per adult equivalent	0.48***	0.57***	0.61
Observations	*207*	*96*	365

Source: World Bank, based on Jinja household survey 2021.
Note: Observations are at the household level. T-tests are computed using nonmigrants as the base.
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table 3.8 Rent Distributions in Jinja, by Stratum, Excluding Imputed Rents

In Uganda shillings

Stratum	25th percentile	Median	75th percentile	Mean	*Observations*
City center	10,095	17,894	47,222	34,000	*154*
Outside city center	11,995	17,525	27,356	24,340	*110*
Outskirts	8,827	16,887	30,337	27,036	*114*

Source: World Bank, based on Jinja household survey 2021.

is often more widely available. This holds especially true for those coming from afar who have no family to settle with. Urban-urban migrants pay, on average, 13 percent more for rent than Jinja nonmigrants and are more likely to live just outside the city center (though the difference from nonmigrants is not statistically significant).

Even though the cost of renting is, on average, higher in the center of the city compared with the other strata, median rents are similar across the three strata. Using the three sampling strata in the Jinja household survey—city center, outside the city center, and the outskirts—reported rental values are estimated to be 40 percent higher in the city center than outside the city center, but only 26 percent higher than in the outskirts (table 3.8). Homes in the city center have, on average, better access to public utilities than those outside the city center and in the outskirts, another factor that explains higher rental values. However, there are several informal settlements within the downtown area of Jinja that provide affordable housing but with overall low quality in construction and service access. Higher-end housing in the city center may explain higher average rental prices, as apparent from the distribution of rents in table 3.8 and the kernel density distribution of rents by stratum (figure 3.12). The density of

Figure 3.12 **Kernel Density of Rental Prices in Jinja, Excluding Imputed Rents**



Source: World Bank, based on Jinja household survey 2021.
Note: Kernel = Epanechnikov bandwidth = 7.6e + 03.

each stratum peaks around similar values (20,000 Uganda shillings per month). The city center's right-side tail is much longer though, indicating that high-rent housing is more likely to be found in the city center.

Migrants and nonmigrants differ in their propensity to live in public housing, to own their own homes, and to live in housing with high-quality characteristics. Both rural-urban and urban-urban migrants are more likely to live in public housing than Jinja nonmigrants; 24 percent of all migrants live in public housing as compared with 16 percent of nonmigrants. For officials in Jinja, this housing choice could mean that population growth from migration may put a higher strain on public housing resources than natural population growth. Urban-urban migrants are also more likely to live in subsidized or free housing, which is surprising given that all other indicators show that they are better off than other respondents. A possible explanation is that some employers provide free or subsidized housing (especially for teachers and security guards) as evidenced from the life history interviews. The quality of public service access is generally better among nonmigrants as compared with rural-rural migrants, with higher access to piped water and private sanitary facilities, but the quality of housing construction is similar across the different groups. With regard to housing ownership, nonmigrants are much more likely (52 percent) than migrants (20 percent) to own their houses.

Choice of housing and opportunity of ownership become more aligned between long-term migrants and nonmigrants when the duration of stay of migrants is considered. Table 3.9 shows the differences between housing location and characteristics according to migrants' duration of stay. Although rental values remain similar across duration, home ownership steadily increases as migrants stay longer. Only 10 percent of migrants who arrived in Jinja three or fewer years ago own homes, whereas 22 percent who arrived three to ten years ago own homes, and 46 percent who arrived more than ten years ago own homes. Some 43 percent of nonmigrants own homes, meaning that longer-term migrants have a slightly higher homeownership rate than nonmigrants. The location also tends to shift with time. As migrants stay longer, they tend to relocate to the outskirts, where homeownership rates are higher because of affordability. With regard to housing quality, migrants become less likely to share toilets the longer they stay (and thus become similar to nonmigrants). While 65 percent of migrants who arrived more than ten years ago share toilets with other households, 86 percent of recent arrivals do. Access to piped water and electricity does not improve for migrants over time, but this outcome may reflect the fact that migrants move to the outskirts, where access to utilities is worse than in the city center or outside the city center.

Table 3.9 Migrants' Housing Characteristics in Jinja, by Duration of Stay

Characteristics	Short-term: 0–3 years	Long-term: 3–10 years	Permanent: 10 or more years	Nonmigrants
Stratum: City center	0.41	0.41	0.33	0.39
Stratum: Outside city center	0.36	0.32	0.31	0.37
Stratum: Outskirts	0.22	0.28	0.35**	0.24
Own home	0.10***	0.22***	0.46***	0.43
Rent, excluding imputed values (Uganda shillings)	30,440	27,039	28,140	33,295
Rent, including imputed values (Uganda shillings)	31,873	29,168**	30,148*	36,520
Constructed floor	0.77	0.72	0.69	0.74
Finished walls	0.73	0.68	0.73	0.76
Number of bedrooms per adult equivalent	0.56***	0.51***	0.49***	0.70
Piped water	0.19**	0.22*	0.20**	0.33
Shared toilet	0.86***	0.79**	0.65**	0.65
Flush toilet	0.11	0.11	0.15	0.15
Electricity from grid	0.69	0.72	0.61**	0.73
Average hours of electricity	17.09	16.63	16.26	16.18
Use of solid cooking fuel inside	0.30	0.33	0.15**	0.25
Observations	*106*	*140*	*236*	*186*

Source: World Bank, based on Jinja household survey 2021.
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Where Do Migrants Work?

Because commuting between home and work is costly, housing location decisions are inextricably tied to the location of work. In the city center, roughly half of the respondents work and live in the same neighborhood, while another 44 percent live somewhere else within Jinja municipality (table 3.10). In the outskirts, 67 percent of respondents work from home or within their neighborhood. The question thus arises as to whether the low share of commuting workers from the outskirts is due to an abundance of suitable jobs within the vicinity or because transportation to job opportunities in the city is too expensive. Which mechanism is at play cannot be determined with the available data (a labor force survey with a large sample size or geo-coded census data are needed to understand these features of Jinja's economic life).

Roughly half of the (migrants and nonmigrants) in the outskirts (52 percent) and the city center (53 percent) walk to work, thus limiting access to job opportunities that may be further away. Although migrants and nonmigrants in the city center may have access to good formal jobs, it is unclear whether the same is true in the outskirts. Migrants and nonmigrants in the outskirts and outside the city center are also about 10 percentage points more likely to take public

Table 3.10 Work and Commuting Patterns in Jinja, by Stratum

	City center	Outside city center	Outskirts
Work location: Same neighborhood	0.49	0.48	0.67***
Work location: Outside neighborhood within the municipality	0.44	0.38	0.12***
Commute time in minutes	25.95	26.37	32.51
Transport to work: Walk	0.53	0.34***	0.52***
Transport to work: Public vehicle	0.07	0.18***	0.17***
Transport to work: Public boda	0.25	0.34	0.22
Industry: Agriculture	0.08	0.13	0.20**
Industry: Manufacturing	0.30	0.31	0.33
Industry: Service	0.61	0.57	0.48**
Employed	0.57	0.48	0.51
Part-time	0.13	0.13	0.19
Hours worked in last week	60.89	55.64	51.11***
Written contract	0.42	0.33	0.34
Weekly earnings in the high season (Uganda shillings)	170,000	220,000	110,000
Weekly earnings in low season (Uganda shillings)	85,476	110,000	81,192
Observations	*310*	*265*	*316*

Source: World Bank, based on Jinja household survey 2021.
Note: The sample only includes employed adults (except for the employment variable, which includes all working-age adults). The base for all t-tests is employed working-age adults.
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

transport to work than migrants and nonmigrants in the city center. Although boda bodas are the most common means of transportation in all three strata (between 22 percent and 34 percent), there is no statistical difference between the respective shares. The commuting patterns in the outskirts are similar to those in the city center, whereas those living outside the city center walk less and take boda bodas more often. These differences could reflect the difference in employment location for migrants and nonmigrants outside the city center.

Migrants and nonmigrants who live in the outskirts of Jinja are more likely to be involved in agriculture and less likely to work in services. Migrants and nonmigrants in the outskirts still work mostly in services (48 percent), followed by manufacturing (33 percent) and agriculture (20 percent). Service sector employment (typically retail, wholesale, or hospitality) dominates among migrants and nonmigrants in the city center (61 percent) and just outside the city center (57 percent), and—similar to the outskirts—about a third are employed in manufacturing.

Self-reported weekly earnings are lowest in the outskirts, but the difference with inner city earnings is not statistically significant. Across low and high seasons (as defined by respondents), migrants and nonmigrants in the outskirts report 81,000–110,000 Uganda shillings per week, compared with 85,000–170,000 in the city center and 110,000–220,000 just outside the city center. Conditional on employment, hours worked in the outskirts are nine hours lower than in the city center, explaining some of the earning differentials. Part-time work is highest (19 percent) among suburban migrants and nonmigrants, though not significantly higher than among the other locations, which report 13 percent. Most respondents do not have written contracts, though a slightly higher share who live in the city center have written contracts (42 percent) compared with others (33–34 percent).

Migrants are more likely to work wage jobs and become employees, whereas nonmigrants are more likely to operate a business and employ others. Some 50 percent of migrants are employed and 31 percent work in wage jobs, while only 36 percent of nonmigrants are employed and only 24 percent work in wage jobs. Rural-urban migrants are more likely to be employed (56 percent) and work in wage jobs (32 percent) compared with migrants from urban areas. Migrants may fall back on operating a business when they cannot find employment, and they experience challenges in running their businesses (box 3.2). Only 2 percent of migrants are employers compared with 5 percent of nonmigrants. About a third of nonmigrants and urban-urban migrants operate a business, while far fewer rural-urban migrants (22 percent) do. Only about 4 percent of all respondents, regardless of migration status, help operate a business without pay.

Migrants from other urban areas strive for more formality regarding contracts and business registration than do nonmigrants and rural-urban migrants.

BOX 3.2

The Experiences of Two Female Migrants

Nakate R. is a 22-year-old female recent rural-urban migrant living in the city center. Her education is O-level certification. She is self-employed, dealing in fish. She says, "However, currently I have stopped working in the fish business because I don't like it anymore and the fish business doesn't have a market. . . . My business location is bad—we are located inside the market (market authority allocated space for me inside the market), where it is not near people (potential buyers). Therefore, I want to change my job to hairdressing. I may struggle, however, due to a lack of skills. . . . I have not yet pursued a hairdressing course." She argues, "Job-related discrimination does exist. For example, my migrant friend failed to get a job because of her migrant status. I see a bright future in Jinja, nevertheless, I expect an increase in job opportunities. This is because of more industries that are coming up, which may create more jobs."

Namakula H. is an experienced urban-urban migrant living in the central business district. She is 26 years old, holds an A-level certificate, and is self-employed. She sells street food, fried cassava. She migrated with the expectation of obtaining employment in one of the many factories situated in Jinja. "There were no jobs in my previous town, but I have so far failed to get a job here in Jinja. I have settled for self-employment, selling fried cassava. . . . I did not require specific skills to start this business, but my finances are limited and the income from the business is not sufficient to cater to my needs. . . . Recently they stopped us from doing business in this place, so the business environment is uncertain. . . . I have not received any help from city authorities with job placement or support for small business. . . . I also think when it comes to jobs and support to businesses, the authorities are quite selective and give preferential treatment to some people," she states. She notes, however, that the likelihood of finding a better job opportunity in Jinja in the future is high.

Urban-urban migrants typically have written contracts (55 percent); this share is much higher compared with nonmigrants (35 percent) and rural-urban migrants (30 percent). Likewise, 89 percent of urban-urban migrant business operators have registered their businesses, whereas fewer than half of Jinja nonmigrants and rural-urban migrants have done so.

Most respondents work in the private sector; 84 percent of Jinja nonmigrants and 89 percent of migrants work in the private sector (figure 3.13). However, government jobs provide an important source of employment for rural-urban migrants and Jinja nonmigrants; 13 percent of rural-urban migrants and 12 percent of Jinja nonmigrants work in the government sector. This is significantly higher than the 3 percent of urban-urban migrants who work in the government sector.

Figure 3.13 Employment Characteristics of Migrants and Nonmigrants in Jinja



Source: World Bank, based on Jinja household survey 2021.
Note: R-U = rural to urban; U-U = urban to urban.

These results are not consistent with the national data, where urban-urban migrants in large towns (such as Jinja) work in the government sector.

How Do Migrants Compare with Nonmigrants in the Job Market?

All migrants and nonmigrants work substantially more than elsewhere in the city (outside the city or the outskirts), except migrants in the outskirts, who work substantially more than nonmigrants, and only slightly less than migrants in the city center. The latter partly follows from the higher engagement of the outskirts' labor force in agriculture (20 percent of the population, table 3.10), a sector that migrants are much less likely to engage in across the world (see also "Human Capital, Occupational Choice, and Location" in chapter 2).

Wage jobs are also concentrated in the city center, with migrants and nonmigrants equally engaged in wage employment, as in the other strata. Wage employment is about 40 percent higher in the city center than in the rest of the city, for migrants and nonmigrants alike. This gap only declines to 35 percent after controlling for the socioeconomic characteristics of the workers and the sector of employment, with the wage employment rate outside the city center still similar between migrants and nonmigrants (table 3A.1). Wages are also higher in and outside the city center; they are lowest in the outskirts.

Lower working hours and lower wages result in much lower individual earnings and consumption per adult equivalent in the outskirts as compared with the city center (by about 67 percent on average), except for migrants (tables 3A.2, 3A.3, and 3A.4). The lower earnings profile in the outskirts holds after controlling for the socioeconomic characteristics of workers and their sector of employment. That said, migrants in the outskirts have 58 percent higher reported earnings than nonmigrants in the outskirts (figure 3.14), largely driven by the urban-urban migrant subgroup among the migrant population; they report substantially higher earnings (not reported here), even though the difference is not statistically significant given the small sample sizes. Lower individual earnings in the outskirts also translate into lower consumption per adult equivalent, again, especially for nonmigrants (table 3A.4); after controlling for household demographics, this outcome suggests that nonmigrants (as well as migrants) in the outskirts have smaller families and dependency ratios.

However, the finding that migrants do as well as (or better) than nonmigrants conceals substantial differences, with urban-urban migrants tending to do better than rural-urban migrants. Bivariate comparisons show (results not reported here) that Jinja migrants from other urban areas work more hours and earn higher wages, which results in higher income and consumption levels than for rural migrants and nonmigrants alike. As in other countries and the rest of Uganda (see "Labor Market Integration and Welfare Outcomes" in chapter 2), Jinja migrants from rural areas also work more than nonmigrants. However, this does not translate into higher income or consumption in the Jinja case.

Figure 3.14 Difference in Earnings between Migrants and Nonmigrants in Jinja



Source: World Bank, based on Jinja household survey 2021.
Note: Unconditional differences in log earnings between migrants and nonmigrants; insignificant coefficients coded as zero. Only the difference between migrants and nonmigrants in the outskirts is statistically significant.

Given the small sample sizes, these unconditional differences (not controlling for demographics including age, dependency ratio, household size, education, or sector occupation) are not statistically significant. Nonetheless, the patterns resonate with what has been observed in other countries.

In sum, the labor market and welfare outcomes in Jinja differ especially between the city center and the outskirts, where they are substantially worse; differences between migrants and nonmigrants are limited overall, except in the outskirts, where migrants earn more and where the stronger performance of urban migrants compensates for the probable lower performance of those coming from rural areas. Demographics, education, household characteristics, and industry variables only partly explain these differences. The sample size is small in all specifications, so the results should be examined with caution.

COVID-19 Effects

The labor market effects of COVID-19 (coronavirus) on migrants and nonmigrants differed depending on the variable. Figure 3.15 displays various self-reported COVID-19 effects as of the time of data collection in February 2021.[11] Migrants are as likely to have temporary job loss (28 percent) due to COVID-19 as nonmigrants (27 percent). However, urban-urban migrants were much less likely to experience temporary job loss (17 percent) and much more likely to experience temporary business closings (54 percent) than nonmigrants (46 percent). No groups were likely to experience permanent job loss or permanent business closings.

Figure 3.15 Difference in COVID-19 Effects in Jinja, by Migrant Status



Source: World Bank, based on Jinja household survey 2021.

Most respondents experienced food insecurity because of COVID-19. More than half of nonmigrants (57 percent) experienced food insecurity. Urban-urban migrants fared slightly better (with 39 percent reporting food security issues). For finding essential goods, COVID-19 affected migrants and nonmigrants similarly, with 45 percent of nonmigrants and 41 percent of migrants reporting difficulty finding essential goods (a statistically insignificant difference).

Few respondents lost their residence during the COVID-19 pandemic, but making rent was a major issue due to COVID-19-related circumstances. About 21 percent of nonmigrants and 31 percent of migrants had difficulty paying rent. Higher job loss, even if temporary, among rural-urban migrants resulted in difficulties making rent (39 percent). In comparison, only 14 percent of urban-urban migrants experienced difficulties making rent. Nonmigrants were somewhere in the middle regarding the inability to pay rent and food security, at 21 percent and 57 percent, respectively. These outcomes underscore the vulnerability of rural-urban migrants, who have much lower financial resilience than their urban-urban migrant counterparts.

Nonmigrants reported worse access to health (26 percent) and financial services (12 percent) and difficulties in paying back loans (6 percent) than rural-urban, urban-urban, or all migrants. However, these differences are not statistically significant except for differences in access to health services, where urban-urban migrants fare considerably better (7 percent) than rural-urban migrants (19 percent). Moreover, access to financial services and lending is lower among migrants to start with.

Testing for COVID-19 was rare for both migrants and nonmigrants: only 2 percent of all respondents were tested for COVID-19 and less than 1 percent of respondents reported testing positive for COVID-19. These figures likely underestimate the prevalence of COVID-19 in Jinja. Access to tests or the cost of tests likely made widespread COVID-19 testing impossible; however, not enough information is available to help understand these barriers to testing.

The Tools of Government

Although Uganda's national policy frameworks, as well as their enabling policies, are in place to support the integration of internal migrants in cities and towns, implementation at the local level remains a challenge. National urban policy guides local governments on the urbanization process, orderly development, and urban management. It seeks to address the issues of urban poverty, urban service delivery, rural-urban migration, economic growth, and regional balance, but without much practical guidance. Local governments, especially cities, play a key role at the forefront of integrating newcomers. In the absence of guidelines and streamlined mechanisms, urban local governments in Uganda struggle to provide appropriate support to migrants and integrate them more firmly into the cities' social fabric.

The institutional and financial capacity of local governments especially impedes appropriate urban planning for infrastructure and services. Whether for migrants or nonmigrants—Uganda's local government policies dictate social and economic rights irrespective of migration status—findings from interviews with key informants suggest a few areas where the de jure responsibilities of government do not always match their de facto functions.

Although local governments have de jure power and autonomy over their financial and planning matters, they lack de facto financial autonomy. This constraint affects urban development of cities in general. However, the absence of financial autonomy means that pressing issues, such as the provision of affordable housing, responding to health epidemics, and others, are more difficult to address and contain.

- *Although participation in planning and budgeting committees is emphasized de jure, there is a lack of awareness about such meetings, thus undermining the participatory process.* Planning and budget decisions are supposed to be made through a bottom-up approach at the village, ward, and division levels, and thus inform municipal council and then district council development planning. Many migrants and nonmigrants are not aware of the meetings at the village, ward, and division levels and do not participate in them.
- *Physical planning falls short because of limited technical staff and considerations of political economy.* Even though spatial planning falls under the jurisdiction of local governments, capacity at both the district and municipal levels is limited. According to an interview with a staff member from the Natural Resource Department of Jinja District local government, there are three planners for the city and another three working at the district level, which is clearly insufficient, considering the burden of preparing and enforcing urban plans, among many other duties to be performed by this staff, and thus leads to poor implementation and enforcement. The resulting sprawl of informal settlements along roads and urban fringes and the encroachment into nature reserves lead to negative externalities that are politically difficult to undo. One Jinja District local government official complained that "slums were allowed to develop in the past," but today "the city is being advised not to allow more slum development."
- *Planning capacity must be matched with an appropriate budget to implement plans and related infrastructure.* Jinja municipal council exercises physical planning functions using the municipality's own source revenue, but the amounts are too small to deliver the needed social and public services. As one official put it, "Before Jinja was declared a city, we had planned to upgrade some slums, but the funds were lacking." Whether planning for an industrial park or upgrading informal settlements, a predictable budget envelope is critical to developing the needed physical infrastructure.

- *There is consensus among respondents that generating affordable housing is key to overcoming issues pertaining to informality and affordable housing for incoming migrants and nonmigrants.* When planning capacity is weak and underfunded, possible instruments of own source revenue—such as land and property taxation—are often overlooked because implementation is time-consuming and often provides low returns due to typically low tax levels. Local governments should consider providing incentives for population density and the construction of multistory housing through tax tools such as a vacancy tax on land to address the underutilization of land within the city. This approach could be complementary to property taxation, which is typically more difficult to implement in the absence of transparent transactions in the real estate market.[12]
- *District and city councils are responsible for education, health, water, roads, and all decentralized services (that is, land administration, social rehabilitation, labor matters, and so on), but demand for services exceeds supply.* Even though innovative ways to address financing shortages (such as public-private partnerships in the educational sector) are pursued, the availability of better services across the spectrum remains a concern for both migrants and nonmigrants.
- *The registration of incoming migrants remains ad hoc.* Even though the Physical Planning Act requires national and regional physical development plans to analyze population growth, distribution and movement are not explicitly mentioned in the fifth schedule of the same act for district, urban, and local physical development plans.

The Way Forward

Jinja municipal council, now elevated to Jinja city, has the potential for economic growth but faces management challenges for sustainable development. Jinja is located on the Nairobi-Kampala highway, which gives it an advantage in attracting industries and laborers. Compared with other cities, it has relatively vibrant manufacturing and tourism sectors (World Bank 2016a). As one of the regional growth poles for eastern corridor development, Jinja would need strategic intervention by both national and local governments to promote local economic development and create sustainable jobs. However, the operationalization of the transition from municipal council to city has taken more time than expected. Since Jinja attained city status on July 1, 2020, several pitfalls have been revealed: a lack of sensitization of citizens to how the status change would affect them during the transition period and future development; a lack of municipal financing capacity to deliver services to citizens with unpaid utility bills; and delays in the transition to city organizational and administrative structure, which negatively affects municipal service delivery. Central and district

governments should support Jinja and other newly incorporated cities to accelerate the transition and quickly resume urban services and management. The central government should develop transition procedures to guide newly incorporated cities in the long term.

Improvements in own source revenues and predictable fiscal transfers to Jinja are critical to allow the city to have financial autonomy. Jinja municipality had not been able to perform its mandates and urban management and service functions because of persistent challenges in fiscal and institutional capacity. Jinja city government should identify revenue sources and lay a solid foundation for securing sustainable local revenues. Tax tools such as urban land taxes and vacancy taxes on land could be usefully employed to encourage better land use within Jinja city.

Jinja city authorities must consider a wide range of financing options to bridge the city's infrastructure and service needs. Own source revenues are too small to pledge for costly infrastructure investment. To ensure financial sustainability, the Jinja city authority must look into alternative funding sources from private investors or partnerships with the private sector to bridge the gap. The education sector in Jinja already uses a public-private partnership arrangement; this could be extended to other sectors, such as the development of roads, parks, housing, or solid waste management facilities.

Broadening municipal financing options would allow the city to spend its own source revenues on community development or local economic development programs supporting the integration of migrants into the labor market. The ongoing Emyooga Program, the Youth Livelihood Program, and the Uganda Women Entrepreneurship Program enjoy limited membership and are not publicly known to migrants and nonmigrants in the city. It was also noted during interviews with key informants that these programs were sometimes used to gain political popularity rather than to support entrepreneurs and youth who actually need the capital to improve their livelihoods. Increasing the coverage of these programs and targeted support for unemployed youth could benefit both migrants and nonmigrants. Vocational training and enforcement of minimum wage regulations and a safe working environment—especially for casual laborers and industry workers—could be additional key actions for local economic development.

Migrants accelerate new development in the city, but development should be undertaken in a planned and orderly manner. Meeting the housing demands of Jinja's growing population has been challenging. Not only are local and central governments not funded well enough to invest in housing to meet demand, private sector–led housing development is also insufficient (Kayiira 2019). To use the limited land in the city center effectively and manage urban sprawl, city authorities should first understand the neighborhoods surrounding transit centers and locate work sites, service centers, retail, or

other facilities for residents, workers, and visitors within walking and moderate driving or transit riding distance of the city. A draft physical development plan is a good first step to guiding orderly development in the city. In addition to a financial plan for the physical development plan, the city should devise by-laws and ordinances for planning and building standards, mobilize financial and human resources to implement such physical development plans, and enhance development control functions, protecting the city's natural environmental features.

Understanding the flow of migrants and urban expansion in Jinja will be helpful for future city planning and management. Currently, statistical data on internal migration can be found in censuses and, to a limited extent, in household surveys, where information on the place of residence of individuals can be found, but which do not track changes of residency over time. Although yielding useful information on the growth of urban centers and surrounding rural settlements, statistics on migration have not been captured or used at the local government level. With support from district and central governments, the city authorities should seek to improve information on the demographic component of urban growth, including internal and international migration, as well as on the commuting population. Understanding patterns of internal migration and mobility and the spatial distribution of people will not only ease future planning but also open avenues for the spatial inclusion of migrants.

The Case of Jendouba and Kairouan, Tunisia

Migrants Can Contribute to Economic Development

Local governments and communities often see migrants as a burden, fearing the effects that incoming populations may have on the availability and quality of services. This is a particular concern in intermediate cities, which often face deeper financial constraints, weaker capacity, and more limited access to basic infrastructure. The case of Tunisia shows that migrants can contribute to the economic development of secondary cities by bringing a young and educated labor force to the city. Focusing on qualitative analysis for the cities of Jendouba and Kairouan, this section suggests that the improved integration of migrants into the social and economic fabric of cities requires actions that are not directed at migrants alone but instead contribute to the spatial integration of migrants and nonmigrants alike.

Addressing many of the challenges identified in this report will require structural changes that need action at the national level, including an overhaul of labor laws, the reform of tenure systems, the digitization of land registries, sound housing policy, and the strengthening of local governments as decentralization reforms take roots.

However, city leaders have an important role to play given that the way that cities are planned and investments are prioritized influences how cities grow. When supported by national institutions, local governments can improve the lives of all citizens, leverage the benefits of population flows for local economic development, and ensure a good future for incoming migrants and host communities.

To tackle the challenges identified in this report and improve the integration of migrants into secondary cities, a multipronged approach will be required. Actions along three lines will be needed: (1) social and labor market instruments will be required to facilitate job searches and reduce discrimination and violence; (2) spatial integration must be improved to ensure organized urban growth that can provide serviced land and decent housing alternatives for all; and (3) municipal governance and management must be improved to support the socioeconomic integration of migrants into urban life and city services.

Secondary Cities as Stepping Stones: Two-Way Population Flows

Despite most population flows in Tunisia remaining within a single delegation,[13] the largest proportion of long-distance flows are between urban areas. The characteristics of migration flows in terms of origin and destination have remained largely unchanged since 1999. Intradelegation moves predominate (with a slight decline in 1999–2004). However, among those that change delegations, most moves are long distance moves (intergovernorate). Moreover, 80 percent of such long distance moves are urban-to-urban flows. With migration between urban areas playing such an important role in Tunisia's migration dynamics, secondary cities in Tunisia emerge as stepping stones to movement along the full set of Tunisian cities.

In Tunisia, as in many other countries, cities with higher living standards and stronger labor demand attract more migrants. The results presented in this case study suggest that the most attractive delegations to migrants are those with higher population densities and urbanization levels, mainly medium-large or large cities. In addition, delegations with higher Regional Development Indexes and education levels are more attractive. However, delegations with higher youth unemployment rates are unable to attract migrants.

Spatial disparities are still present in Tunisia despite positive economic performance in the early 2000s. Economic activity and investment are concentrated in the coastal areas. Public policy and incentives to bring economic activity to lagging regions have been mostly ineffective, and investments in infrastructure have fallen behind in these regions. Thus, the 12 largest cities are located in the coastal areas of Tunisia (except for the city of Kairouan), and the prevalence of poverty and unemployment in intermediate cities, coupled with the lack of economic opportunities and the persistent low quality of jobs, brings additional challenges. The poor performance of the economy since 2011

and the COVID-19 pandemic have deepened existing challenges, adding to unemployment and poverty rates through considerable job losses.

Jendouba and Kairouan are both intermediate cities and are located in the two poorest internal regions of Tunisia. Each of these cities has its own characteristics but face similar challenges in aiming to ensure economic and social inclusion for all citizens, including migrants from rural areas looking for job opportunities and better living conditions. The latest census for 2014 suggest that Kairouan has 140,000 inhabitants and is much larger than Jendouba (45,000 inhabitants). Kairouan is the chief town of the governorate with the highest poverty rate in Tunisia (20.8 percent compared with 15.0 percent at the national level). Jendouba is the chief town of the governorate with one of the highest unemployment rates (24.6 percent compared with 15.2 percent at the national level).

Jendouba and Kairouan have expanded considerably in recent decades, with sizable infill growth in Kairouan and urban expansion in Jendouba. From 1992 to 2010, the built-up area of Kairouan grew at a rate similar to that of its population, at about 1.9 percent annually. The city almost doubled its existing built-up area, adding 7.55 square kilometers in nearly 30 years (panel a of map 3.4). This new land, which represented 83 percent of the city area in 2010, was mainly infill urbanization occupying open spaces within existing urban boundaries (Angel et al. 2016). Jendouba also saw significant increases in urban land between 1995 and 2015, with the built-up area growing by roughly 40 percent, from 7.8 square kilometers to 11.0 square kilometers. Unlike Kairouan, which has a more compact and saturated shape, Jendouba has developed into a more sprawling city, with new built-up areas mostly extending into the outskirts of the city, thus posing important challenges to the delivery of infrastructure.

Given the weak industrial structure and the dominance of agricultural activities, Jendouba and Kairouan face significant difficulties in offering economic opportunities to their citizens, especially for women and educated youth (secondary and above). Analysis of the economic structure based on 2014 census data reveals no strong specialization in any single activity in Jendouba, with slightly larger ratios for building and public works and agriculture. However, results confirm that Jendouba has recorded a significant decrease in its agricultural activity against a small increase in education, health, and administrative services (with the creation of the University of Jendouba in 2003–04). Unfortunately, this increase has been unable to meet the employment needs of the local population, especially those with a higher level of education. The economy of Kairouan is based on the agricultural sector, which employees 24.2 percent of the workforce. Census data also reveal that the contribution of the manufacturing sector to employment remains low in Kairouan, at roughly 15 percent. As a result, a higher share of workers are engaged in low-quality jobs and unpaid work or self-employment in agriculture (24.2 percent for Kairouan and 15.17 percent for Jendouba as compared with only 10.5 percent at the national level).

Map 3.4 Evolution of Built-up Areas in Kairouan and Jendouba, 1990–2015

a. Kairouan



b. Jendouba



Sources: World Bank elaboration using World Settlement Footprint 2015. figshare. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.10048412.v1 (Marconcini et al. 2020).

Even though these cities face large out-migration flows, migration in Jendouba and Kairouan flows in more than one direction. Jendouba and Kairouan are losing population to the more prosperous coastal regions and cities (figure 3.16). However, they also receive large inflows of migrants from

Figure 3.16 **Main Outflows from the Governorates of Jendouba and Kairouan, 2009–14**

a. Outflows from the governorate of Jendouba (more than or equal to 150 individuals)



(continued next page)

Figure 3.16 **Main Outflows from the Governorates of Jendouba and Kairouan, 2009–14**
(continued)

b. Outflows from the governorate of Kairouan (more than or equal to 150)



Source: World Bank calculations using 2014 Census.
Note: Delegations of origin are on the left; those of destination are on the right.

rural areas and from the most distant delegations of the same governorate (figure 3.17).

Between 2009 and 2014, the governorate of Jendouba received 10,305 migrants. About 50 percent of inflows into the city of Jendouba were intragovernorate flows. The city of Jendouba attracted 42 percent of these

Figure 3.17 **Main Inflows into Jendouba and Kairouan, 2009–14**

a. Intragovernorate migration flows, Jendouba (more than or equal to 150 individuals)



b. Intragovernorate migration flows, Kairouan (more than or equal to 150 individuals)



Source: World Bank calculations using 2014 Census.
Note: Delegations of origin are on the left; those of destination are on the right.

migrants (4,291 out of 10,305), of whom 52 percent (2,216 out of 4,291) were from urban areas (urban to urban migration) and 11 percent (490) were from rural areas (rural-urban migration). In Kairouan, the largest inflows also came from within the governorate, given that the city also attracts migrants from nearby delegations with low urbanization and high poverty rates.

Between 2009 and 2014, the governorate of Kairouan received 15,275 migrants, of whom 10,203 were of working age (ages 15–64). The city of Kairouan received 66 percent of these migrants (all ages) and 68 percent of migrants ages 15–64. The largest share (74 percent for all ages and 73 percent for ages 15–64) of these migrants are urban-urban migrants, as compared with only 18 percent (19 percent for migrants ages 15–64) who are rural–urban migrants.

The analysis of census data confirms that migrants did not necessarily secure jobs before moving to Jendouba or Kairouan and may not have moved for work reasons (a point also confirmed in discussions with migrants). Migrants ages 15–64 coming to the city in search of work account for 22 percent of inflow migrants to Jendouba and 17 percent of those coming to Kairouan city. Additionally, 45 percent came to Jendouba following marriage or to join their families (53 percent for Kairouan city).

The cities of Jendouba and Kairouan are the origin of large outflows, suggesting high migrant turnover, with intermediate cities in the interior possibly playing a role as stepping stones to longer moves toward larger cities where labor demand is stronger. Census data confirm the statements of certain focus group participants who indicated that they were planning to move to other coastal cities or out of the country.

Cities stand to gain from migrant inflows given that migrants contribute to upgrading the local labor force; they are more educated and younger than nonmigrants. Data analysis shows that 32 percent of all Tunisian migrants to urban areas have tertiary education as compared with only 16 percent of all urban nonmigrants. These patterns are sustained in both Jendouba and Kairouan. Indeed, 31 percent of migrants to Jendouba city ages 15–64 have a higher education level (887 of 2,892). These migrants are distributed as follows: 69 percent are urban-urban migrants, 9 percent rural-urban, 16 percent urban-rural.[14] Migrants to Kairouan city with a higher level of education account for 26 percent of migrants (1,826 out of 6,903), of whom 83 percent are from urban areas (urban-urban migrants) and 14 percent are from rural areas (rural-urban migrants). Analysis also confirms that migrants are less likely to be self-employed than nonmigrants. In general, migration improves the probability of being employed and of having a paid job.

Considering only rural nonmigrants as a baseline, the analysis finds that women, youth ages 25–34, and the better educated are more likely to

migrate from rural to urban areas. Moreover, a comparison of all rural-urban migrants to rural nonmigrants shows that migration improves the likelihood of employment. This finding is not confirmed for migrants to the cities of Jendouba or Kairouan, given that the difference in terms of the proportion of employed people between the two groups is not statistically significant. These results can be explained by the fact that these two governorates have very high urban unemployment rates and that economic activity is mainly based on the agricultural sector. As a result, the urban areas offer fewer job opportunities, especially for graduates who migrate from rural areas. In addition, fewer migrants from rural to urban areas in the governorate of Jendouba are employed than the nonmigrant rural population; results for the city of Kairouan are consistent (table 3.11).

Urban-urban migrants are better educated, younger, and more likely to be employed than nonmigrants (see table 3.12). Urban-urban migrants, which are the largest proportion of migrants, have a higher level of education than nonmigrants; the gap is very large (34 percent versus 16 percent). Similar results are also found for the governorates of Jendouba and Kairouan. Urban-urban migrants are more likely to find a job than urban nonmigrants. Additionally, women, youth ages 25–34, and married people are more likely to be urban-urban migrants than nonmigrants.

Finally, rising housing costs in urban areas changed the profile of migration from family to individual migration after the Tunisian Revolution of 2010–11. Estimates indicate there are clear differences in migration patterns before and after 2011. Recent migrants tend to be single (individual migration), while pre-2011 migrants were more likely to be married (family migration).[15] This result may be explained by rising housing prices and rents in urban areas after 2011, a finding confirmed by the qualitative analysis. To cope with this increase in housing costs, internal migrants from rural and noncoastal parts of the country informally or illegally occupy land at the outskirts of the cities.

City Voices: Migrant Experiences and Municipal Perspectives

During focus group discussions, migrants from Jendouba and Kairouan suggested that migration is motivated by the search for job opportunities and by the desire to exit precarious, underpaid agricultural sector jobs. Additional motivations include the low quality of and access to vital services such as health care facilities, as well as a lack of connective infrastructure in the rural areas of these governorates. One migrant stated, "The most basic services are absent, there are no roads, electricity, drinking water, none of this infrastructure, there are no opportunities for any leisurely activities, and no jobs." In Jendouba, security is also noted as a reason for migration for those who lived in mountainous regions with low population density. They look to escape areas where terrorist groups

Table 3.11 Rural Nonmigrants Compared to Urban Migrants in Tunisia

Characteristic	All destinations in Tunisia			Migrants to Jendouba			Migrants to Kairouan		
	Rural nonmigrants	Rural-urban migrants	Difference	Rural nonmigrants	Rural-urban migrants	Difference	Rural nonmigrants	Rural-urban migrants	Difference
Female	0.51	0.55	0.03***	0.52	0.56	0.03*	0.52	0.56	0.04***
No education	0.30	0.12	–0.18***	0.36	0.09	–0.27***	0.42	0.13	–0.29***
Primary education	0.32	0.27	–0.05***	0.28	0.15	–0.13***	0.29	0.21	–0.08***
Secondary education	0.33	0.45	0.11***	0.31	0.48	0.17***	0.25	0.46	0.20***
Tertiary education	0.05	0.17	0.12***	0.05	0.28	0.23***	0.03	0.21	0.18***
Manager	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.01***	0.02	0.02	0.00
Self-employed	0.06	0.03	–0.03***	0.04	0.04	–0.01	0.07	0.04	–0.03***
Wage earner	0.37	0.57	0.20***	0.32	0.43	0.11***	0.32	0.48	0.16***
15–24 years old	0.26	0.29	0.03***	0.25	0.21	–0.04***	0.27	0.31	0.03***
25–34 years old	0.24	0.40	0.16***	0.21	0.42	0.21***	0.24	0.40	0.17***
35–44 years old	0.21	0.19	–0.02***	0.19	0.27	0.08***	0.21	0.19	–0.02*
45–54 years old	0.17	0.09	–0.08***	0.19	0.07	–0.12***	0.16	0.07	–0.09***
55–64 years old	0.13	0.04	–0.08***	0.16	0.04	–0.12***	0.12	0.03	–0.09***
Employed	0.84	0.86	0.02***	0.73	0.71	–0.02	0.84	0.84	0.00
Married	0.54	0.55	0.02***	0.55	0.66	0.11***	0.54	0.55	0.01

Source: World Bank calculations using 2014 Census.
Note : *** Differences between migrants and nonmigrants are significant at 1 percent; ** differences between migrants and nonmigrants are significant at 5 percent; * differences between migrants and nonmigrants are significant at 10 percent.

Table 3.12 Urban Nonmigrants Compared to Urban Migrants in Tunisia

	All destinations in Tunisia			Migrants to Jendouba			Migrants to Kairouan		
Characteristic	Urban Nonmigrants	Urban-urban migrants	Difference	Urban Nonmigrants	Urban-urban migrants	Difference	Urban Nonmigrants	Urban-urban migrants	Difference
Female	0.50	0.52	0.02***	0.52	0.52	0	0.51	0.54	0.03***
No education	0.10	0.04	–0.06***	0.13	0.03	–0.10***	0.18	0.05	–0.13***
Primary	0.26	0.15	–0.11***	0.24	0.11	–0.13***	0.24	0.16	–0.08***
Secondary	0.48	0.47	–0.01***	0.47	0.45	–0.02**	0.45	0.47	0.02***
Tertiary	0.16	0.34	0.18***	0.16	0.41	0.25***	0.14	0.33	0.19***
Manager	0.04	0.04	0.00*	0.03	0.03	0.00**	0.03	0.04	0.01
Self-employed	0.06	0.04	–0.02***	0.06	0.03	–0.03***	0.06	0.05	–0.01***
Wage earner	0.45	0.57	0.12***	0.38	0.57	0.19***	0.38	0.52	0.14***
Apprentice	0.00	0.00	0.00***	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Family helper	0.00	0.00	0.00***	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00**
15–24 years	0.23	0.22	–0.01***	0.21	0.17	–0.04***	0.25	0.21	–0.04***
25–34 years	0.24	0.4	0.16***	0.21	0.39	0.18***	0.23	0.39	0.16***
35–44 years	0.21	0.22	0.01***	0.21	0.27	0.06***	0.21	0.25	0.04***
45–54 years	0.19	0.11	–0.08***	0.21	0.12	–0.09***	0.18	0.11	–0.07***
55–64 years	0.13	0.05	–0.08***	0.16	0.05	–0.11***	0.13	0.04	–0.09***
Employed	0.85	0.88	0.03***	0.75	0.83	0.08***	0.8	0.84	0.04***
Married	0.56	0.63	0.07***	0.55	0.69	0.14***	0.55	0.66	0.11***

Source: World Bank calculations using 2014 Census.
Note: *** Differences between migrants and nonmigrants are significant at 1 percent; ** differences between migrants and nonmigrants are significant at 5 percent; * differences between migrants and nonmigrants are significant at 10 percent.

have been active in recent years. In sum, regional disparities and the marginalization of rural areas are the basis for people's decisions to migrate.

Migrants face challenges in finding employment opportunities at their destinations, with informal channels being the main route for their job search. In Jendouba, rather than using official channels such as the national employment agency, migrants activate their social networks of extended family, acquaintances, and neighbors, as well as the city's "Café of the Unemployed," a local coffee shop, to secure jobs. Similarly, in Kairouan, jobs requiring more specialized skills are difficult to find and keep, and access to such jobs depends on one's social networks and family ties. Bribery was also mentioned as a way to find employment.

Migrants integrate into different job sectors in each city. In Jendouba, men rely on the aforementioned networks to find jobs as construction day laborers, while women work in irrigated agricultural areas just outside the city. Although Kairouan has an established industrial sector, male migrants tend to find more opportunities as construction workers and in the services sector, such as being waiters in restaurants and cafés. Many women work as nannies or caretakers of children, as bakers of artisanal bread, or as craftswomen; some with vocational training or specialized skills are more likely to be employed in garment factories or agri-food processing plants.

Regardless of the sector, migrants in both cities face precarious working conditions and are not covered by labor laws or social security. For skilled and unskilled workers alike, migrants usually are more economically vulnerable, making them more likely to accept any job regardless of the conditions. They reported, "If we don't work, we don't eat," and that working conditions are not ideal, salaries are low, and social security coverage is patchy or nonexistent. Employers often exploit migrant workers, who frequently feel discriminated against by employers and co-workers alike. In Jendouba, migrants are mainly seen as essential to sectors where nonmigrants refuse to work, such as agriculture, leading to a process of "reverse commuting," whereby migrants who now live in the city travel daily to work the nearby rural fields (usually on small irrigated farms or olive groves). Moreover, skilled migrants in both cities state that having a diploma is not sufficient to find a good job, which has forced them to accept jobs for which they are overqualified.

Female migrant workers suffer from double discrimination in the workplace, with lower salaries and constant harassment. In Jendouba, women do physically demanding jobs in agriculture and are paid significantly less than male workers for the same work. In fact, agriculture is a feminized sector in which employers recruit women because they work longer hours for lower pay. In Kairouan, female migrants suggested that they are paid 20 percent to 30 percent less than men who perform the same job. A migrant woman in Kairouan reported, "I work from 7 am to 3 pm to earn 15 dinars/day (approximately US$5.50), and

there is no insurance against accidents on the job or while commuting to work." According to female migrant experiences, factories prefer to hire single women who are unburdened by family. Moreover, sexual harassment of women in the agricultural sector is rampant, and in factories, female workers are victims of verbal abuse and harassment by their employers, and sometimes by their male colleagues.

Limited social networks make it harder for female migrants to attend to the household and children while working long shifts. One male participant explained, "My job is to put food on the table, while my wife is responsible for raising the children." But since most migrant women work to support their families, they effectively share the responsibility of "putting food on the table." Those who work outside the home critically depend on their networks of neighbors and extended family members to attend to their responsibilities of raising children and earning an income. Although working double shifts was common among both migrant and nonmigrant female laborers, nonmigrants had more extensive social networks of family, kin, and friends on whom to depend for help with childcare and other emergencies.

Migrants, as well as some of the cities' low-income dwellers, settle in zones where land prices are affordable but services are lacking. Integration into the city—in particular, access to affordable housing and basic services—was raised as one of the greatest challenges upon arrival. The poor quality or absence of access to roads, public lighting, and other basic services left migrants feeling they were not integrated into the rest of the city.

Migrants in Jendouba settle in the periphery of already consolidated neighborhoods. Migrants who moved to Jendouba after 2011 purchased small lots of cheap, undeveloped, privately owned land to build their houses; however, these subdivisions of land are not planned and lack services. In contrast, migrants who arrived earlier in Jendouba settled on state-owned land, and although they are unlikely to be displaced, their tenure has not yet been formalized.

In Kairouan, migrants settle in expanding peripheral areas where the market for both land and half-built homes is thriving. These neighborhoods have two characteristics: First, there is a thriving market for land sales, with half-built homes with for-sale signs in which owners build one room, enclose it with a fence, and put it on the market for sale to migrants or city dwellers looking for cheaper housing options. Second, for basic services, households rely on communal water standpipes and common electricity meters that are shared among several households. Typically, all roads in these neighborhoods are nondemarcated dirt roads, and sanitation is nonexistent.

Nonmigrants are ambivalent about migrant populations; they recognize the value they add to the local economy but also point out that they compete

for jobs and services. Many participants agreed that, without migrants, Jendouba would lack a much-needed labor force—"economic activity would stop"—but they also noted competition from migrants for already scarce jobs, especially given that migrants accept lower wages and worse working conditions. Similarly, in Kairouan, participants recognize that, without migrants, the city would have no specialized labor force for construction work or artisanal crafts; but they also associate the growth of peripheral neighborhoods lacking infrastructure with the influx of migrants. Moreover, they link migrants to crowded hospitals and clinics and competition for industry and service jobs.

In the past decade in Tunisia, a crisis of trust has developed between citizens and authorities, including at the local level; this lack of trust is more present among migrants. Migrant communities in Jendouba and Kairouan share an animosity toward state authorities, who are perceived to be largely absent. This animosity can create fertile ground for social unrest and may hinder the implementation of integration policies. "The Omda [local government official] practices a form of clientelism and allowances are not distributed to those who deserve it," reported one migrant. "We need leaders who are close to us, listen to us, and who understand our real problems," stated others. And sometimes government presence is associated with violence. For instance, in Kairouan, where many migrants and nonmigrants struggle to pay electricity bills, police violently intervened and forcibly disconnected households from the network. In both cities, migrant and nonmigrant communities alike are disillusioned with electoral politics and perceive that officials only are present to collect votes, and once they have secured votes, they disappear. This disillusionment with political representation makes it difficult for local authorities to engage in dialogue with these communities.

Although different in many respects, the municipalities of Jendouba and Kairouan face similar challenges. Though Jendouba and Kairouan differ in size and population demographics, the mayors of the two cities both manage municipalities with limited budgets and small teams of skilled technicians. Operating under such constraints is particularly taxing for these and similar municipalities, which saw their territorial jurisdictions expand after the municipalization of the entire national territory in 2014. In Jendouba, a five-fold increase in municipal jurisdiction integrated previously rural areas without basic infrastructure into the city. The annexation of new areas placed an additional burden on municipalities to service these zones without a sufficient budget.

A lack of resources to update land planning instruments and the sale of subdivisions of land lacking infrastructure are great challenges for urban planning. Many incoming migrants and low-income populations settle in

these newly added zones, where municipalities struggle to manage informal urban expansion. Limited resources and a lack of planning leave city governments unable to keep pace with informal urban expansion, and they thus find themselves constantly playing catch-up. Jendouba municipality lacks the technical and financial expertise to update its planning documents (master plans, detailed urban plans) to balance urban expansion and the productivity of peripheral rural lands. In Kairouan, the most up-to-date municipal master plan does not include areas into which the city has been expanding, defeating the entire purpose of forward-looking planning. Moreover, the sale of land in illegal, unserved subdivisions makes planning redundant because brokers sell small pieces of land to low-income buyers who start building homes and subsequently make claims upon the municipality to provide services. In this case, municipalities are required to intervene post-urbanization, making service provision many times more expensive.

The Way Forward: Better Integration of Labor Migrants in Jendouba and Kairouan

Integration of migrants into secondary cities is a multidimensional challenge that brings together policies focused on migrants and policies meant to integrate all urban dwellers, such as improving spatial planning and municipal governance. The challenges faced by labor migrants go well beyond labor market integration, including aspects related to the spatial and social integration of migrants into cities. As such, a single instrument will be insufficient to tackle these issues; instead, a multipronged agenda that addresses integration into both the social and economic aspects of city life is needed. Actions will be required along three lines: (1) strengthening labor market integration to ease the process of finding a good job as migrants move into the city; (2) enhancing spatial integration for migrants and nonmigrants living in the peripheral areas of the city; and (3) improving municipal governance and management to support the socioeconomic integration of migrants and nonmigrants into urban life and city services.

Social and Labor Market Instruments for Better Quality and More Inclusive Jobs for Migrants

Better intermediation and support services should allow both cities to take full advantage of the capacity of migrants and maximize the return on the human capital of youth. To reduce discrimination toward migrants and address sexual harassment issues, both cities could strengthen access to and the quality of labor market regulation services and social insurance (in coordination with the national government). Coordination with existing civil society organizations to develop and organize awareness campaigns about sexual harassment prevention in the workplace and workers' rights (including increasing awareness

of employer responsibilities in such cases) can ensure that programs and laws respond to society's needs.

At the national level, sponsoring skill upgrading programs, enforcing labor protection laws, and creating care infrastructure such as daycare centers would support migrant integration and improve working conditions for all city migrants and nonmigrants. Migrants expressed the desire for training that would allow them to upgrade their skills and eventually target better jobs in other cities. Migrants are generally unable to take time off from work to enroll in such training programs. Therefore, these programs must be fully subsidized in addition to offering migrants a small remuneration in place of the daily wages they would forgo when enrolled in training. Moreover, daycare services can help free women's time to help them integrate into and remain in the labor market. Like training programs, facilities such as daycare centers support everybody regardless of their migration status, but may have a significant effect on migrant women given that their local networks may be weaker.

Spatial Integration Planning

At the municipal level, improving data and information systems and strengthening forward-planning practices can help enhance spatial integration within the city. Better information collection systems to track urban expansion need to be set up. At present, this information is available from multiple sources, but its extraction is not straightforward. The systematization and digitization of this information would be more beneficial if data about urbanization patterns, municipal assets, and services provided were also linked to land records within these cities. It is imperative to break data silos between decentralized and deconcentrated institutions to facilitate access to this information. By understanding patterns of urban expansion and their historical evolution, municipalities can better engage in forward-planning practices.

Strengthening overall citizen engagement can contribute to better migrant integration into city participation mechanisms, increase their voice in the city, and build cohesion with local communities. There is ample evidence (Dixon, Bessaha, and Post 2018) that becoming actively involved in the host community can facilitate immigrant integration, ensuring that their voices are heard, helping them influence local policy, and facilitating exchanges with nonmigrants. Expanding and encouraging civic community activities can be an important step toward easing and accelerating the integration of migrants into the city. For example, the European Union plan for inclusion and integration includes a pillar to support improving migrant participation in the local community, with activities to bring together migrants and local communities in educational, health, or sports pursuits while also ensuring the participation of migrants in consultative and decision-making processes.

Lifting constraints in the business environment can help create new opportunities for all workers in the cities. For the cities of Jendouba and Kairouan, where economic activity is limited and demand for labor is low, strengthening local economic development will be key to ensuring that jobs are available to migrants and nonmigrants alike. Complementing investments in infrastructure with improvements in the business environment can be an important step toward fostering local economic development, increasing opportunities for all workers in the city. In secondary cities located in lagging areas, an improved understanding of local absolute advantages can help identify areas or sectors where government investments and efforts may lead to higher returns. Recent research suggests that, rather than focusing on achieving comparative advantages through unsustainable fiscal incentives or distortionary policies, a focus on leveraging absolute advantages in lagging areas can help foster local economic development (Duranton and Venables 2018). Duranton and Venables (2018) argue that comparative advantage is a key concept when thinking about trade between countries, but when the focus is regional development within a country, firms and investments are allocated across different areas by focusing on absolute advantage instead. This means that firms choose the places that are most efficient in the production of their output. Hence, competing with coastal cities where productivity is high in a wide range of outputs may be difficult. Understanding where the opportunities lie is a first step in leveraging the absolute advantage of these lagging regions and their cities. Therefore, the first step in thinking about what sectors could be supported to foster local economic development is to take stock of local assets and advantages revealed by the current sectors active in a given place and identify distortions and bottlenecks that have limited the growth of these sectors and driven investment into other, less productive sectors. Lifting these constraints can go a long way toward fostering local economic development. Further supporting the growth of these sectors with investments could help speed up changes.

Better Governance for Better Services and Improved Living Conditions for All Migrants and Nonmigrants

At the national level, approving building codes, reforming the land tenure system, and crafting a national housing policy can lead to efficiency gains and help avoid future costs of urban improvement. The approval of building codes would grant municipalities clarity for their spatial interventions because they would have ample jurisdiction to freely administer the built environment. The creation of one centralized, digitized, easily accessible registry of land records could be the first step toward reforming the land tenure system. Finally, reflections on

national housing policy to address both supply- demand-side constraints will be essential. A national housing policy could review the provision of serviced land as one of the key constraints for the availability of housing and needed actions in this area. A pathway to addressing bottlenecks to housing supply for different income groups can help avoid the prevalent "catch-up" and retrofit approach that leads to costly upgrading programs.

Strengthening municipalities to achieve financial autonomy so as to meet their responsibilities and adopting a three- to five-year investment planning cycle can increase the municipal margin of maneuver to implement spatial integration policies. Municipalities could take an initial step by reviewing the current, costly instruments used to enumerate built and unbuilt land. Municipalities could test different enumeration techniques as pilot projects on portions of their territories. In the medium and long term, an improved enumeration system can lay the foundation for improved tax collection.

Adapting a formula for intergovernmental fiscal transfers and a public procurement law can facilitate municipal investment planning. The current formula for intergovernmental fiscal transfers is biased toward medium-sized cities because of how it weighs population size and regional development indicators. Simplifying this formula and adapting it to support the challenges faced by cities with accelerated peripheral urban expansion and low access to services is essential, and may also be a cost-effective strategy to improve access to services in low-density areas. Ultimately, the overall amount of intergovernmental fiscal transfers should be increased in tandem with a training program at the municipal level to ensure municipalities have the absorptive capacity to spend the money at their disposal.

Annex 3A

Table 3A.1 Determinants of Wage Employment in Jinja

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Wage employment	Wage employment	Wage employment	Wage employment	Wage employment	Wage employment
Outside city center	−0.389**	−0.398**	−0.333**	−0.389**	−0.413**	−0.364**
	(0.167)	(0.166)	(0.162)	(0.171)	(0.169)	(0.183)
Outskirts	−0.412***	−0.425***	−0.338**	−0.358**	−0.364**	−0.340*
	(0.135)	(0.136)	(0.151)	(0.162)	(0.168)	(0.181)
Migrant = 1		0.203	0.420**	0.349*	0.279	0.220
		(0.130)	(0.189)	(0.200)	(0.206)	(0.218)
Outside city center × migrant = 1			−0.294	−0.342	−0.272	−0.199
			(0.308)	(0.331)	(0.294)	(0.280)
Outskirts × migrant = 1			−0.365	−0.349	−0.317	−0.295
			(0.264)	(0.279)	(0.278)	(0.301)
Sex (male = 1)				0.440***	0.431***	0.339***
				(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.114)
Some primary				0.577	0.598	0.711
				(0.416)	(0.417)	(0.502)
Completed primary				0.655	0.674	0.828
				(0.434)	(0.439)	(0.512)
Some secondary				0.561	0.588	0.660
				(0.443)	(0.427)	(0.502)

(continued next page)

Table 3A.1 **Determinants of Wage Employment in Jinja** (continued)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Wage employment	**Wage employment**	**Wage employment**	**Wage employment**	**Wage employment**	**Wage employment**
Completed secondary				0.764*	0.778*	0.813*
				(0.418)	(0.415)	(0.493)
Any postsecondary				1.081**	1.093**	1.125**
				(0.419)	(0.425)	(0.507)
Age				0.0269	0.0321	0.0204
				−0.000460	−0.000529	−0.000357
Age squared				(0.000497)	(0.000523)	(0.000484)
Household size					−0.0126	−0.0150
					(0.0299)	(0.0346)
					−0.0774	−0.0547
Dependency ratio, all					(0.0789)	(0.0863)
						1.114***
Industry: manufacturing						(0.241)
Industry: service						0.422*
						(0.241)
Constant	0.0579	0.0147	−0.0305	−1.279	−1.186	−1.606*
	(0.0960)	(0.0981)	(0.0999)	(0.806)	(0.907)	(0.853)
Observations	*920*	*920*	*920*	*907*	*907*	*878*

Source: World Bank.
Note: Marginal effects; standard errors in parentheses. The base for strata is Jinja city center; the base for migrants is nonmigrants; the base for sex is female; the base for education is no education; the base for industry is agriculture. All models are estimated with a Probit specification. The observations included in these models are all employed respondents.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3A.2 Determinants of Hours Worked in Jinja

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Hours worked in last week	Hours worked in last week	Hours worked in last week	Hours worked in last week	Hours worked in last week	Hours worked in last week
Outside city center	−13.56	−13.65	−15.73*	−14.24*	−13.95*	−6.159
	(8.452)	(8.399)	(8.722)	(7.919)	(7.657)	(4.231)
Outskirts	−13.08*	−13.14*	−17.24**	−19.80***	−20.20***	−7.611**
	(6.912)	(6.901)	(8.251)	(6.574)	(6.577)	(3.683)
Migrant = 1		3.953	−4.151	−3.155	−2.643	4.552
		(5.602)	(9.533)	(7.846)	(8.044)	(5.243)
Outside city center × migrant = 1			9.066	13.02	12.70	2.791
			(13.93)	(11.02)	(10.70)	(7.560)
Outskirts × migrant = 1			17.41	14.05	14.00	−3.084
			(11.47)	(9.588)	(9.597)	(6.738)
Sex (male = 1)				26.11***	26.38***	7.201***
				(3.610)	(3.510)	(2.092)
Some primary				32.35**	31.61**	5.102
				(12.87)	(12.70)	(5.623)
Completed primary				25.28*	24.61*	6.400
				(13.58)	(13.56)	(5.615)
Some secondary				36.22***	35.57***	3.468
				(13.89)	(13.45)	(5.581)
Completed secondary				33.98***	33.55***	5.474
				(12.81)	(12.62)	(5.700)

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Table 3A.2 **Determinants of Hours Worked in Jinja** (continued)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Hours worked in last week	**Hours worked in last week**	**Hours worked in last week**	**Hours worked in last week**	**Hours worked in last week**	**Hours worked in last week**
Any postsecondary				29.73**	29.25**	−2.074
				(13.29)	(13.18)	(5.548)
Age				10.97***	10.84***	1.661***
				(1.026)	(1.073)	(0.634)
Age squared				−0.128***	−0.126***	−0.0203**
				(0.0136)	(0.0146)	(0.00821)
Household size					0.0633	0.267
					(1.385)	(0.613)
Dependency ratio, all					1.886	−1.492
					(2.501)	(1.523)
Industry: manufacturing						16.27***
						(3.460)
Industry: service						22.63***
						(3.495)
Constant	16.68***	15.80**	17.66**	−223.3***	−223.1***	2.788
	(6.250)	(6.699)	(7.347)	(23.82)	(26.29)	(14.64)
Observations	*1,612*	*1,612*	*1,612*	*1,594*	*1,594*	*878*

Source: World Bank.
Note: Marginal effects; standard errors in parentheses. The base for strata is Jinja city center; the base for migrants is nonmigrants; the base for sex is female; the base for education is no education; the base for industry is agriculture. Hours worked are coded as zero for nonemployed respondents, and all models are estimated with a Tobit specification with a lower bound of zero hours. The number of observations is lower in column (6) because of the inclusion of industry controls, which are only defined for employed respondents; therefore column (6) presents results that are conditional on being employed.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3A.3 Determinants of Log Earnings in Jinja

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Log weekly earnings	Log weekly earnings	Log weekly earnings	Log weekly earnings	Log weekly earnings	Log weekly earnings
Outside city center	0.0107	0.0122	0.0736	−0.0195	−0.0480	−0.00504
	(0.173)	(0.174)	(0.196)	(0.172)	(0.172)	(0.173)
Outskirts	−0.665***	−0.663***	−0.840***	−0.776***	−0.788***	−0.695***
	(0.229)	(0.231)	(0.283)	(0.265)	(0.277)	(0.261)
Migrant = 1		−0.0708	−0.157	−0.207	−0.307	−0.230
		(0.161)	(0.243)	(0.196)	(0.212)	(0.216)
Outside city center × migrant = 1			−0.246	−0.116	−0.0246	−0.154
			(0.370)	(0.320)	(0.318)	(0.324)
Outskirts × migrant = 1			0.736*	0.674*	0.717*	0.619*
			(0.395)	(0.363)	(0.374)	(0.363)
Sex (male = 1)				0.388***	0.364***	0.404***
				(0.125)	(0.123)	(0.121)
Some primary				0.455	0.490	0.352
				(0.467)	(0.461)	(0.430)
Completed primary				0.903*	0.935*	0.841*
				(0.486)	(0.480)	(0.447)
Some secondary				1.098**	1.152**	1.014**
				(0.476)	(0.465)	(0.427)
Completed secondary				1.137**	1.179**	1.066**
				(0.472)	(0.460)	(0.425)

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Table 3A.3 Determinants of Log Earnings in Jinja (continued)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Log weekly earnings	**Log weekly earnings**	**Log weekly earnings**	**Log weekly earnings**	**Log weekly earnings**	**Log weekly earnings**
Any postsecondary				1.564***	1.592***	1.427***
				(0.477)	(0.471)	(0.439)
Age				0.142***	0.148***	0.155***
				(0.0396)	(0.0389)	(0.0381)
Age squared				–0.00154***	–0.00162***	–0.00171***
				(0.000520)	(0.000510)	(0.000504)
Household size					–0.0206	–0.0155
					(0.0212)	(0.0200)
Dependency ratio, all					–0.0826	–0.0899
					(0.0781)	(0.0764)
Industry: manufacturing						0.329
						(0.247)
Industry: service						0.548**
						(0.232)
Constant	11.75***	11.77***	11.79***	7.710***	7.833***	7.331***
	(0.106)	(0.114)	(0.123)	(0.841)	(0.855)	(0.830)
R^2	0.0341	0.0345	0.0457	0.175	0.180	0.193
Observations	*833*	*833*	*833*	*820*	*820*	*820*

Source: World Bank.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The base for strata is Jinja city center; the base for migrants is nonmigrants; the base for sex is female; the base for education is no education; the base for industry is agriculture. Hours worked are coded as zero for nonemployed respondents. All models are estimated with an ordinary least squares specification.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3A.4 Determinants of Consumption per Adult Equivalent in Jinja

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Log consumption per adult equivalent	Log consumption per adult equivalent	Log consumption per adult equivalent	Log consumption per adult equivalent	Log consumption per adult equivalent	Log consumption per adult equivalent
Outside city center	−0.260	−0.278	−0.0763	−0.116	−0.152	−0.136
	(0.278)	(0.274)	(0.263)	(0.241)	(0.130)	(0.134)
Outskirts	−0.117	−0.145	−0.0753	−0.0504	−0.381***	−0.361***
	(0.209)	(0.195)	(0.221)	(0.203)	(0.120)	(0.119)
Migrants = 1		0.478***	0.925***	0.911***	0.0990	0.124
		(0.163)	(0.266)	(0.249)	(0.208)	(0.208)
Outside city center × migrant = 1			−0.866**	−0.800**	0.0464	0.00563
			(0.353)	(0.326)	(0.229)	(0.235)
Outskirts × migrant = 1			−0.353	−0.322	0.147	0.121
			(0.328)	(0.300)	(0.243)	(0.245)
Sex (male = 1)				0.0139	−0.0409	−0.0225
				(0.0611)	(0.0458)	(0.0493)
Some primary				−0.0109	0.251	0.227
				(0.274)	(0.162)	(0.156)
Completed primary				0.355	0.504***	0.491***
				(0.298)	(0.174)	(0.172)
Some secondary				0.0825	0.583***	0.560***
				(0.312)	(0.162)	(0.159)
Completed secondary				0.304	0.606***	0.603***
				(0.274)	(0.152)	(0.149)

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Table 3A.4 Determinants of Consumption per Adult Equivalent in Jinja (continued)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Log consumption per adult equivalent	Log consumption per adult equivalent	Log consumption per adult equivalent	Log consumption per adult equivalent	Log consumption per adult equivalent	Log consumption per adult equivalent
Any postsecondary				0.723**	1.033***	1.008***
				(0.334)	(0.175)	(0.170)
Age				0.0630**	0.0297**	0.0293*
				(0.0320)	(0.0138)	(0.0150)
Age squared				−0.000734*	−0.000355*	−0.000357*
				(0.000405)	(0.000183)	(0.000197)
Household size					−0.216***	−0.215***
					(0.0134)	(0.0132)
Dependency ratio, all					−0.0385	−0.0445
					(0.0504)	(0.0507)
Industry: manufacturing						0.0112
						(0.0870)
Industry: service						0.101
						(0.0854)
Constant	10.17***	10.07***	9.971***	8.533***	10.69***	10.65***
	(0.184)	(0.183)	(0.193)	(0.738)	(0.311)	(0.320)
R^2	0.0102	0.0435	0.0639	0.128	0.615	0.614
Observations	*915*	*915*	*915*	*902*	*902*	*873*

Source: World Bank.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The base for strata is Jinja city center; the base for migrants is nonmigrants; the base for sex is female; the base for education is no education; the base for industry is agriculture. Hours worked are coded as zero for nonemployed respondents. All models are estimated with an ordinary least squares specification.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes

1. The survey data for Tunisia have been only partially analyzed, given long delays in data collection following COVID-19 (coronavirus).
2. Background papers and reports for this chapter include "Secondary Cities and Migration: The Case of Jinja" (World Bank 2021a); " Secondary Cities and Migrants: The Tunisia Case (World Bank 2021b); and " Qualitative Research Study on Rural to Urban Labor Migrants in Jijiga" (Frontier 2021).
3. There are roughly 100 zones in Ethiopia. Because of data limitations, migration flows within zones cannot be detected. The migration numbers reported here are thus underestimated.
4. There is also urban-urban migration in Ethiopia, with people moving for work from one city to another within the country. These urban migrants tend to be highly educated, more so than the local urban population, and are more likely to work in the public sector (civil servants who get transferred from one city to another).
5. In principle, new arrivals to urban areas can apply for an urban kebele ID if they have lived in their new kebele for at least six months, they have a guarantor, and their landlord is willing to sign that the migrant lives in one of his or her properties. In practice, these conditions are often difficult to meet. Low-income migrants tend to be mobile in their search for work and affordable shelter, requiring them to change kebeles frequently, even while remaining in the same city. For tax reasons, landlords are reluctant to report that they rent out rooms. To issue an ID card, some cities require ownership of property, which is outside the reach of rural migrants and indeed much of the incumbent urban population.
6. According to the 2018 Urban Employment and Unemployment Survey, unemployment in Jijiga is more than 20 percentage points higher for women than for men (Ethiopia CSA 2018).
7. Population decomposition was calculated using the 2002 and 2014 census, accounting for changes in administrative boundaries. A similar approach was adopted by Sladoje, Randolph, and Khan (2019), without distinguishing between Kampala and secondary cities, which makes the two results not strictly comparable. Sladoje, Randolph, and Khan (2019) estimate that 59 percent of the urban population increase was driven by changes to urban boundaries, 31 percent by natural growth, and 10 percent by migration.
8. The city of Kampala is defined here as Kampala District, and therefore excludes the greater metropolitan area. This definition is consistent with the Kampala City Authority classification. For other urban areas the Uganda Bureau of Statistics classification is used.
9. The 675 households in the Jinja sample correspond to 1,629 working-age adults, 29 percent of whom were migrants who moved to Jinja within the past 10 years. About 28 percent of those with migrant status relocated from other urban areas, whereas 72 percent moved to Jinja from rural areas. In the nonmigrant category, 430 working-age respondents were migrants who had lived in Jinja for more than 10 years, and are here classified as nonmigrants. Returnees—those who had moved outside of Jinja but have returned—number 338. The remaining 392 respondents were working-age adults who had never lived outside of Jinja. Although the sample

was intended to be representative of the population, caution should be exercised in interpreting these results as being representative of subsets of the population, particularly with regard to the representativeness of population subgroups within the geographic stratum, given that sample size is a major concern in the analysis presented here.

10. This may simply reflect sample design rather than the actual population dynamics in Jinja, but the differences from migrants are still useful in illustrating housing patterns.
11. The full effects of COVID-19 may not be captured because the data collection took place during the COVID-19 pandemic.
12. There is ample empirical evidence on property and land taxation. See, for example, Haas and Kopanyi (2017) for examples from Kampala.
13. Delegations are the second administrative level in Tunisia, following the governorate. In 2014, there were 264 delegations. This is the smallest geographical unit used in this study for the analysis of migration using census data. A migrant is any person who has changed his or her delegation of residence during the 2009–14 reference period, whether within or between governorates.
14. Given that the analysis is at the delegation level, a portion of the migrants is rural-rural.
15. Estimation results are available from the authors upon request.

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Chapter 4

The Mayor's Wedge

Introduction

This chapter examines policies, programs, and tools that can help or hinder local government officials in managing the challenges and leveraging the opportunities offered by migration, particularly in secondary cities in Africa. The primary focus is on what mayors and local government authorities can feasibly do, on their own and in partnership with others, especially in the context of underresourced secondary cities, to leverage their policy mandate and resource availability, and also to influence national policy—in other words, "the mayor's wedge." With this focus comes the recognition that many policies that can directly affect the drivers of migration often fall under the jurisdiction of national governments. At the same time, there is still much that can be done within the jurisdiction of local governments to both support and leverage the force of migration—with adequate preparation. Good city management can make the difference between the successful integration of newcomers into the life and economy of a city, or the creation of cities that are physically, economically, and socially fragmented.

In discussing the different policy and program entry points, three broad perspectives are taken. First, the focus is on managing urban expansion instead of on curbing migration. Fighting the forces that drive migration is difficult (often even counterproductive), and policies to reduce rural-urban migration are often also damaging for the poor, regardless of their migrant status (Tacoli, McGranahan, and Satterthwaite 2015), as well as for migrants and their families.[1] On the other hand, as highlighted in the section in chapter 2 titled "Urban Markets at Work: A Dynamic Perspective," emerging evidence suggests benefits from urban density in Africa, and also when brought about by migrants. Hence, this chapter moves away from a discussion of migration control policies and focuses on how cities can better facilitate and leverage the

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integration of migrants into cities instead. Second, many national and local policies needed to leverage migration for the benefit of all require a pan-urban or whole-of-city approach, benefiting both migrants and nonmigrants alike. Third, migrants are mobile, changing where they live and work between and within cities. Improving the understanding of where migrants work and live facilitates reaching the migrant population and fostering their integration by crafting interventions within these spaces.

The chapter is organized as follows: First, it provides a brief overview of national policies, emphasizing key areas where local governments can join forces with national governments and make their voice heard to help shape these policies. Second, it discusses the role of local governments and shows how a whole-of-city approach can strengthen integration and ensure better outcomes for all. Finally, it shows how in some cases, targeted interventions to spaces where migrants live and work can facilitate integration while ensuring better living standards for all. Many of the recommendations apply to towns, secondary cities, and big cities alike, though where they differ is highlighted.

The Role of National Governments

Addressing the opportunities and challenges of migration and fostering an inclusive practice requires a multilevel governance approach that brings together central, regional, and local governments. Important guidance can be provided through ongoing programs such as National Urban Policies.[2] The thematic priorities of National Urban Policies typically include economic development, poverty eradication, provision of adequate infrastructure and services, curbing and upgrading informal settlements, environmental protection, and urban-rural links and food security. Developing an understanding of the barriers to the effective integration of migrants at the municipal level will open up potential policy avenues for national policies to support local governments as well as provide a valuable framework for assessing policies related to rural-to-urban mobility.

Areas where greater interaction between national governments and municipalities can help include, among others (see table 4A.1 for more detail):

- *Reviewing registration requirements at both the local and national level* to identify where restrictions are in place regarding access to services and who has the authority and competency to allow access. For example, registration was highlighted as a particular challenge for migrants in Ethiopia when trying to access public services or support programs. Obtaining an urban *kebele* ID card is a long and cumbersome process for migrants.

- *Strengthening the capacity of local governments to articulate their needs* and understand how to access national funds can provide additional funding for local programs from both the national government and international development agencies. Limited capacity is often a deeper constraint in secondary cities compared with capital cities, where local capacity tends to concentrate in many countries.
- *Developing pragmatic and flexible approaches to facilitating access to land, infrastructure, and services.* Developing such approaches can be done by building a good understanding of what a municipality can do on its own, what it can do with regional and central government ministries and agencies, and what can be done with community partners, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, universities, and the development community.
- *Using geographic information system and mapping tools to match demand with supply* and encouraging cooperation among adjoining municipalities to identify where services and facilities such as neighborhood health clinics, hospitals, and primary and secondary schools can improve access to and levels of service across municipal boundaries.

Another area in which national policies can help local governments manage urban pressures links to population policies. Policy makers often view migration as creating excessive demographic pressure on a municipality's capacity to deliver urban infrastructure, effective land use management, and employment opportunities, thus contributing to urban poverty. Herein they are heavily influenced by the early literature on the links between rural-urban migration and urban unemployment (Awumbila 2015; and Bundervoet 2018). The limited research on the sources of urbanization in developing countries (in policy circles typically equated with urban growth) further led to the misconception that rural-urban migration is often the main driver of rapid urban population growth. Recent research, however, highlights that in developing countries, and especially in Africa, natural population increase is the more important driver (see "The Decreasing Contribution of Migrants to Urban Population Growth" in chapter 2). These misconceptions about the drivers of urban population growth have contributed to policies in developing countries that focus on controlling rural-urban migration to manage urban demographic pressures rather than policies to manage urban natural increase.

Local Government Action

National policy frameworks are essential, but local action to foster migrant inclusion is equally needed (Serageldin 2016). Much can and needs to be done by local governments to leverage migration. The benefits can be substantial,

including for the urban fiscal balance. Recent estimates for China suggest that migrants contribute between 6 percent and 15 percent of total local revenues (Sieg, Yoon, and Zhang 2020). At the same time, a lack of proactive strategies for migrant inclusion can lead to conflicts with incumbent interests over land, the formal economy, finance, and government, creating tensions that exacerbate ethnic and social fault lines and undermine the contributions migrants could make (Cartwright et al. 2018).

Effective migrant inclusion requires building migration into how a municipality is managed and planned. Municipal leadership should not view the integration of migrants into the municipality as "an additional piece of work, added to the end of overstretched planning processes, but rather an opportunity that should be integrated with what is already ongoing" (Blaser Mapitsa and Landau 2019). Successful integration requires thinking ahead and preparing for urban growth, including through migration. It can benefit migrants and nonmigrants alike and helps build cohesive and prosperous communities. Inclusion of migration considerations can happen along the different domains of policy making, including budgeting, participation, accountability, and perception. It should happen with an eye toward accommodating differential needs and fostering social cohesion, and should be maximally informed by data and evidence (box 4.1).

Migrant inclusion is multifaceted and requires addressing economic and social as well as spatial dimensions. The economic aspects of inclusion involve the availability of jobs, earning capacity, and opportunity for advancement. Influencing factors are the local economy and opportunities available for migrants, access to education and training, connectivity to employment, and access to noncollateralized credit and microfinance. The social dimension of marginalization involves barriers that are more difficult to break down. These barriers can lead to an uncaring attitude that results in the delay or denial of access to public services (Serageldin 2016), as has been expressed by some migrants in the case cities. In Jijiga, Ethiopia, for example, most migrants interviewed expressed resentment about the lack of service provision and did not feel welcomed by the local government administration. In Jinja, Uganda, a migrant noted that "migrant youths are not favored when there is a job opportunity, because they are of different tribes." Spatial segregation results from low-income households clustering together in spatially informal or remote areas. Among other issues, restrictive and exclusionary land use regulations, lengthy and expensive administrative processes for land development, a lack of land regularization and titling mechanisms, and corrupt practices of land conversion have led to high prices for land and informal occupation (World Bank 2015).

Against this background, five policy domains for local governments to support migrant integration are discussed that often benefit all citizens, migrants and nonmigrants alike: (1) strengthening economic inclusion through job

BOX 4.1

Framework for Measuring Municipal Responsiveness

Successfully integrating migrants requires a comprehensive urban planning approach. The questions below provide a guiding framework with which to identify gaps in policy and information that may create barriers to integration.

- *Budgeting.* Are budgeting systems responsive to demographic changes? Do they incorporate forward-looking planning? Do they start from multisite planning and collaboration?
- *Participation.* Are the perspectives of migrants included in technocratic mechanisms built to address the needs of nonmigrants?
- *Accountability.* Can the responsiveness of the authorities to the feedback of migrants be built into the political processes, given that migrants are usually not part of the voter base?
- *Perceptions.* To what extent do officials think that mobile populations fall within their responsibility, and what does this imply?
- *Social cohesion.* To what extent do officials accommodate the unique challenges of communities with diverse needs?
- *Data collection and management systems.* Can these systems accommodate mobility? Are they sufficiently disaggregated, of sufficient quality, and accessible to officials?

Source: Adapted from Blaser Mapitsa and Landau 2019.

creation, (2) addressing gender inequities, (3) improving spatial planning, (4) building adequate data and budgetary decentralization, and (5) increasing participation and government capacity (see table 4A.2 for more detail).

Job Creation

Secondary cities often face limited labor demand, calling for a more conducive business environment and supporting infrastructure. As revealed in the case city studies (chapter 3), high unemployment rates are a common challenge. Complementing investments in infrastructure with improvements in the business environment can be an important first step toward fostering local economic development and job creation. Such investments will help attract new firms and enable incumbent enterprises (formal and informal) to improve their revenues and hire more workers, increasing opportunities for all workers in cities, nonmigrants as well as migrants. In this, both large and small and formal and informal enterprises have an important role to play and will continue to

coexist for some time to come, often catering to different consumers demanding different products, quality, and convenience (box 4.2). With much employment still informal, and much of it in household enterprises with no or few employees, improving productivity through targeted programs remains an important intermediate step as well, including for economic inclusion (Beegle and Bundervoet 2019). Household enterprises also facilitate the labor market entry for migrants, given low entry and exit costs. In certain structural contexts, they may even be the optimal response (Davis, Hsu, and VanVuren 2023). Overall, it is better organizational quality (not to be equated with formalization) that matters for raising enterprise productivity and creating more, good jobs.[3]

Second, in secondary cities in lagging areas, an improved understanding of the local absolute advantages can help identify areas and sectors where

BOX 4.2

Different Firms for Different Markets

The existence of high transaction costs and heterogeneity in consumer demand help explain why large processing firms take over markets at varying paces and why they often coexist with many small and medium enterprises (SMEs). As countries develop, sectors grow from small simple traditional firms to a mix of small and large firms. This evolution also holds in agri-food, which makes up at least a third of urban employment in Africa's towns and secondary cities (Nico and Christiaensen 2023).

When transaction costs are low, a large modern firm can exploit economies of scale and scope and produce a wide range of products at lower costs than smaller traditional firms. When transaction costs are high, on the other hand, and the costs and reliability of procuring intermediate inputs (crop supplies or throughput) increase, SMEs tend to have a comparative advantage over larger firms. Large firms need secure quality supplies at scale to fully utilize their capacity, which is necessary to capture the economies of scale and scope that give them their competitive edge. SMEs can also have advantages in the production of highly local, inexpensive traditional products; cost and product innovation; or the addition of complementary services such as delivery (AGRA 2019).

In addition, as incomes rise, consumer markets diverge, with different consumers and markets demanding different levels of quality and convenience. Different sizes of organizations, each with its own level of comparative advantage and labor productivity, tend to cater to these different markets. These dynamics are vividly illustrated by the case of injera-making[a] enterprises in urban Ethiopia, with small producers selling mainly directly to consumers, while restaurants make up a large share of the customer base of medium and large producers.

Source: AGRA 2019; Minten et al. 2016.
a. Injera is a teff-based flatbread popular in Ethiopia.

government investments and efforts may lead to higher returns. Research suggests that, rather than focusing on achieving comparative advantages through unsustainable fiscal incentives or distortionary policies, attention to leveraging absolute advantages in lagging areas can help foster local economic development (Duranton and Venables 2018). Leveraging absolute advantages requires taking stock of local assets and advantages revealed by the current sectors active in cities and identifying distortions and bottlenecks that have limited the growth of these sectors. Lifting these constraints can go a long way toward fostering local economic development. In towns and secondary cities, absolute advantages are often built around tradable primary activities such as agriculture, mining, or tourism (cultural heritage, natural parks), so-called industries without smokestacks (Newfarmer, Page, and Tarp 2018).

Third, the focus on job creation and absolute advantage can be complemented with interventions in areas where migrants are disproportionately constrained. Understanding the skills needed by promising sectors and the skills that migrants bring can, for example, underscore the need for targeted skills-building programs for migrants. Although previous chapters suggest that urban-urban migrants often are more educated and have better labor market outcomes than nonmigrants, rural-urban migrants may require special attention through programs that contribute to improving their skills, thus facilitating their transition into urban labor markets. Even though such programs may aim at improving the skills of rural-urban migrants, there are benefits from offering them broadly to the city population, given that other vulnerable, nonmigrant groups may also benefit from such interventions. Other possible municipal interventions, as highlighted elsewhere in this chapter, include improving access to finance for small businesses and savings groups and providing opportunities for skills development (see tables 4A.3–4A.6). Together, the focus on job creation through a conducive business environment and supporting infrastructure, absolute advantage, and targeted interventions can enable mayors to turn the density of their towns and cities (including migration-induced density) into a positive agglomeration force, as indicated by the emerging evidence in the section "Urban Markets at Work: A Dynamic Perspective" in chapter 2.

A Gendered Perspective

A broad focus on the inclusion of women and other vulnerable groups can bring benefits to migrants and nonmigrants alike. The case cities reviewed in the previous chapters indicate the challenge of discrimination and harassment faced by migrant women. Interviews with female migrants in Jendouba and Kairouan suggest that factories prefer to hire single women who are unburdened by family. Moreover, sexual harassment of women in the agricultural sector is rampant, while in factories, female workers are victims of verbal abuse and

harassment by employers, and sometimes by their male colleagues. To reduce discrimination against women, migrants, or other vulnerable groups, cities can strengthen the quality of social protection systems in coordination with national governments. Investing in mechanisms to increase awareness of many forms of discrimination and violence in coordination with civil society can help prevent overall discrimination and break taboos, including reducing episodes of sexual harassment in the workplace. Information and educational campaigns that clearly communicate the responsibilities of employers can help prevent discrimination and protect migrant and nonmigrant workers alike.

Better Spatial Planning

Given the diversity of residential and economic spaces that migrants occupy throughout their journey to integrate into the city, place-based strategies may be needed to effectively address migrants' needs. Helping migrants overcome barriers and constraints can make a significant difference in how well and quickly they can integrate into a municipality's economy and work spaces. Furthermore, by focusing on the spaces where migrants live and work, a local government authority can develop policy and program interventions to improve conditions and opportunities for all migrants and nonmigrants, with a lens toward migrants. For migrants, social capital influences their destination, highlighting the importance of the spatial dimension as a cornerstone of social inclusion.

The spatial or physical dimension of inclusion consists of access to infrastructure, basic public services, road improvements, housing, and land (Serageldin 2016). It also concerns the spatial planning of economic activities to facilitate access to jobs. In general, spatial development and planning among local governments in Africa are made more difficult by outdated plans and planning approaches, regulatory constraints, and a lack of human capital and implementation capacity. In Jinja, Uganda, even though spatial planning falls under local government jurisdiction, capacity at both the district and municipal level is limited. According to an interview with a staffer from the Natural Resource Department of Jinja District local government, there are three planners for the city and another three working at the district level. Longer-term efforts are underway to increase the efficacy of planning and include social, economic, and environmental issues. As spatial planning becomes more inclusive, strategic, and integrated, opportunities to mainstream strategies that support the integration of migrants can open up.

Addressing housing and land affordability and adequate intracity mobility can significantly improve migrant integration into the urban economy and fabric. The analysis in previous chapters and interviews with migrants highlight access to housing and land as one of the main challenges faced by migrants as they move into cities. With limited access to affordable housing, the only options migrants are often left with is to settle in informal communities, with

limited access to basic services and work opportunities, or in the overcrowded center of the city, close to the jobs.

Adopting best practices in linking urban planning and capital improvement plans can help integrate municipal interventions with spatial implications. Less complex spatial plans that take note of current conditions and trends can be used to adjust service delivery to meet current and future demand. A focus on improving property rights, land tenure, and other instruments to facilitate the workings of land markets can help improve the availability of serviced land for development, thus increasing the housing supply. Furthermore, overcoming the spatial and organizational fragmentation of smallholder firms and providing better access and necessary infrastructure can increase employment opportunities that can benefit migrants. Local governments need to develop and operationalize links between local development plans and financing for local investments that support economic development.

Adequate Data and Budgets

A lack of data and information management capacity is a significant impediment to developing, implementing, and monitoring policies and programs that address the needs of migrants as well as society at large. These shortcomings also make effective planning for urban growth more difficult. In Jijiga, Ethiopia, for example, local authorities explicitly noted the need for better data on the scale and composition of migrant inflows. Information on the availability of land and land uses can be an important step toward building cadastral information that can help in planning and managing urban growth. Lack of adequate data and information management systems further impedes an informed dialogue between policy makers, administrators, researchers, and the public about labor migration, the experiences of migrants and the challenges they face, the positive and negative impacts of labor migration, and potential policy directions and interventions.

Municipalities must think about innovative ways to collect demographic and spatial information and update it frequently. Local governments can partner with community-based organizations (CBOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and advocacy groups; universities; and development partners to fill their information gaps. Civil society organizations are also important in ensuring that the voices of underrepresented groups are heard, ensuring that no one is left behind (UCLG 2019). For example, the detailed data sets gathered by the young Chicoco Maps team in Port Harcourt, Nigeria, demonstrate a successful methodological approach to, and effective methods of, participatory data gathering and sharing in informal settlements. Trade unions and business groups—particularly for informal sectors—are key resources that can be mobilized, given that they often already collect information about their members or users. Finally, although seeking out new data sources is important, a sustained

shift is also needed to mainstream issues of migration status into existing survey tools and processes.

Only if cities have the resources to fulfill their mandates will they be able to respond to the changing needs of migrants, no matter where they come from. In the African context, decentralization levels and local governments' own source revenues are low, which has led to the common consensus that many Sub-Saharan African countries have a mediocre level of fiscal decentralization (Paulais 2012). In Ethiopia, for example, intergovernmental transfers are based on a formula that includes population size as a main parameter. As a mobile and unregistered group, migrants are underrepresented in official statistics and are thus not considered in service delivery budgeting and planning. Operating under such constraints is particularly taxing for municipalities such as Jendouba and Kairouan in Tunisia, which saw their territorial jurisdictions expand in 2014. In Jendouba, a five-fold increase of the municipal jurisdiction integrated previously rural areas without basic infrastructure into the city. The annexation of new areas into municipal boundaries places an additional burden on municipalities to service these zones without sufficient budget resources. Given the difficulty of improving local government revenues through local taxation, central government transfers remain critical budget elements.

In most African countries, central government grants and subsidies tend to overshadow subnational revenue sources. The level of central government transfers as a percentage of local government revenue is 85 percent or more in Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. Intergovernmental transfers occur through conditional, unconditional, and equalization grants,[4] with the quantities determined in different ways. The lack of transparency and predictability makes it difficult for local governments to plan and execute projects (UCLG 2019). Furthermore, central government budget assistance inherently favors vertical sectors such as health and education, as well as favoring national implementation (through line ministries) at the expense of territorial approaches (Paulais 2012). A sectoral approach will often fail to account for where migrants live and create demand for services.

Undertaking fiscal reforms that increase local revenue sources requires a long-term commitment by central and local governments. Within these longer-term reform efforts, the challenge for local governments is to pursue practical and effective means of developing policies and delivering services that directly and indirectly affect the integration of migrants. Strengthening tools and information to manage land can be a first step toward building multipurpose cadasters that can help take steps toward the collection of property taxes as an important resource for local governments. Furthermore, to overcome fiscal gaps, local governments can explore the possibility of mobilizing public-private partnership funding for smaller, targeted investment packages that benefit migrants. Potential examples include public-private partnerships for markets,

bus stations, road surfacing, transit points that include commercial activities, and the financing of distributive community-based infrastructure, including microgrids, sanitation, and water networks. Property owners can also contribute to these programs; there are ample examples of cost sharing organized by migrants and nonmigrants at both the street and the neighborhood level.

Migrant Voice and Government Capacity

Facilitating participation in the policy-making process is usually an effective way to ensure that the perspectives and concerns of different stakeholders are heard and addressed and social cohesion is built (Lee et al. 2022). Municipal planning and budgeting documents typically represent the needs of migrants and nonmigrants and businesses that can access consultation forums. Migrants, however, are often de facto excluded from popular participation and planning processes. For example, in Jinja, Uganda, planning and budget decisions are supposed to be made through a bottom-up approach at the village, ward, and division levels, and thus inform municipal council and then district council development planning. Many migrants and nonmigrants are not aware of these meetings and do not participate in them. Inclusive approaches can also help maintain a constructive dialogue. For instance, in Kairouan, Tunisia, as many migrants and nonmigrants struggled to pay electricity bills, police forcibly disconnected households from the network, creating discontent and hampering relationships between local authorities and communities. Creative communication tools and built-in feedback mechanisms that are culturally sensitive and explicitly account for how marginalized groups, including migrants, access information are needed. Given resource and knowledge gaps, local governments can work with strategic partners to increase migrant participation and community knowledge of programs.

Mainstreaming migration issues and support into local government departments can occur through training, knowledge sharing, and solutions-based task forces. Training and sensitization programs should reflect African cities' evolving realities and the types of spaces and places where well-established or newly arrived migrants live and work, challenging misperceptions about or stigma associated with migration. For example, in line with earlier research on internal migration in Ethiopia, city authorities in Jijiga mainly stressed the challenges of migration instead of also pointing out its benefits. Among the challenges they cited were the increase in the unemployment rate and competition for scarce jobs between locals and migrants, the expansion of informal settlements and illegal trade, escalating rental prices, and security threats such as robbery and theft.

Knowledge sharing is another means of raising awareness about common challenges and solutions within a municipality and among different municipalities and upper levels of government. Given the severe impacts of COVID-19

(coronavirus), secondary cities would benefit from this approach to work effectively across siloed line agencies and nongovernmental groups involved with migrants and other vulnerable groups (Cities Alliance 2021). Additionally, to promote broader systemic change, building policy-making capacity among senior decision-makers can help align and coordinate ministries' and agencies' policies, programs, and projects that affect migration strategies.

Finally, at the local and regional levels, task forces focused on issues or projects affecting migrants can help remove bureaucratic hurdles for cooperation and address interjurisdictional planning needs, such as transport and infrastructure corridors and peripheral settlements. Local governments can partner with CBOs and NGOs to provide vocational training and access to micro-credit to leverage existing resources and increase the accountability, transparency, and sustainability of government programs in local communities.

A Focus on Migrants through Space

Better planning for urban growth is the best way to help integrate migrants into cities, but in some cases, targeted action may be needed. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the best tool local governments can use to respond to challenges brought by growing populations and leverage the opportunities offered by migration flows is to plan ahead and ensure that services are available to everyone. However, when divisions between nonmigrants and migrants run deep for cultural, linguistic, or historical reasons, spatially targeted action may be needed. Where necessary, a focus on spaces where migrants live and work can be used to improve conditions and opportunities for all migrants and nonmigrants. A pan-urban perspective is needed to ensure that improvements address the needs of the most vulnerable (for example, migrants) and do not create additional barriers separating them from the rest of the city, but instead facilitate their integration, such as by creating spaces where both migrants and nonmigrants can share activities, including sports, education, or shopping.

Settlement patterns that reflect the similar spatial evolution of urban areas can be identified in most cities. These typologies help frame potential policies and intervention strategies that proactively support the integration of migrants into the economy and society of a municipality. This framework is not meant to be a generalization of African urban morphology, but rather to serve as a starting point for understanding where and how interventions can be developed. Municipalities may find it useful to establish settlement typologies that reflect local growth dynamics, conditions, and the places migrants live and work. The following presents some examples of interventions that can be designed according to some typologies of places where migrants live and work.

Where Migrants Live

Housing quality and affordability determine the location decisions of migrants and have a long-term impact on livability and access to opportunities (see table 4A.7). This spatial focus is supported by earlier research by Beauchemin and Bocquier (2004) on migration patterns in the 1980s and 1990s in several West African cities. The authors highlight that migrant trajectories are more complex than was initially thought, with migrants generally settling in peri-central areas, where they may be housed by friends or family, or even rent, before eventually moving to the outskirts of the city where it may be possible for them to buy plots of land, although such land is often only available through informal markets and is disconnected from service networks.

Similarly, a study of migrant households in Arusha, Tanzania, finds that both migrants and urban-born nonmigrants often move among different locations in central parts of the city, either living with relatives or in rented accommodations. Many later move out and establish their own households after some years. The authors identify three types of settlements where migrants live in Arusha: densely developed inner city areas, consolidated peripheral areas, and newly developing peripheral settlements (Andreasen et al. 2017). Similar patterns have been observed in the case cities.

Densely developed inner city areas are attractive to migrants because they offer a range of lower-cost rental options and relatively good access to income-producing opportunities (see table 4A.8). Although these neighborhoods are congested, land values are high, reflecting the location and potential income generation from renting or informal activities. For the lower-income areas, the unregulated nature of the private rental market (especially subletting) contributes to increased population and housing density in central areas and intensifies pressures on the local environment. Landlords may focus more on maximizing the number of rental rooms than on the quality of the rooms they rent. These areas tend to be older, are densely populated, and have limited or inadequate infrastructure. However, compared with more peri-urban or peripheral areas of the city, inner-city settlements tend to have better service provision. This type of migrant settlement pattern was, for example, observed among rural-urban migrants in Jinja, Uganda. Migrants there are more likely to live in the city center and less likely to live in the outskirts than nonmigrants. They pay 27 percent less rent and occupy more affordable housing located in informal settlements in the city center.

At one point on a migrant's journey within a city, he or she may live in what could be called a consolidated peripheral area (see table 4A.9). These communities, which were previously on the edge of the city, have been absorbed into the urban fabric; they can also include villages that have been incorporated into the city. These communities are relatively accessible to the city center through various transit options. As these peripheral areas are absorbed into the urban area, homeowners become landlords for the growing rental market. These

communities can be composed of a mix of long-term landowners and new renters (often migrants). Compared with densely developed inner-city neighborhoods, the housing stock could be more spacious and higher in quality, while still being accessible to employment in the city center. These previously peripheral areas have different levels of physical development and, depending on the expansion of urban infrastructure, some access to various services. Migrant settlement in peripheral areas of already consolidated neighborhoods was, for example, observed in Jendouba, Tunisia. Migrants who moved to Jendouba after 2011 purchased small lots of cheap, undeveloped, privately owned land to build their houses; however, these subdivisions of land are not planned and lack services. These communities are relatively accessible to the city center through various transit options. In contrast, focus groups in Kairouan, Tunisia, suggest that migrants in this city rent in more consolidated and relatively better equipped central neighborhoods. Renting is a transitory option for migrants as they settle in the city and save up to buy housing in peripheral expanding neighborhoods where land and housing are affordable.

Migrants' search for lower-value rents or land often occurs outside the city's central areas in newly developing peripheral settlements (see table 4A.10). Despite the low density, these areas experience very rapid and usually unplanned growth. They typically include longer-term migrants and nonmigrants as well as new arrivals. Households tend to move from central parts of the city as part of a process of establishing themselves as homeowners. As migrants stay longer, they tend to relocate to the outskirts, where homeownership rates are higher due to affordability. For example, in Jinja, Uganda, only 10 percent of migrants who arrived in Jinja three or fewer years ago own homes, whereas 22 percent who arrived three to ten years ago own homes, and 46 percent who arrived more than ten years ago own homes. Buying affordable, undeveloped land in the periphery allows aspiring homeowners to construct their own houses incrementally over a number of years. Given the self-built process, these settlements are often not serviced by formal water provision or electricity networks. Much of the infrastructure, such as pit latrines or boreholes, is provided by the individual household or shared with other community members, with limited coordinated efforts at the community scale unless the area absorbs existing rural settlements. Most of the migrants in these communities still work locally or commute to more central locations.

This typology of urban centers, consolidated neighborhoods, and peripheral neighborhoods is useful in framing potential policies and intervention strategies. Such spatially oriented strategies have the potential to proactively support the integration of migrants based on their housing and service needs while also being consistent with a pan-urban development approach that benefits all migrants and nonmigrants. The case cities suggest that migrants who settle in peripheral areas of the cities may have a harder time integrating into the

economic and social life of the city. Migrants in the periphery of Jinja, Uganda, work fewer hours than those in the center of the city; those in Jendouba, Tunisia, mentioned serious challenges in accessing basic services, remaining disconnected from city networks. Programming incremental strategies that respond to both initial and longer-term priorities can improve the integration of migrants and increase the quality of life for all migrants and nonmigrants and enterprises within these communities.

Given fiscal constraints, incremental *in situ* improvements can be a realistic approach for dense inner-city areas. Complex land ownership and tenure patterns will often present significant challenges to improving infrastructure and services that can be addressed through incremental strategies. Public realm improvements such as lighting, solid waste collection, and addressing circulation blockages at critical entry and exit points can strengthen the local economy and improve safety and access for migrants and nonmigrants. One challenge will be outreach efforts to migrant households and groups to understand their needs and priorities. Given the importance of the rental market for migrants in these areas, addressing the underlying housing, land tenure, and zoning issues will be essential. For example, it may be necessary to explore opportunities to improve subletters' rights, which can affect migrants. In the longer term, resolving underlying land property rights challenges can stimulate incremental housing investment that can open up more rental housing, providing additional housing alternatives for the most vulnerable.

Within more consolidated neighborhoods, the municipality can identify existing and future internal circulation and infrastructure networks to encourage densification of existing housing and guide new development. Smaller interventions can also improve accessibility, thereby improving internal mobility and access to social services and employment opportunities within communities or in adjacent ones. Improving circulation networks can be linked to re-blocking programs in cooperation with the community and tied to registration programs depending on the underlying property rights. Supporting the improvement of public spaces and infrastructure can lead to well-managed densification and land use. Zoning and development regulations can promote mixed-use and appropriate in-home enterprises. Working with the community to identify opportunities to reserve or acquire land for needed public facilities such as schools, markets, health centers, youth centers, and recreational open spaces before the neighborhood fully densifies will be essential.

In peripheral settlements, proactively guiding development before settlement patterns are consolidated is both possible and desirable. The failure to manage peri-urban areas has led to a loss of strategic urban utility corridors, high compensation costs associated with land acquisition and resettlement, a lack of space for public facilities such as schools and hospitals, and high levels of land disputes. The overall impact creates uncertainty in land markets (Roberts 2014).

Overcoming these constraints can include laying out circulation networks and planning for infrastructure that will shape the community's future development and reduce the cost of infrastructure provision over time. Additionally, landowners can be encouraged to use agreed-upon standards, even if the subdivision is informal, by indicating that future infrastructure investments for their settlement will receive a higher priority. Furthermore, establishing mechanisms that allow preservation of "rights of way"—reserving land for utility and transit corridors, markets, schools, and other public uses— will be important.

Where Migrants Work

Migrants primarily work in sectors where there are low barriers to entry. Consequently, the informal sector, where many migrants tend to work, dominates the economy of Africa's urban areas. Significant dissonance between city aspirations and planning systems and pervasive informality often results in widespread exclusionary practices (Chen and Carré 2020). Given the flexible nature of many jobs and migrant livelihoods, this research focuses on spaces where migrants work and how policy and program interventions can improve employment conditions and opportunities, with a view to migrants and nonmigrants alike. An examination of the literature identified four different spatial typologies, often informal, where migrants may work: (1) streets, (2) markets and enterprise hubs, (3) home-based businesses, and (4) hidden and temporary spaces. These spaces are where many migrants enter the workforce, highlighting the challenges migrant workers face in these locations and industries. For example, in Jijiga, Ethiopia, rural migrants are less likely to have permanent wage jobs in the public or private sector or to be self-employed in the formal sector and are instead more likely to work as temporary or casual laborers and in informal self-employment. In Jinja, Uganda, the urban informal sector is a fallback strategy, by which low-skilled migrants can use their limited skills to earn a living. These informal jobs are characterized by poor working conditions, labor intensity, and movement between wage employment and self-employment. A female migrant emphasized in an interview that she has changed employment four times.

Where labor workforce data are available, informal street trading is a substantial share of urban employment (see table 4A.3). In African cities, roughly two-thirds of women working in informal trade are employed in street trading, accounting for about 10 percent to 20 percent of total employment and providing an essential source of livelihood with low barriers to entry (Roever and Skinner 2016). Furthermore, research also highlights the importance of informal trading for food security in cities in Africa (Giroux et al. 2020), and it became increasingly important during the COVID-19 crisis. Research on secondary cities in Nigeria suggests that challenges regarding lack of services and an overall enabling environment are binding constraints on informal traders in

the food sector (Resnick et al. 2019). Potential policies and interventions could include the following:

- *Encouraging government-instigated dialogue with formal and informal trading associations, which is essential for designing and implementing regulations and spatial interventions.* Spatial interventions must be designed with feedback from traders and include piloting and re-envisioning. Creating open and ongoing dialogue with trader associations can be beneficial to municipalities and trader associations alike. For example, working with trader associations to collect data and information on traders and their needs will assist in the process of planning and adapting policies in the future. Trust-building measures should be considered for the success of this dialogue.
- *Adopting regulation and management as opposed to enforcement and criminalization for the informal sector.* A significant challenge when developing and implementing regulations and licensing is to be aware of the barriers to entry for marginalized groups, including migrants. In Jijiga, Ethiopia, for example, a kebele ID is required to obtain a driver's license or business license that would enable formal self-employment. Migrants explained that this meant they could not advance to more lucrative activities that require official permits and licenses. More generally, the income and earnings of street vendors should be considered when assessing their ability to pay fees.
- *Improving safety and public service provision along streets, which can positively impact livelihood and general health and well-being.* Improving access to water and waste collection, for example, can reduce costs and time away from selling. Increasing street lighting and public toilets can be particularly beneficial to women traders.

Markets, both formal and informal, are bustling hubs of activity facilitating the exchange of goods and services (see table 4A.4). Markets throughout Africa can be home to a range of occupations, including specializations such as fabric, foodstuffs, and building materials. They can also take on various urban forms, from the clustering of roadside umbrella stands to formal multistory structures with stalls for rent. Potential policies and interventions include the following:

- *Although* in situ *market upgrading and improved service provision would be preferred by many traders, relocation is often deemed necessary when markets outgrow their space, sometimes creating unsafe conditions.* When relocation becomes necessary, new market spaces should be introduced in central locations. In Kampala, Uganda, close proximity to markets and customers is crucial for the viability of informal sector firms. Importantly, policies seeking to encourage informal firms to move from their current location are unlikely

to succeed because any move away from a large number of customers and foot traffic will affect firm profitability (World Bank 2017). With the spatial expansion of secondary cities, new markets should be proactively planned and designed around transport nodes or other essential nodes. Furthermore, the pandemic has provided an opportunity to develop new ways of organizing trade through collaborative efforts between traders and communities, enabling the emergence of logistics systems that are inclusive and more resilient (Cities Alliance 2021).

- *A participatory design process for upgrading markets can determine the needs and priorities of different trader groups.* Clustering cottage industries together and establishing serviced incubator space can support workers. Service provision should be geared toward the specifics of different trades. The process of formalizing markets often negatively affects many low-income traders who cannot afford to pay rent for market stalls. A potential solution can be tiered levels of stalls or spaces to suit different trades and affordability.
- *Programs to support cottage industries should be implemented in partnership with NGOs, CBOs, and micro-finance institutions already working in the field.* Such programs include vocational training with a responsive curriculum based on the market or clustering of the cottage industry. This approach would be particularly beneficial to migrants seeking further education and training.

Home-based industries are an important and often overlooked sector of the informal economy, particularly for women (see table 4A.5). Home-based businesses can include various occupations, including food preparation and catering, tailoring services, petty trading, artisanal work, or even light manufacturing. Home-based workers are often called the "invisible" workforce because they work alone, are isolated and often scattered, and face challenges in organizing. Potential policies and interventions include the following:

- *Improving service provision throughout these communities.* Better services can have a significant impact on these often-hidden entrepreneurs. Many home-based workers are based in informal settlements where infrastructure is limited, unreliable, or fragmented. Steady electricity for a barber, for example, can significantly increase income-generating potential and reduce the business expense of running a generator.
- *Supporting mixed-use development, which should be a focus for local authorities, especially in supporting the development of new growth in peri-urban and peripheral areas.*
- *Connecting home-based workers with supporting partners.* Home-based workers, many of whom are women, are often not organized into any trader

network, and can have difficulty qualifying for loans from formal financial institutions. These barriers can be addressed with support from NGOs, CBOs, and micro-finance institutions.

Migrants also find employment in less visible and poorly documented spaces (see table 4A.6). Domestic workers are not always covered under labor laws and social protection policies or schemes. Casual or day labor, such as construction jobs, is often temporary, requires minimal training, and therefore has limited social protection. In the Ethiopian case study, the majority of migrants found casual employment in daily labor and construction and, for young women, domestic work. Migrants engaged in domestic work reported that they experienced domestic abuse, long hours of work, and maltreatment by their employers. Another more hidden and often stigmatized employment space for migrants is in the waste sector. This hidden or temporary employment leaves these groups with limited social protections, disconnected from local community groups, and often left out of official policies and programs. Potential policies and interventions include the following:

- *Supporting these workers through local government communication and advocacy campaigns geared toward the most vulnerable.* Many of the workers in these industries, especially migrants new to the city, are not aware of their rights and can be taken advantage of.
- *Programs that benefit waste pickers by recognizing their essential role and integrating them into the formal system.* Waste-to-wealth programs, for example, are becoming more common throughout the global south. Without designated sites and equipment for these workers, they are often well behind international standards, putting themselves and their families at risk.

By focusing on the spaces where migrants work, city officials can craft policies and programs that improve working conditions unique to these different industries and the spaces and places in the city, including streets, markets and enterprise hubs, home-based businesses, and hidden and temporary spaces.

Conclusion

City leaders can leverage the benefits of migration for city development. Ample literature suggests that the benefits of migration are large for migrants, nonmigrants, and city leaders alike when integration is strong. Hence, rather than fearing inflows of migrants, city leaders can take proactive measures that facilitate their integration into the city and improve the overall quality of life in their cities. Doing so can help turn migrant-induced density into a positive force of agglomeration and job creation.

The key to ensuring migrant integration into the socioeconomic fiber of cities lies in good urban management, which prepares for growth and benefits all citizens regardless of their migrant status. Absorbing migrants into a city is part of the larger issue of how well municipalities manage the delivery of services for an expanding population of migrants and nonmigrants. Although migrants can affect the size and speed of growth of a secondary city and the demand for services, municipalities typically lack an understanding of the actual composition and scale of this growth. Understanding key migration dynamics and how they shape the municipality's growth and development is essential to prioritizing services that have the highest impact in fostering the integration of migrants. Effective local leadership and cooperation with other governmental and nongovernmental agencies can help local authorities maximize their margin of maneuverability when developing programs. Effective population policies, including female empowerment and access to contraceptives, to manage growth from urban natural increase are also crucial.

Targeted interventions aimed at migrants may be needed where information bottlenecks exist. To ensure that migrants know their rights and responsibilities, communication campaigns can be designed to ensure that incoming households have all the information they need to act as an integral part of the community.

A focus on migrant needs with the objective of improving the city as a whole can inform the design of policy and investment interventions. This chapter discusses how a focus on where migrants live and where they work can help identify bottlenecks to their successful integration into the city's social and economic activities. However, the policies and investments targeted at such places, while taking account of migrant needs, should be designed with a pan-urban approach to ensure that no additional barriers are created that build spaces for migrants alone. Instead, interventions should aim to create spaces that facilitate integration and interaction between different groups in the cities.

Annex 4A Additional Tables

Local Government Actions

Table 4A.1 Applying a Migrant Focus to National Urban Policies

Policy sector	National urban policy recommendations	Potential impact on migrants
Data collection and analysis	Collect data and evidence that include the informal sector to better reflect low-income and marginalized groups in allocating funding	Better information on where migrants and nonmigrants, work and live can help improve governments' understanding of their challenges and improve policy design for the benefit of all.
Finance and budgeting	Adopting a fiscal strategy that increases public budgets across all government levels clarifies subnational agencies' ability to engage different financing mechanisms.	Creating predictability in central transfers and opportunities for municipalities to raise their development funds can increase the capacity of local governments to package funding for projects that affect migrants.
Infrastructure	Develop infrastructure strategies that align with spatial plans and promote community-led solutions to essential services and economic opportunities	Distributive and networked infrastructure that includes new technologies for renewable energy and local sanitation options can reduce the costs of services for lower-income communities that include migrants.
Land rights and tenure	Link spatial planning and tenure strategies to open opportunities for land-based financing and provide tenure security to enhance the productivity and resilience of low-income and marginalized groups that include migrants.	Land rights and tenure are essential given that migrants often begin their journey within the spatial and economic informal sectors.
Service provision framework	Increase the capacity of and resources allocated to urban governments and codify commitments into law.	Clarifying mandates and responsibilities within a multigovernance structure can improve migrants' and nonmigrants' access to services that are delivered by local, regional, and central government agencies.
Social justice and human rights	Create a culture of rights and social justice to manage inevitable competition for space, markets, and services.	Outlining the legal rights of migrants is essential to their ability to access basic services, including health care, education, and continuing education away from their place of origin.
Spatial planning	National urban policies can clarify spatial planning strategies across government tiers and how land is acquired for public interests as cities grow.	Defining and clarifying spatial planning responsibilities can significantly improve management of the spatial development of a municipality.

Sources: Cartwright et al. 2018; and World Bank.

Table 4A.2 Municipal Capacity: What Can Be Done?

Programs and interventions	Benefits to migrants	Challenges for municipality	Diagnostics and tools
Spatial tools: Planning, infrastructure, and services			
• Incorporate realistic demographic data and growth projections that account for the impact of migration in different areas of the municipality • Undertake self-assessments and urban audits • Integrate informal settlements into the planning process • Improve multimodal connectivity, including pedestrians • Consider distributed and networked infrastructure (energy, water, waste) with community co-ownership and maintenance agreements with the municipality	• More realistic spatial development that considers growth pressures from different stages of migration • Improved services and infrastructure • Reduced commuting costs and time	• Updating data to understand trends and patterns • Working with existing community structures, prioritizing investments, and developing flexible regulatory frameworks for upgrading informal settlements • Creating alternative regulatory frameworks and financing mechanisms for community-based and distributive networks	• See Farvacque-Vitkovic and Kopanyi 2019 for self-assessment tools that include an urban audit • The City Resilience Action Planning Tool (CityRAP), UN-Habitat, https://unhabitat.org/city-resilience-action-planning-tool-cityrap
Budgeting and finance			
• Undertake self-assessments • Improve municipal own source financing for capital investments • Prioritize projects with targeted funding from internal and external sources • Public-private partnerships for markets where migrants work • Land-based financing that includes informal settlements	• Job creation and pathways to stable income • Creation of rental housing opportunities and pathways to land ownership and permanent housing options • Targeted interventions that address migrant needs	• Integrating the formal and informal sectors • Coordinating and maintaining infrastructure across sectors • Mobilizing, leveraging, and packaging funding from multiple sources	• See Farvacque-Vitkovic and Kopanyi 2019 for self-assessment tools that include an urban audit

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Table 4A.2 Municipal Capacity: What Can Be Done? (continued)

Programs and interventions	Benefits to migrants	Challenges for municipality	Diagnostics and tools
Inclusive development: Economic inclusion			
• Public-private partnerships for municipal-level economic infrastructure, such as transportation hubs, workspaces, and markets • Regular dialogue with existing active private sector groups and associations to improve the environment for business and alleviate the constraints local firms face • Involve community and private sector associations in producing local development plans • Raise awareness of locally available sources of finance for small firms • Provide business development services to informal enterprises, for example, financial literacy training, business plan development, cooperative establishment, collective bargaining, and quality upgrading advice	• Increased job opportunities and services (if well located) • Increased visibility and awareness of migrant needs in the business environment • Improved skills for migrants to increase employment opportunities • Access to micro-finance to expand migrant-run businesses	• Models for funding and enabling a regulatory framework • Outreach to formal and informal firms • Development of processes and training staff to engage local firms when developing local area plans	• "Informal Economy Budget Analysis," Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO), https://www.wiego.org/informal-economy-budget-analysis • "Local Economic Development in Practice," UN-Habitat https://unhabitat.org/local-economic-development-in-practice • "Circle City Scan Tool," International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives, https://iclei.org/circle_city_scan_tool
Spatial tools: Land tenure and administration			
• Strengthen land administration systems, including the application of new technologies to improve documentation, information storage and retrieval, and valuation • Recognize and address barriers for municipalities to assemble land and finance infrastructure that can generate local economic development • Improve and streamline registration • Use communal land tenure and customary land tenure systems	• Improves pathways to secure land tenure and more diverse housing opportunities • Fosters labor demand for sectors that employ migrants • Recognizes existing settlements where migrants live and improves pathways to secure land tenure	• Operationalizing new technologies within existing regulatory frameworks • Capacity limitations and corruption • Structuring diverse funding sources and innovative community public-private partnerships for distributed and networked infrastructure • Changing legal frameworks and national land registration policies that affect local development	• Various tools to strengthen land administration, for example, the Social Tenure Domain Model, from the Global Land Tool Network https://stdm.gltn.net

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Table 4A.2 Municipal Capacity: What Can Be Done? (continued)

Programs and interventions	Benefits to migrants	Challenges for municipality	Diagnostics and tools
Inclusive development: Institutional capacity			
• Capacity building for civil servants and staff on technical skills for functions such as social service provision or data collection that affect migration policies and projects • Knowledge sharing on the benefits and challenges of migration to the local economy and urban environment	• Integrates migrants into municipal programs • Reduces negative viewpoints regarding migrants and increases knowledge regarding central and local programs that benefit migrants and their integration	• High staff turnover • Funding for programs, identifying curriculum and training partners • Developing locally contextualized curriculum and training materials • Identifying effective platforms for exchanging relevant practices	• See Blaser Mapitsa and Landau 2019
Inclusive development: Coordination and partnerships			
• Align local and central government programs, projects, and budgets to take migration trends and the needs of migrant populations into account • Partner with universities to increase scholarship and teaching on migration • Support CBOs' and NGOs' services in vocational training and micro-credit programs	• Integrated and silo-busting program implementation • Leveraging scarce funding sources • Access to action research, additional capacity, coordinating and leveraging diverse research agendas that address migration, for example, land, infrastructure, housing, local economic development, and so on • Sustainability and alignment of programs across CBOs, broader outreach by local government to marginalized groups, greater program reach and leveraging of funds and resources	• Coordinating and aligning multistakeholder interests • Funding sources for university involvement • Programming common elements among different neighborhoods and sectors to increase cost effectiveness, institutional capacity, and impact • Managing political interests to avoid capture by special groups	• See Blaser Mapitsa and Landau 2019

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Table 4A.2 Municipal Capacity: What Can Be Done? (continued)

Programs and interventions	Benefits to migrants	Challenges for municipality	Diagnostics and tools
Spatial tools: Health and education			
• Integrate children of migrant families into primary and secondary schools • Improve access to health services and develop innovative delivery systems targeting marginalized groups, including migrants	• Increased education and mobility • Access to more targeted, preventive, and affordable health care	• Aligning national and local regulations regarding attendance • Funding of capital and staffing costs and access to land and services • Existing barriers such as registration and identification	• See UN-Habitat and WHO 2020
Inclusive development: Social inclusion and consultation			
• Community outreach and surveys that target migrants, for example, focus groups during evening hours and weekends • Partner with CBOs and NGOs working with migrant communities and associations • Improve information and transparency regarding services such as health, vocational training, credit programs, and the like	• Migrant priorities and potential contributions included in projects • Sensitizing and expanding municipal capacity to develop and implement programs benefiting migrants • Increased access to services	• Staffing, time, and funding for additional outreach • Recognizing the value of collaborative frameworks and working with civil society • Resources and availability of information and know-how on targeting marginalized groups	• "Community-Driven Development Toolkit: Governance and Accountability Dimensions," World Bank • See UN-Habitat 2021
Data access and management			
• Mainstream migration into surveying and data collection • Partner with trade associations, NGOs, and CBOs that collect urban poverty data • Align data collection among central government ministries and local government departments, including migration data • Increase the transparency of local regulations, fees, and taxes	• Integration and inclusion of migrant needs and priorities into spatial planning and programs • Recognition and understanding of the role of the informal economies and settlements in which migrants work and live • Migrants included in planning and budgetary considerations • Increased knowledge of regulatory process and fees	• Building skills and providing training to municipalities and communities in data collection • Making new technologies available to municipalities and NGOs • Developing trust and accountability regarding data sharing • Providing up-to-date access via different platforms (web-based, digital, and paper)	• Monitoring urban growth—Africapolis; Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project; the Atlas of Urban Expansion; and the WorldPop project • "Know Your City Campaign," Slum Dwellers International

Source: World Bank.
Note: CBO = community-based organization; NGO = nongovernmental organization.

Table 4A.3 Improvements to Public Spaces—Streets

Component	Benefit to migrants	Challenges for municipality
Trading space		
• Designate spaces for street traders with temporary sheds, shading, or covers • Consider complete street design interventions inclusive of street trading for all transport modes	• Creation of safe spaces for traders, especially for new migrants, to work and store supplies	• Developing management and financing protocols
Regulations		
• Establish street vending regulations to allow secure trading spaces near transport locations and public squares • Establish neutral enforcement agents and user-friendly appeal processes	• Formalization and security for street traders and increased income opportunities	• Developing transparent protocols for implementation and monitoring
Outreach and communication		
• Promote local government dialogue with street trader associations • Establish institutional space for trader associations to play an active role in monitoring licensing and regulations and in resolving disputes or issues that arise on an ongoing basis	• Increase trust with local government and create solutions-based dialogue among typically contentious actors	• Developing a proactive, systematic outreach policy
Financial support		
• Organize credit and savings groups	• Availability of flexible and often short-term capital for traders creates a financial and social safety net	• Finding partners among nongovernmental organizations, community-based organizations, and micro-finance institutions
Safety		
• Improve street lighting	• Improves safety and security of traders and migrants, especially women, thereby increasing working hours and opportunities	• Maintenance and management of street lighting
Public infrastructure and services		
• Increase the provision of public toilets and water	• Improves health and well-being of traders, particularly women. Reduces costs and time away from customers	• Maintenance and management of infrastructure

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Table 4A.3 **Improvements to Public Spaces—Streets** (continued)

Component	Benefit to migrants	Challenges for municipality
Licensing and permitting		
• Encourage licensing and permitting to regulate trading spaces, not to criminalize traders without licenses • Introduce cashless systems for payment with receipts where possible	• Security for trading and potential to provide training and information on rights and responsibilities • Transparent and accessible information on regulations and rights and submission of complaints	• Enforcement of permitting without criminalizing traders • Creation and management of a permitting system • Establishing fees commensurate with the income and earnings of street vendors and their ability to pay
Data collection		
• Undertake market surveys and data collection on location and types of street traders	• More responsive support programming, recognition of traders, and links to the local economy	• Developing and administering survey instruments and activating data

Source: World Bank.

Table 4A.4 Improvements to Public Spaces—Markets and Enterprise Hubs

Component	Benefit to migrants	Challenges for municipality
Market upgrading		
• Encourage participatory upgrading program to create vibrant, sanitary, accessible, and safe markets and enterprise hubs	• Co-design markets and enterprise hubs to fit the needs of traders, fabricators, shoppers, and municipal regulators	• Time-intensive process • Inclusion of traders in a solutions-focused, not antagonistic, discussion
Market sites		
• Plan and reserve land for markets in key node sites	• Accessible and well-located markets as the urban area develops	• Developing temporary uses to protect sites from encroachment
Transport and mobility		
• Plan well-designed layouts for transport or taxi mobility in proximity to markets and enterprise hubs	• Reduced conflict over use of space, decreased congestion surrounding markets, and increased mobility for goods traders and shoppers	• Planning for mobility and identifying well-located sites
Service provision		
• Improve service provision for markets, accounting for unique industry needs	• Access to water, electricity, and solid waste disposal geared toward market activities (for example, food preparation, clothing, and tailoring, among others)	• Financing and maintaining investments
Affordability		
• Incorporate affordable market stalls, such as tiered level of stalls or spaces for different trades and costs	• Allow for entry at all levels, especially for migrants	• Developing fee system that considers the income and earnings of traders and ability to pay
Public and social services		
• Increase the provision of public facilities and social services, for example, public toilets and daycare	• Particularly beneficial for women	• Financing • Responsive design and maintenance
Safety		
• Improve storage, lighting, and security	• More secure goods • Enhances safety of traders and shoppers • Allows markets to remain open after dark	• Financing • Responsive design and maintenance

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Table 4A.4 Improvements to Public Spaces—Markets and Enterprise Hubs (continued)

Component	Benefit to migrants	Challenges for municipality
Training and skills-building programs		
• Provide vocational training with responsive curriculum based on the market or clusters of cottage industries	• Access to training to upskill and improve employment opportunities	• Matching skills training to the needs of local enterprises (formal and informal)
Communication and outreach		
• Promote dialogue among government and market or cottage industry associations	• Proactive engagement to provide feedback on needs and priorities	• Establishing a systematic outreach program and identifying the associations
Micro-enterprise support		
• Establish micro-enterprise workspace programs—incubator space and support and clustering enterprises with similar profiles	• Secure, safe, and serviced locations • Opportunity to access credit and training, including marketing	• Financing • Establishing well-located and accessible sites • Providing programming
Microfinance		
• Expand access to credit geared to migrants and small-scale fabricators who employ migrants	• Ability to scale up and increase employment opportunities	• Financing • Finding micro-finance partners • Managing the program
Data collection		
• Undertake market surveys and data collection on location and types of enterprises, both formal and informal	• More responsive support programming, recognition of enterprises, and related forward and backward links to the local economy	• Developing and administering survey instruments and activating data

Source: World Bank.

Table 4A.5 **Improvements in City Management That Can Help Home-Based Businesses**

Component	Benefit to migrants	Challenges for municipality
Zoning and land use		
• Encourage zoning for home-based enterprises in formal and informal settlements • Establish mixed-use zoning	• Direct income-generating potential • Access to employment and income-generation activities in proximity to home	• Finding best practices to develop responsive zoning and avoid health and safety conflicts
Infrastructure		
• Improve service provision, that is, electricity and water	• Access to basic services, including solid waste disposal and electricity	• Financing and maintenance • Focusing on service provision and infrastructure for informal settlements
Microfinance		
• Expand access to credit and savings groups	• Availability of flexible and often short-term capital for traders creates a financial and social safety net	• Finding partners among nongovernmental organizations, community-based organizations, and micro-finance institutions
Data collection		
• Undertake household surveys and data collection on location and types of home-based industries	• More responsive support programming, recognition of home-based enterprises, and related forward and backward links to the local economy	• Developing and administering survey instruments and activating data

Source: World Bank.

Table 4A.6 Improvements in Waste Management

Component	Benefit to migrants	Challenges for municipality
Workspace		
• Designate adequate spaces for waste pickers to sort and store collected materials	• Creates safe spaces for sorting and storing waste away from the home	• Identifying accessible and safe spaces and reserving them for waste management
Formalization		
• Encourage programs that recognize and support the role of waste pickers in the formal recycling system, such as waste to wealth	• Reduces stigma for their work. Increases income and accessibility to formal systems	• Developing and managing a waste management system that incorporates marginalized groups
Communication and outreach		
• Develop local government outreach programs that encourage dialogue with waste pickers and informal labor associations	• Proactive engagement to provide feedback on needs and priorities	• Establishing a systematic outreach program and identifying associations
• Establish "know your rights" program for domestic workers	• Transparent and accessible information on rights and social protection	• Developing an accessible media strategy and platform for the most vulnerable
Data collection		
• Undertake surveys and data collection on marginalized informal sectors	• More responsive support programming, recognition of informal sectors and related forward and backward links to the local economy	• Developing and administering survey instruments and activating data

Source: World Bank.

Table 4A.7 Typologies for Settlements Where Migrants Settle

Component	Densely developed inner-city area	Consolidated peripheral area	Newly developing, peripheral settlement
Age of settlement	Well established: 20+ years	15+ years	Less than 10 years
Location	Close to the city center and commercial business district Walking distance to central market	Relative proximity to the city center: 15 minutes by car or public transit; 45-minute walk	Generally, on the edge of the municipality: 20 minutes or more by car or public transit; 1 hour + walk.
Population density	High	Moderate	Low
Growth rate	Low or stable	Moderate to high, 5 percent or more	High, 10 percent or more
Housing market	Predominantly rental with high turnover	Mixed: original homeowners and renters seeking higher-quality rentals	Primarily new homeowners who will also rent
Transportation	Dense and narrow internal paths with limited motor access Close proximity to public transit and transport nodes	Dense and narrow internal paths with several motorable access roads Accessible public transit within walking distance	At least one major arterial access road through or adjacent to the community, and unplanned internal circulation network
Infrastructure	Public and communal provision	Piecemeal provision with limited access to public networks	Limited and self-provided
Schools	Accessible and overcrowded	Accessible and overcrowded	Lacking
Health centers	Good access	Limited access	Lacking

Source: Andreasen et al. 2017; World Bank.

Table 4A.8 **Improving Densely Developed Inner-City Areas**

Component	Benefit to migrants	Challenges for municipality
Settlement improvements		
• Encourage *in situ* improvement of urban neighborhoods to leverage existing capital investments, including private sector housing and rental units	• Expands the supply of housing stock and rental opportunities for migrants close to employment opportunities • Reduces overcrowding	• Gentrification, pricing migrants out of the area over time • Identifying funding sources within the municipality and the community • Possible relocation of businesses or homes to allow for improved infrastructure
Infrastructure		
• Promote incremental improvements to infrastructure o Public toilets, wells, boreholes, drainage, solid waste o Electrification including solar—benefits local economic development and education opportunities at home o Laundry and washing facilities • Develop in partnership with the community, NGOs, and migrants, communal sense of ownership is key to the sustainability of improvements	• Increases health and well-being of community	• Coordination of and cost-sharing improvements with the community to increase access to basic services • Matching outreach to when migrants are home, especially migrants who are newcomers or not permanent residents
Transportation and circulation		
• Improve transportation and access in and out of the community. Identify smaller interventions that enhance accessibility, improve road safety, and open circulation networks; pave streets; improve drainage; and locate (reserve) space for bus stops and transit nodes • Work with community to identify choke points that can be improved for pedestrian and vehicular circulation, including motorized and nonmotorized city-specific modes such as motor scooter trucks, boats, and bicycles	• Reduces the cost and time of commuting to employment opportunities. Increases safe pedestrian access to employment centers, markets, and transportation nodes	• Compensation and relocation costs in dense communities
Market sites		
• Reserve land for community market sites with basic infrastructure (water, electricity, and solid waste collection)	• Increases access to food and employment	• Finding locations and utilities; maintaining facilities

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Table 4A.8 Improving Densely Developed Inner-City Areas (continued)

Component	Benefit to migrants	Challenges for municipality
Educational, social, and cultural services		
• Provision and maintenance of vocational training centers, youth centers with training opportunities, and schools • Systematic partnering with existing NGOs and CBOs to provide and manage services	• Opportunities for skill enhancement • Fills gaps in local government delivery	• Finding locations and utilities; maintaining facilities
Safety		
• Improve street lighting	• Improves safety and security of traders and migrants, especially women, thereby increasing working hours and opportunities	• Retrofitting existing electrical infrastructure and on-going maintenance
Zoning and development regulations		
• Recognize informal settlements in city planning and sectoral improvements • Promote mixed uses, especially along commercial streets, and in-home enterprises	• Protects neighborhoods where migrants move • Increases employment opportunities from home, especially for women	• Capacity to undertake long-term planning • Political will required to shift planning practice to include informal settlements in development planning
Rental housing market		
• Introduce or improve rental regulations and create more transparent rental markets	• Housing security and quality, improved framework for accountability with landlords	• Applying regulations within informal markets
Land ownership and tenure		
• Consider interim and communal solutions that provide tenure security and stimulate housing investment to increase the supply of rental units	• Preserves neighborhoods where migrants live and increases housing options	• Requires coordination with central ministries • Development of interim solutions • Potential displacement of marginalized migrants, particularly renters and subletters

Source: World Bank.
Note: CBO = Community-based organization; NGO = nongovernmental organization.

Table 4A.9 **Improving Consolidated Peripheral Areas**

Component	Benefit to migrants	Challenges for municipality
Settlement improvements		
• Encourage proactive *in situ* improvement of neighborhoods to guide development and capital investments, especially housing and rental income	• Expands the supply and range of rental opportunities for migrants close to employment opportunities • Reduces overcrowding	• Gentrification, pricing migrants out of the area over time • Possible relocation of some businesses or homes to allow for improved infrastructure
Infrastructure		
• Complementary and incremental improvements of infrastructure to accommodate foreseen densities • Supplement existing infrastructure investments, redirecting and guiding small-scale water and sanitation among parcels • Promote investments in partnership among community, local governments, NGOs, and migrants, communal "ownership" is key to sustainability of improvements	• Increases health, well-being, and housing options	• Technical issues of working with existing, fragmented infrastructure networks in different and overlapping jurisdictions • Financing and maintenance challenges • Impacts or improvements to rental housing available to migrants
Transportation and circulation		
• Improve transportation and access in and out of the community with link to major arterials and transport corridors • Encourage small interventions that enhance accessibility, open circulation networks, pave streets, improve drainage, plan (reserve space) for bus stops and transit nodes • Work with community to identify circulation choke points that can be improved for pedestrian and vehicular circulation	• Reduces the cost and time of commuting to employment opportunities by improving access to central employment locations • Increases safe pedestrian access to markets and transportation nodes	• Compensation and relocation costs
Market sites		
• Reserve land for community market sites with basic infrastructure—water, electricity, and solid waste collection	• Increases access to food and employment	• Finding locations and utilities; maintaining facilities • Maintaining affordability for marginalized traders

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Table 4A.9 Improving Consolidated Peripheral Areas (continued)

Component	Benefit to migrants	Challenges for municipality
Educational, social, and cultural services		
• Provision and maintenance of vocational training centers, youth centers with training opportunities, and schools • Systematic partnering with existing NGOs and CBOs to address needs	• Opportunities for skill enhancement • Fills gaps in local government delivery	• Reserving space for future facilities and allowing temporary uses • Lack of funding
Safety		
• Improve street lighting	• Safety and security of traders and migrants, especially women, thereby increasing working hours and opportunities	• Retrofitting existing electrical infrastructure, maintenance
Zoning and development regulations		
• Recognize informal settlements in city planning and sectoral improvements • Promote mixed uses, especially along commercial streets, and in-home enterprises • Consider regularization strategies to improve circulation networks; explore community-led reblocking, preliminary registration, and eventual title	• Protects neighborhoods where migrants move and relocate • Increases employment opportunities from home, especially for women	• Capacity of local governments to undertake long-term planning • Shift in practice to include informal and emerging settlements in development planning
Rental housing market		
• Introduce or improve rental regulations and create more transparent rental markets	• Housing security and quality, improved framework for accountability with landlords	• Applying regulations within informal markets
Land ownership and tenure		
• Streamline registration process to provide security of tenure and stimulate housing investment • Address backlog in registration, try to get ahead and bring properties onto the tax rolls • Create incentive programs for re-blocking, including informal division by larger landowners, for example, maintain rights of way or access easements	• Preserves neighborhoods where migrants establish themselves	• Coordination with central ministries • Development of interim solutions • Potential displacement of marginalized migrants, particularly renters and subletters

Source: World Bank.
Note: CBO = community-based organization; NGO = nongovernmental organization.

Table 4A.10 **Improving Newly Developing Peripheral Settlements**

Component	Benefit to migrants	Challenges for municipality
Infrastructure		
• Develop incremental servicing strategies to accommodate foreseen densities • Guide small-to-medium scale water and sanitation networks • Establish or strengthen community networks	• Increases health and well-being • Increases range of housing options for migrants	• Technical issues of working with existing fragmented networks • Financing and maintenance challenges • Balancing the impact on the rental housing market
Transportation and circulation		
• Anticipate transportation and access in and out of the community and links with major arteries and transport corridors	• Reduces the cost and time of commuting to employment opportunities by improving access to central employment locations • Increases safe pedestrian access to markets and transportation nodes	• Identifying growth areas and reserving land for transport nodes and bus stops
Market sites		
• Reserve land for community market sites with basic infrastructure—water, electricity, solid waste collection	• Increases access to food and employment	• Finding locations and utilities; maintaining facilities • Maintaining affordability for marginalized traders
Educational, social, and cultural services		
• Increase access to existing facilities that may be out of the area and reserve space for future facilities, including schools, community and youth centers, and vocational training institutions	• Opportunities for skill enhancement • Fills gaps in local government delivery	• Reserving space for future facilities and activating with temporary uses • Funding
Safety		
• Plan for street lighting	• Improves safety and security of traders and migrants, especially women, thereby increasing working hours and opportunities	• Retrofitting existing electrical infrastructure, maintenance

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Table 4A.10 Improving Newly Developing Peripheral Settlements (continued)

Component	Benefit to migrants	Challenges for municipality
Zoning and development regulations		
• Recognize informal settlements in city planning and sectoral improvements • Anticipate mixed uses, including subsistence agriculture and in-home enterprises • Anticipate and plan for circulation networks, explore community-led reblocking as needed, and ties to registration and eventual title	• Protects neighborhoods where migrants move and relocate • Income-generating opportunities, including small-scale farming, especially for women	• Capacity to undertake long-term planning • Shift in practice to include informal and emerging settlements in development planning
Land ownership and tenure		
• Streamline registration process to provide security of tenure and stimulate housing investment • Create incentive programs for subdivision processes, including informal division by larger landowners, for example, maintain rights of way or access easements	• Preserves neighborhoods where migrants establish themselves • Supports migrants in becoming landowners	• Coordination with central ministries • Development of interim solutions • Potential displacement of marginalized migrants, particularly renters and subletters
Coordination among adjacent municipalities		
• Undertake joint planning initiatives to identify the potential for shared facilities and infrastructure provision • Ensure links among road networks to maintain efficient local and regional circulation networks • Coordinate land use plans along development corridors and identify development nodes	• Availability of services • Improves access to jobs and lower transportation costs	• Policy coordination and resource sharing

Source: World Bank.

Notes

1. The *hukou* system in China, which prevents rural-urban migrants from accessing public social services at destination, impedes the human capital accumulation of migrant children (Sieg, Yoon, and Zhang 2020).
2. Coming out of Habitat III policy recommendations in 2016, National Urban Policies (NUPs) were developed as an implementation tool for the New Urban Agenda; in Africa, NUPs are in the early stages of development. As of 2020, 38 African countries had enacted NUPs; 21 countries had explicit National Urban Strategies; and another 17 were in pre-implementation stages (Pieterse, Haysom, and Crush 2020). In many West African countries, NUPs rarely reflect on migration and the diverse functions of cities and urban neighborhoods—particularly informal settlements—in the context of human mobility (Dick and Schraven 2021).
3. Although formal status tends to be associated with larger scale and higher productivity, many formal firms in developing countries also stay small and unproductive, while a number of informal firms are productive and promising (Ulyssea 2018). The key is better organizational forms, either through internalization of interactions with input and output markets into more structured, larger units of economic entities, as firms typically do, or through other organizational forms, such as associations, cooperatives, online platforms, and inclusive value chain developments, as is often observed in agriculture (Saliola et al., forthcoming).
4. In Uganda, 85 percent of total transfers are conditional grants (Dillinger and White 2018).

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Research on migration and urban development in Africa has primarily focused on larger cities and rural-to-urban migration. However, 97 percent of Africa's urban centers have fewer than 300,000 inhabitants, and a sizable share of urban migrants come from other urban areas. A more holistic and dynamic perspective, incorporating migration flows along the full urban hierarchy, as well as urban-urban migrants, is needed to better understand and leverage migration for urban development.

Migrants, Markets, and Mayors: Rising above the Employment Challenge in Africa's Secondary Cities draws on demographic data, research literature, key informant interviews, and empirical research to better understand how migrants in Africa's secondary cities fare in urban labor markets, how they affect aggregate urban productivity, and how mayors can leverage migrants' potential to the benefit of all. It explores these questions across countries and four urban case settings: Jijiga in Ethiopia, Jinja in Uganda, and Jendouba and Kairouan in Tunisia.

Although mayors in secondary cities often see migrants as a burden to their cities' labor markets and a threat to development, the report finds that migrants contribute increasingly less to urban population growth and that they usually strengthen the resident labor force. The report also finds that labor market outcomes for migrants are at least as good as those for nonmigrants.

Africa's secondary cities are well placed to leverage migration, but evidence-based policies are needed to manage the growth and development of land and labor markets. The report reviews policy options that mayors can take to strengthen the financial, technical, and planning capacity of secondary cities and better leverage migration to benefit migrants and nonmigrants alike.

Much of the literature on migration to cities examines migration in a nonspatial fashion or focuses on rural-urban migration to the largest, most visible cities. This volume fills a gap by focusing on migration to secondary cities, coming up with a compelling set of facts. Overall, the volume is very well done and sets a benchmark for future research.

– **J. Vernon Henderson**, *School Professor of Economic Geography, London School of Economics*

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